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Essays on information acquisition
Weijie Zhong
This dissertation studies information acquisition when the choice of information is fully
flexible. Throughout the dissertation, I consider a theoretical framework where a decision
maker (DM) acquires costly information (signal process) about the payoffs of different al-
ternatives before making a choice. In Chapter 1 ., I solve a general model where the DM
pays a cost that depends on the rate of uncertainty reduction and discounts delayed pay-
offs. The main finding is that the optimal signal process resembles a Poisson signal —
the signal arrives occasionally according to a Poisson process, and it drives the inferred
posterior belief to jump discretely. The optimal signal is chosen to confirm the DM’s
prior belief of the most promising state. Once seeing the signal, the decision maker is
discretely surer about the state and stops learning immediately. When the signal is oth-
erwise absent, the decision maker becomes gradually less sure about the state, and con-
tinues learning by seeking more precise but less frequently arriving signals. In Chapter 2 .,
I study the sequential implementation of a target information structure. I characterize
the set of decision time distributions induced by all signal processes that satisfy a per-
period learning capacity constraint on the rate of uncertainty reduction. I find that all
decision time distributions have the same mean, and the maximal and minimal elements
by mean-preserving spread order are exponential distribution and deterministic distri-
bution. The result implies that when the time preference is risk loving (e.g. standard or
hyperbolic discounting), Poisson signal is optimal since it induces the riskiest exponential
decision time distribution. When time preference is risk neutral (e.g. constant delay cost),
all signal processes are equally optimal. In Chapter 3., I relax the assumption on informa-
tion cost by assuming that the measure of signal informativeness is an indirect measure
from sequential minimization. I first show that an indirect information measure is sup-
ported by sequential minimization iff it satisfies: 1) monotonicity in Blackwell order, 2)
sub-additivity in compound experiments and 3) linearity in mixing with no information.
Then I study a dynamic information acquisition problem where the cost of information
depends on an indirect information measure and the delay cost is fixed (the DM is time-
risk neutral). The optimal strategy is to acquire Poisson type signals. The result implies
that when the cost of information is measured by an indirect measure, Poisson signals
are intrinsically cheaper than other signal processes. Chapter 4. introduces a set of useful
technical results on constrained information design that is used to derive the main results
in the first three chapters.
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Introduction
This dissertation considers the following question: what is the optimal way to acquire
information over time to learn about the payoffs of different options? This is a very clas-
sic question that has been extensively studied in the literature starting from Wald (1947.)
and Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949.). However, we still do not have a complete
answer to this question, as the conventional approaches have been searching within very
limited types of information, e.g. many models consider only Brownian motion type in-
formation. Typically, papers in the literature study the optimal choice of “when to stop
learning” taken a specific process of information as given, or the optimal control of a
specific parameter of a given parametric family of information processes.
The goal of this dissertation is to answer the question by searching among all con-
ceivable types of information, and completely endogenize the information acquisition
strategy.
The practical motivation for permitting such flexibility in the type of information is
that in practice the process of information acquisition can often be controlled in multi-
ple aspects. The rapid development in statistics, data science and computer science is
making information acquisition increasingly more flexible. For example, nowadays if a
tech company wants to figure out the market’s response to an internal innovation, it can
launch an A-B test on an online marketing platform, fine-tune hundreds of parameters of
the test design and change them adaptively when data arrives. Another example is that
FDA recently published its guidance of adaptive design for clinical trials (see FDA (2018.)).
The guidance states that clinical trial designs with adaptive sample size, adaptive dose
selection and response-adaptive randomization might improve the efficiency of the trials.
In these examples, there is no a priori reason why some ad hoc restrictions on the type of
information, e.g. the acquired data is generated from a normal distribution, are satisfied.
1
The optimal information acquisition process might generate skewed and fat-tailed data,
which can only be fully covered in a completely flexible information acquisition model.
The theoretical framework for the entire dissertation is a sequential decision making
model building upon the Wald framework. I consider a decision maker who makes a
one-time choice from a set of actions, whose payoffs depend on a state unknown to the
decision maker. The state is initially selected by the nature and remains fixed over time.
At any instant of time, the decision maker chooses whether to stop learning and select an
action or continue learning by choosing nonparametrically an informative signal structure
for the next moment of time. Both delaying the decision and acquiring information are
costly. Of course, hardly any prediction can be made in a model with such generality.
I will proceed by solving this optimization problem, keeping the full generality in the
decision problem and information acquisition, but imposing three different sets of more
restrictive assumptions on the cost of delay and the cost of information in the following
three chapters.
In Chapter 1 ., entitled “Optimal dynamic information acquisition”, I study the case that
(i) the decision maker discounts delayed utilities in a standard way, (ii) the cost of in-
formation depends on how fast the uncertainty about the unknown state is decreasing
(also known as posterior separability). The goal of Chapter 1 . is to fully solve for the op-
timal dynamic information acquisition strategy in a fairly general model with standard
assumptions (discounting and posterior separable cost structure).
There are two main results. The first result states that although the model is non-
parametric and allows fully flexible strategies, the optimal information acquisition strat-
egy modeled as the induced posterior belief process can be restricted to a simple jump-
diffusion processwithout loss. The second result fully characterizes the optimal belief pro-
cess, which involves only a compensated Poisson jump process almost surely. In other
words, it is optimal to conduct experiments that generate skewed and fat-tailed data.
2
Such experiment can be a stress test against the most promising state: Passing the test
is rare but a pass is a conclusive proof that the state is very likely and a corresponding
action should be adopted immediately. Otherwise, failing the test does not immediately
end the test. I also show that conditional on failures, the future tests have higher difficulty
— passing rate is lower but a pass is more precise.
The analysis in Chapter 1 . illustrates that the optimality of Poisson type signal pro-
cesses is a joint implication of the two assumptions in the model: exponential discount-
ing and the information cost structure. Discussion in Appendix A.1.4.1. suggests that the
posterior separability assumptions is essentially a neutrality condition: learning a target
information structure through all equally costly strategies takes the same amount of time
on average. To further understand the roll played by the two assumptions, I generalize
each of them in the following two chapters.
In Chapter 2 . on “Time preference and information acquisition”, I keep the assumption on
information cost and generalize the cost of delay to general convex or concave time cost.
To get tractability in the model with further generality, I impose additional restrictions
that (i) the flow cost of information acquisition is fixed (ii) the target decision rule is fixed.
These restrictions shut down the dynamics of target decision rule and flow cost level, and
highlight the implication of information on decision time. The main result of Chapter 2.
is that for all convex time cost functions, the optimal dynamic information acquisition
strategy is a Poisson signal process that either implements the target decision rule at a Pois-
son rate or generates no information with large probability. For any concave time cost,
the optimal dynamic information acquisition strategy is a pure accumulation strategy that
only accumulates information but makes no decision until a deterministic date. Noticing
that the neutrality condition makes all information acquisition strategy equally efficient
on average. So the key implication of difference strategies is that the Poisson signal pro-
cess induces decision in a riskiest way on the dimension of time: decision is either taken
3
very early on or there is a long delay. On the contrary, the pure accumulation strategy
minimizes time-risk involved in decision making.
Chapter 2 . reveals a key implication of information acquisition: it determines the risk
in the decision making time. Therefore, under the neutrality condition (posterior separa-
bility assumption), all information acquisition strategies induce the same expected deci-
sion time and they only differ in the risks. Then, the preference on information acquisition
strategies is solely pin down by the preference on time risk.
To deepen our understanding about the cost of information, I generalize the assump-
tion on information cost in Chapter 3 . on “indirect information measure and dynamic learn-
ing”. I assume that (i) the cost of delay is linear in time (time-risk neutral) and (ii) the
cost of information depends on an indirect information measure. An indirect information
measure takes an arbitrary cost function of information as primitive, and for each signal
structure derives the minimized expected total cost from a sequence of signal structures
that replicates the original signal structure. In other words, the assumption I put on the
cost of information is essentially that (i) I allow within period sequential minimization
of information measure, (ii) there is increasing marginal cost to the information measure
per period. The main result of Chapter 3 . is that the optimal signal process is a direct
compound Poisson signal: signal arrives according to a Poisson counting process and the
arrival of signal suggests the optimal action directly, where the optimal action profile can
be solved in an equivalent static rational inattention problem.
The analysis in Chapter 3 . suggests that Poisson type information acquisition is not
only the “riskiest” when we restrict the information cost to satisfy neutrality i.e. all learn-
ing strategies to be equally fast, it is also the “fastest” when we relax such restrictions on
information cost, as long as the cost can be justified bywithin period informationmeasure
minimization.
Chapter 4. introduces a set of useful technical results on constrained information de-
4
sign, which are used to characterize the optimal strategies in Chapters 1 . and 3. I character-
ize the set of all combinations of expected value of finite objective functions from design-
ing information. I show that the set is compact, convex and can be implemented by signal
structures with finite support when the state space is finite. Moreover, the set as a corre-
spondence of prior belief is continuous. Based on this result, I develop a concavification
method of Lagrangian that works with general constrained optimization. Other appli-








When individuals make decisions, they often have imperfect information about the
payoffs of different alternatives. Therefore, the decision maker (DM) would like to ac-
quire information to learn about the payoffs prior to making a decision. For example,
when comparing new technologies, a firm may not know the profitability of alternative
technologies. The firm often spends a considerable amount of money and time on R&D
to identify the best technology to adopt. One practically important feature of the infor-
mation acquisition process is that the choice of “what to learn” often involves considering
a rich set of salient aspects. In the previous example, when designing the R&D process, a
firmmay choose which technology to test, howmuch data to collect and analyze, how in-
tensive the testing should be, etc. Other examples include investors designing algorithms
to learn about the returns of different assets, scientists conducting research to investigate
the validity of different hypotheses, etc.
To capture such richness, in this chapter, I consider a DM who can choose “what to
learn” in terms of all possible aspects, as well as “when to stop learning”. Themain goal is
to obtain insight into dynamic information acquisition without restriction onwhat type of
information can be acquired. In contrast to my approach, the classic approach is to focus
on one aspect while leaving all other aspects exogenously fixed. The seminal works by
Wald (1947.) and Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949.) study the choice of “when to stop”
in a stopping problem with all aspects of the learning process being exogenous. Building
upon the Wald framework, Moscarini and Smith (2001.) endogenize one aspect of learn-
ing, the precision, by allowing the DM to control a precision parameter of a Gaussian signal
process. Che and Mierendorff (2016.) endogenize another aspect of learning, the direction,
by allowing the DM to allocate limited attention to different news sources, each biased in
a different direction. Here, by allowing all learning aspects to be endogenous, the current
7
Chapter 1. Optimal dynamic information acquisition
chapter contributes by studying which learning aspect(s) is(are) endogenously relevant
for the DM and how the optimal strategy is characterized in terms of these aspects.
In the model, the DM is to choose from a set of actions, whose payoffs depend on
a state unknown to the DM. The state is initially selected by nature and remains fixed
over time. At any instant of time, the DM chooses whether to stop learning and select
an action or to continue learning by nonparametrically choosing the evolution of the belief
process. The choice of a nonparametric belief process models the choice of a dynamic
information acquisition strategy with no restriction on any aspect. I introduce two main
economic assumptions. (i) The DM discounts delayed payoffs. (ii) Learning incurs a flow
cost, which depends convexly on how fast the uncertainty about the unknown state is
decreasing. The main model is formulated as a stochastic control-stopping problem in
continuous time.
The main result shows that the optimal strategy is contained in a simple family char-
acterized by a few endogenously relevant aspects (Theorem 1.1.) and fully solves for the
optimal strategy in these aspects (Theorems 1.2 . and 1.3.). Specifically, the first result states
that although themodel is nonparametric and allows for fully flexible strategies, the belief
process can be restricted to a simple jump-diffusion process without loss. In other words, a
combination of a Poisson signal—a rare and substantial breakthrough that causes a jump in
belief—and a Gaussian signal—frequent and coarse evidence that drives belief diffusion—
is endogenously optimal. A jump-diffusion belief process is characterized by four param-
eters: the direction, size and arrival rate of the jump, and the flow variance of the diffusion.
The four parameters represent four key aspects of learning: the direction, precision and
frequency of the Poisson signal, and the precision of the Gaussian signal. The first result
suggests that the DM need consider only the trade-offs among these aspects; any other
aspect is irrelevant for information acquisition.
The second result fully characterizes the parameters of the optimal belief process. I
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find that the Poisson signal strictly dominates the Gaussian signal almost surely, i.e. no
resources should ever be invested in acquiring the Gaussian signal. The optimal Poisson
signal satisfies the following qualitative properties in terms of the three aspects and the
stopping time:
• Direction: The optimal direction of learning is confirmatory– the arrival of a Poisson
signal induces the belief to jump toward the state that the DM currently finds to be
most likely. As an implication of Bayes rule, the absence of a signal causes the belief
to drift gradually towards the opposite direction, namely, the DM gradually becomes
less certain about the state.
• Precision: The optimal signal precision is negatively related to the continuation value.
Therefore, when the DM is less certain about the state, the corresponding continuation
value is lower, which leads the DM to seek a more precise Poisson signal.
• Frequency: The optimal signal frequency is positively related to the continuation value.
In contrast to precision, the optimal signal frequency decreases when the DM is less
certain.
• Stopping time: The optimal time to stop learning is immediately after the arrival of
the Poisson signal. Therefore, the breakthrough happens only once at the optimum.
Then, the DM stops learning and chooses an optimal action based on the acquired
information.
The optimal strategy is very heuristic and easy to implement. In the previous example,
the firm can choose the technology to test, as well as the test precision and frequency. As
a result, the optimal strategy is implementable. The optimal R&D process involves test-
ing the most promising technology. The optimal test is designed to be difficult to pass,
so good news comes infrequently, as in a Poisson process. A successful test confirms
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the firm’s prior conjecture that the technology is indeed good and the firm immediately
adopts the technology. Otherwise, the firm continues the R&D process. No good news
is bad news, so the firm becomes more pessimistic about the technology and revises the
choice of the most promising technology accordingly. The future tests involve higher
passing thresholds and lower testing frequency. As illustrated by the example, although
this chapter studies a benchmark with fully flexible information acquisition, the optimal
strategy applies to more general settings where information acquisition is not fully flexi-
ble, but involves these salient aspects.
The main intuition behind the optimal strategy is a novel precision-frequency trade-off.
Consider a thought experiment of choosing an optimal Poisson signal with fixed direc-
tion and cost level. The remaining two parameters—precision and frequency—are pinned
down by the marginal rate of substitution between them. Importantly, the trade-off de-
pends on the continuation value. Due to discounting, when the continuation value is
higher, the DM loses more from delaying the decision. Therefore, the DM finds it op-
timal to acquire a signal more frequently at the cost of lowering the precision to avoid
costly delay. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution of frequency for precision
is increasing in the continuation value. As a result, frequency (precision) is positively
(negatively) related to the continuation value.
In addition to precision and frequency, this intuition also explains other aspects. First,
the Gaussian signal is equivalent to a special Poisson signal with close to zero precision
and infinite frequency. The previous intuition implies that infinite frequency is generally
suboptimal except when the continuation value is so high that the DM would like to sac-
rifice almost all signal precision. As a result, the Gaussian signal is strictly suboptimal
except for the non-generic stopping boundaries. Second, for any fixed learning direction,
Bayes rule implies that the absence of a signal pushes belief away from the target direc-
tion; to ensure the same level of decision quality the signal precision should increase over
10
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time to offset the belief change. By acquiring a confirmatory signal, the DMbecomesmore
pessimistic and, consequently, more patient over time. Therefore she can reconcile both
incentives through reducing the signal frequency and increasing the signal precision. By
contrast, if the DM acquires a contradictory signal, she becomes more impatient over time
and prefers the frequency to be increasing. The two incentives become incongruent, thus,
learning in a confirmatory way is optimal.
This intuition suggests that the crucial assumption for the optimal strategy is dis-
counting — discounting drives the key precision-frequency trade-off. This observation
highlights the deep connection between dynamic information acquisition and the DM’s
attitude toward time-risk. Discounting implies that the DM is risk loving toward payoffs
with uncertain resolution time, as the exponential discounting function is convex. Intu-
itively, the riskiest information acquisition strategy is a “greedy strategy” that front-loads
the probability of success as much as possible, at the cost of a high probability of long
delays. The confirmatory Poisson learning strategy in this chapter exactly resembles a
greedy strategy. The key property of the strategy is that all resources are used in verify-
ing the conjectured state directly and no intermediate step occurs before a breakthrough.
By contrast, alternative strategies, such as Gaussian learning and contradictory Poisson
learning, involve accumulating substantial intermediate evidence to conclude a success.
The intermediate evidence in fact hedges the time risk: the DM sacrifices the possibility
of immediate success to accelerate future learning.
Extensions of the main model further illustrate the role played by each key assump-
tion. The first extension replaces discounting with a fixed flow delay cost. In this spe-
cial case, all dynamic learning strategies are equally optimal, as the crucial precision-
frequency trade-off becomes value independent. This extension also illustrates that all
learning strategies in the model are equally “fast” on average and differ only in “riski-
ness”. This result further illustrates that the preference for time risk pins down the opti-
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mal strategy. Second, I consider general cost structures and find that the (strict) optimality
of a Poisson signal over a Gaussian signal is surprisingly robust: it requires a minimal con-
tinuity assumption. Third, I study an extension where the flow cost depends linearly on
the uncertain reduction speed. In this special case, learning has a constant return to signal
frequency. As a result, the optimal strategy is to learn infinitely fast, that is, acquire all
information at period zero.
This chapter provides rich implications by allowing learning to be flexible in all as-
pects. First, the main results highlight the optimality of the Poisson signal compared to
the widely adopted diffusion models. Specifically, the diffusion models are shown to be
justified only under the lack of discounting. Second, the characterization of the optimal
strategy unifies and clarifies insights from some existing results. In these results, although
the DM is limited in her learning strategy, she actually implements the flexible optimum
whenever feasible and approximates the flexible optimum when infeasible. Moscarini
and Smith (2001.)’s insight that the “intensity” of experimentation increases in continu-
ation value carries over to my analysis. I further unpack the design of experiment and
show that higher “intensity” contributes to faster signal arrival but lower signal precision.
Che and Mierendorff (2016.) make same prediction about the learning direction as that of
my analysis when the DM is uncertain about the state. But they predict the opposite
when the DM is more certain about the state– the DM looks for a signal contradicting the
prior belief. I clarify that the contradictory signal is an approximation of a high-frequency
confirmatory signal when the DM is constrained in increasing the signal frequency.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The related literature is reviewed in
Section 1.2. The main continuous-time model and illustrative examples are introduced
in Section 1.3. The dynamic programming principle and the corresponding Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation are introduced in Section 1.4. I analyze an auxiliary discrete-
time problem and verify the HJB equation in Section 1.5 . Section 1.6 . fully characterizes
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the optimal strategy and illustrates the intuition behind the result. In Section 1.7. I discuss
the key assumptions used in the model. Section 1.8. explores the implications of the main
model on response time in stochastic choice and on a firm’s innovation. Further discus-
sions of other assumptions are presented in Appendix A.1 ., and key proofs are provided
in Appendix A.2. All the remaining proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
1.2 Related literature
1.2.1 Dynamic information acquisition
This chapter is closely related to the literature about acquiring information in a dy-
namic way to facilitate decision making. The earliest works focus on the duration of
learning. Wald (1947.) and Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949.) analyze a stopping prob-
lemwhere the DM controls the decision time and action choice given exogenous informa-
tion. Moscarini and Smith (2001.) extend the Wald model by allowing the DM to control
the precision of a Gaussian signal. A similar Gaussian learning framework is used as the
learning-theoretic foundation for the drift-diffusion model (DDM) by Fudenberg, Strack,
and Strzalecki (2018.). Following a different route, Che andMierendorff (2016.), Mayskaya
(2016.) and Liang, Mu, and Syrgkanis (2017.) study the sequential choice of information
sources, each of which is prescribed exogenously.
Other frameworks of dynamic information acquisition include sequential searchmod-
els (Weitzman (1979.), Callander (2011.), Klabjan, Olszewski, and Wolinsky (2014.), Ke and
Villas-Boas (2016.) and Doval (2018.)) and multi-arm bandit models (Gittins (1974.), Weber
et al. (1992.), Bergemann and Välimäki (1996.) and Bolton and Harris (1999.)). These frame-
works are quite different from my information acquisition model. However, the forms
of information in these models are also exogenously prescribed, and the DM has control
over only whether to reveal each option.
Compared to the canonical approaches, the key new feature of my framework is that
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the DM can design the information generating process nonparametrically. In a similar
vein to this chapter, two concurrent papers Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.) and
Hébert and Woodford (2016.) model dynamic information acquisition nonparametrically;
however they focus on other implications of learning by abstracting from sequentially
smoothing learning. In Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.) the linear flow cost assump-
tion makes it optimal to learn instantaneously, whereas in Hébert and Woodford (2016.),
the no-discounting assumption makes all dynamic learning strategies essentially equiva-
lent.1 . By contrast, the main focus of this chapter is on characterizing the optimal way to
smooth learning. I analyze the setups of these two papers as special cases in Sections 1.7.1 .
and 1.7.3.
A main result of this chapter is the endogenous optimality of Poisson signals. Sec-
tion 1.7.2 . shows a more general result: a Poisson signal dominates a Gaussian signal for
generic cost functions that are continuous in the signal structure. This result justifies Pois-
son learning models, which are used in a wide range of problems, e.g., Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005.), Keller and Rady (2010.), Che andMierendorff (2016.), and Mayskaya (2016.);
see also a survey by Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016.).
1.2.2 Rational inattention
This chapter is a dynamic extension of the static rational inattention (RI) models,
which consider the flexible choice of information. The entropy-based RI framework is
first introduced in Sims (2003.). Mateˇjka and McKay (2014.) study the flexible information
acquisition problem using an entropy-based informativeness measure and justify a gen-
eralized logit decision rule. Caplin and Dean (2015.) take an axiomatization approach and
1Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.) assume the decision problem to be history dependent. Therefore,
non-trivial dynamics remain in the optimal signal process. However, the dynamics are a results of the his-
tory dependence of the decision problem rather than the incentive to smooth information. In the dynamic
learning foundation of Hébert and Woodford (2016.), all signal processes are equally optimal because of a
key no-discount assumption. They select a Gaussian process exogenously to justify a neighbourhood-based
static information cost structure.
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characterize decision rules that can be rationalized by an RI model. On the other hand,
this chapter also serves as a foundation for RI models, as it characterizes, in detail, how
the reduced-form decision rule is supported by acquiring information dynamically. In
several limiting cases, my model completely reduces to a standard RI model.
The RI framework is widely used in models with strategic interactions (Mateˇjka and
McKay (2012.), Yang (2015a.), Yang (2015b.), Mateˇjka (2015.), Denti (2015.), etc). My work
is different from these works as no strategic interaction is considered and the focus is on
repeated learning. Despite the strategic component, Ravid (2018.) also studies a dynamic
model with repeated learning. In Ravid (2018.), an RI buyer learns sequentially about the
offers from a seller and the value of the object being traded. Similar to the DM in my
model, the buyer systematically delays trading in equilibrium, and the stochastic delay
resembles the arrival of a Poisson process.2 . However, in Ravid (2018.), the delay is an
equilibrium property that ensures the buyer’s strategy is responsive to off-path offers. By
contrast, the stochastic delay in my work is a property of an optimally smoothed learning
process.
I use the reduction speed of uncertainty as a measure of the amount of information
acquired per unit time. This measure captures the posterior separability from Caplin and
Dean (2013.). The posterior separable measure nests mutual information (introduced in
Shannon (1948.)) as a special case and is widely used in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014.),
Clark (2016.), Matyskova (2018.), Rappoport and Somma (2017.), etc. I provide an axiom-
atization for posterior separability based on the chain rule in Appendix A.1.4.1 . Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy (2017.) axiomatize (uniform) posterior separability based on behavior
data. Morris and Strack (2017.) provide a dynamic foundation for posterior separability
based on implementing an information structure with Gaussian learning. In addition to
2Precisely speaking, in the analysis of Proposition 2, Ravid (2018.) shows that when quality is determin-
istic, the delay time distribution is exponential, which is the same as the stopping time induced by a Poisson
signal process.
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axiomatizing posterior separability, Frankel and Kamenica (2018.) relates to my work in
another interesting way. The valid measure of information defined in their paper coincides
with the uncertainty reduction speed per unit arrival rate of a Poisson signal derived in
this chapter.
1.2.3 Information design
In this chapter, I use a belief-based approach to model the choice of information.
This approach is widely used for studying Bayesian persuasion models (Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011.), Ely (2017.), Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017.), etc.). An impor-
tant methodology in this literature is the concavification method developed in Aumann,
Maschler, and Stearns (1995.) (based on Carathéodory’s theorem). An alternative ap-
proach to model information is the direct signal approach 3 . used in both information
design problems, such as Bergemann and Morris (2017.), and rational inattention prob-
lems. However, neither of the two methods applies to my dynamic information acqui-
sition problem. I take the belief-based approach as in Bayesian persuasion models, but
utilize a generalized concavification method developed in Chapter 4 .
1.2.4 Stochastic control
Methodologically, this chapter is closely related to the theory of continuous-time stochas-
tic control. The early theories study control processes measurable to the natural filtration
of Brownianmotion (see Fleming (1969.) for a survey). The application of Bellman (1957.)’s
dynamic programming principle leads to the HJB equation characterization of the value
function. On the contrary, the main stochastic control problem of this chapter has general
martingale control process, which is a variant of the (semi)martingalemodels of stochastic
control studied in Davis (1979.), Boel and Kohlmann (1980.), Striebel (1984.), etc. However,
3This approach applies to settings where without loss of generality we can restrict the problem to con-
sidering only signals that are direct recommendations of actions.
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none of the existing theories are sufficiently general to nest the stochastic control problem
studied in this chapter. I introduce an indirect method that proves a verification theorem
for a tractable HJB equation.
1.3 Model setup
The main model is a continuous-time stochastic control problem. A DM chooses an
irreversible action at an endogenous decision time. The DM can control the information
received before the decision time in a flexible manner, bearing a cost on information.
Decision problem: Time t P r0,`8q. The DM discounts the delayed utility with rate
ρ ą 0. The DM is a vNM expected utility maximizer with Bernoulli utility associated with
action-state pair pa, xq P AˆX at time t being e´ρtupa, xq. Both the action space A and the
state space X are finite. The DM holds a prior belief µ P ∆pXq about the state. Define
Fpνq fi maxaPA Eνrupa, xqs given belief ν P ∆pXq.
Information: I model information using a belief-based approach. A distribution of
posterior beliefs is induced by an information structure according to Bayes rule iff the
expectation of posterior beliefs is equal to the prior. Hence, in a static environment the
choice of information can be equivalently formulated as the choice of a distribution of
posterior beliefs (see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011.) for example). Extending this for-
mulation to the dynamic environment studied here, I assume that the DM chooses the
entire posterior belief process xµty in a nonparametric way. Now Bayes’ rule should be
satisfied at every instant of time—@s ą t, the expectation of µs is µt. Thus, I restrict xµty
to be a martingale, with xFty as its natural filtration. A formal justification that choosing
a belief martingale is equivalent to choosing a dynamic information structure is provided
in Appendix A.1.4.
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It is useful to define the following operator Lt for any xµty and f : ∆pXq Ñ R:
















By definition, Lt f captures the expected speed at which f pµtq increases. Let Dp f q be the
domain of xµty on which Lt f pµtq is well defined.4 . For well-behaved Markov process xµty
and Cp2q smooth f , L f is the standard infinitesimal generator (subscript t omitted).
Cost of information: I assume that the flow cost of information depends on how fast
the information reduces uncertainty. The flow cost of information is CpItq, where:
Assumption 1.1. It “ ´LtHpµtq, where H : ∆pXq Ñ R is concave and continuous.
I call H an uncertainty measure—because H is concave iff ErHpµqs captures the Black-
well order on the belief distribution. By Assumption 1.1 ., It is the speed at which un-
certainty falls when the belief updates. I call It the (flow) informativeness measure. One
example of H is the entropy function Hpµq “ ´ř µx logpµxq. Revelation of information
reduces entropy; hence, the entropy reduction speed is a natural measure of the amount
information. Assumption 1.1 . is the main technical assumption in my analysis. I general-
ize this assumption in Section 1.7.2. For further discussions, see Appendix A.1.4., where
I show that it is the continuous-time analog of “posterior separability” and provide an
axiom for posterior separability.











4Formally, xµty P Dp f q if the uniform limit (w.r.t t) exists almost surely. Let D “ Ş fPCp∆XqDp f q. D
contains all Feller processes, whose transition kernels are stochastically continuous w.r.t. t and continuous
w.r.t. state µ. However, D is much more general than Feller processes as it allows the transition kernel to
be discontinuous in state µ.
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whereM is the set of all martingales xµty inDpHqwith cadlag5 . path and satisfying µ0 “ µ,
and τ is a xFty-measurable stopping time.6 .
The objective function in Equation (1.1) . is fairly standard in canonical information ac-
quisition problems. The DM acquires information that affects xµty and chooses stopping










. The novel feature is that the DM is allowed to fully control xµty, in
contrast to canonical models, where the DM controls only a few parameters determining
xµty. The nonparametric control of the belief process exactly captures the flexible design
of information by the DM.
I make the following assumption on the cost function CpIq to generate incentive to
smooth learning over time.
Assumption 1.2. C : R` Ñ R` is weakly increasing, convex and continuous. lim
IÑ8C
1pIq “ 8.
The increasing and continuous cost function assumption is standard. The convex-
ity of CpIq and the condition limC1pIq “ 8 give the DM strict incentive to smooth the
acquisition of information. Given Assumption 1.2., if the DM acquires all information im-
mediately then uncertainty falls at infinite speed and the marginal cost C1pIq is infinite,
hence suboptimal.7 . I solve a special case violating Assumption 1.2. in Section 1.7.3., where
I assume C to be linear. In this case the optimal strategy is to acquire all information at
t “ 0 (a static strategy).
5cadlag: µt : t ÞÑ ∆pXq is right continuous with left limits. Note that assuming martingale xµty being
cadlag can be weakened to assuming xFty being right continuous (see the martingale modification theorem
in Lowther (2009.)).
6I postpone the formal definition of integrability in Equation (1.1) . to Section 1.5.1 . For now, assume that
the integral is well defined for all admissible strategies. Further discussions in Remark A.2 . provide a formal
justification that ignoring the integrability is innocuous.
7A weaker sufficient condition can guarantee information smoothing: supI λI ´ CpIq ą ρ sup F, where
λ “ limIÑ8 CpIqI . This condition explicitly states that when I is sufficiently large, C is sufficiently convex
that the utility gain from smoothing information dominates the loss from waiting longer. All the following
theorems in this chapter are proved under this weaker condition.
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In Example 1.1 ., I present a few examples of canonical Wald-type sequential learning
models, each of which is a variant of Equation (1.1). with additional constraints on the set
of admissible belief processes. Example 1.1 . first illustrates how different learning tech-
nologies can be systematically compared under the same framework with an entropy-
based cost function. The comparison also illustrates why a fully flexible learning frame-
work is useful.
Example 1.1. Let the state be binary X “ tl, ru. The prior belief of state x “ r is µ P p0, 1q.
A “ tL,Ru. The DM wants to choose an action that matches the state: upL, lq “ upR, rq “
1; upL, rq “ upR, lq “ ´1. The discount rate ρ “ 1, H is the standard entropy function:
Hpµq “ ´µ logpµq ´ p1´ µq logp1´ µq, and the information cost CpIq “ 12 I2.
I consider three simple heuristic learning technologies: Gaussian learning, perfectly
revealing breakthroughs and partially revealing evidence. A DM who uses a specific
learning technology is modeled by restricting the admissible control set M to include
only the corresponding family of processes. In each case, the DM controls a parameter
that represents one aspect of learning.
1. Gaussian learning: The signal follows a Brownian motion whose drift is the true state,
and whose variance is controlled by the DM. Therefore, the posterior belief follows a
diffusion process (Bolton and Harris (1999.)), so the set of admissible controls are:
MD “ txµty|dµt “ σtdWtu
TheDM controls the signal precision xσty. According to Ito’s lemma, It “ ´12σ2t H2pµtq “
σ2t
2µtp1´µtq . This problem is studied inMoscarini and Smith (2001.)
8
., where the value func-
8With “belief elasticity” defined as E pµq “ µp1´ µq in my model.
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The solution VDpµq is plotted as the blue curve in Figure 1.1 . The shaded region is the
experimentation region and the non-shaded region is the stopping region.
σt dWt







Figure 1.1: Incremental information








2. Breakthroughs: The DM observes breakthroughs that perfectly reveal the true state with
arrival rate λt. Then, belief follows a Poisson process that jumps to 1 if the state is r and
to 0 if the state is l. The set of admissible control is:
MB “
!
xµty|dµt “ p1´ µtqdJ1t pλtµtq ` p0´ µtqdJ0t pλtp1´ µtqq
)
xJitp¨qy are independent Poisson counting processes with Poisson rate p¨q. The DM con-
trols the signal frequency xλty. The Entropy reduction speed is λtHpµq. The HJB equa-
tion is as follows:
ρVBpµq “ sup
λą0
λpµFp1q ` p1´ µqFp0q ´VBpµqq ´ 12pλHpµqq
2
The solutionVB is plotted as the red curve in Figure 1.2. The two arrows show the belief
jumps induced by breakthroughs at µ.
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3. Partially revealing evidence: The DM allocates one unit of total attention to two news
sources, each revealing one state with arrival rate γ “ 2. Then belief follows a compen-
sated Poisson process, and the set of admissible belief processes is:
MP “
$’&’%xµty
ˇˇˇˇdµt “p1´ µtqpdJ1t pαtγµtq ´ αtγµtdtq
`p0´ µtqpdJ0t pp1´ αtqγp1´ µtqq ´ p1´ αtqγp1´ µtqdtq
,/./-
xJitp¨qy are independent Poisson counting processes with Poisson rate p¨q. The DM con-
trols xαty, the attention allocated to the signal revealing state r. This control process is
identical to that in Che and Mierendorff (2016.). Applying their analysis, optimal αt is a











The solution VP is plotted as the black curve in Figure 1.3 . The optimal strategy is qual-
itatively the same as in Che and Mierendorff (2016.). In the deep gray region, optimal
learning direction is confirmatory: the arrival of news reveals the a priori more likely
state (represented by solid arrows). In the light gray region, optimal learning direction
is contradictory: the arrival of news reveals the a priori less likely state (dashed arrows).







Figure 1.3: Partially revealing evidence










In this example, the three learning technologies are analyzed for the same underlying
decision problem and the same entropy cost function. Therefore, the utilities are directly
comparable. I plot all three value functions in Figure 1.4 . and use differently colored re-
gions to illustrate the order of utility. Each color corresponds to a learning strategy be-
ing optimal: blue—Gaussian learning, red—breakthroughs, and gray—confirmatory evi-
dence.9 . As shown in Figure 1.4 ., allowing the DM to use a rich set of strategies improves
the decision-making quality.
More interestingly, there appears to be a pattern when optimizing in different aspects.
When the prior belief is highly uncertain, a fully revealing Poisson signal that can bring
the DM directly to a conclusion is optimal. When the prior belief is quite uncertain but
asymmetrically in favor of one state, allocating attention to the more promising direction
becomes optimal. When the prior belief is very certain, an imprecise but frequent Gaus-
sian signal becomes optimal. The formal analysis for fully flexible information acquisition
in Section 1.6. illustrates that this pattern is systematic: the optimal direction, precision
and frequency of learning are exactly the relevant aspects and are closely related to the
location of the prior belief.
1.3.1 Motivation for a flexible model
Example 1.1 . implies that single-aspect models are insufficient for modeling a dynamic
information acquisition problem with a rich strategy set. For instance, the model consid-
ering only partially revealing evidence predicts that seeking contradictory evidence is
generally optimal when the belief is uncertain. However, further analysis shows that
this prediction is misleading when Gaussian signals are also feasible. Studying a model
where information acquisition is flexible in all aspects enables us to obtain insights about
information acquisition without interference from any ad hoc restriction. Such insights
9In this example, whenever contradictory learning dominates confirmatory learning, contradictory
learning is dominated by Gaussian learning, thus, contradictory learning is not optimal in any region.
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include which aspect(s) is(are) endogenously salient for information acquisition and how
each of these aspects is determined by the DM’s incentives.
Although the results are derived in a fully flexible model, they apply to much more
general settings where information acquisition is not flexible in all aspects. First, all re-
sults directly apply to all settings where information acquisition is flexible in those en-
dogenously salient aspects, as all other aspects are redundant for implementing the un-
constrained optimum. Second, even for settings where some of the relevant aspects are
constrained, the intuitions from the flexible model identify the DM’s most important in-
centive and how the hypothetically ideal strategy might be approximated by adjusting
other aspects. In fact, the analysis of the flexible model in Sections 1.4 . and 1.6. shows that
the set of endogenously salient aspects is quite small, and the optimal strategy satisfies
very simple qualitative properties in these aspects. Therefore, the findings of this chapter
are useful in a very wide range of settings.
1.4 Dynamic programming and HJB equation
Solving Equation (1.1). is not an easy task due to the abstract strategy space. To the
best of my knowledge, no general theory applicable to this stochastic control problem
exists. The most closely related problems are studied in a set of remarkable papers on the
martingale method in stochastic control (Davis (1979.),Boel and Kohlmann (1980.),Striebel
(1984.)). These papers introduce abstract formulations of stochastic control problems with
general (semi)martingale control processes. The problems have finite horizon and specific
objective functions; hence, they do not nest Equation (1.1).
Nevertheless, it is useful to introduce the general dynamic programming principle
and HJB characterization. On the basis of the intuition of dynamic programming, the
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(( “ 0 (1.2)
HJB Equation (1.2). is conceptually the same as the standard HJB equation. Recall the def-
inition for operator Lt, LtVpµtq is the flow utility gain from continuing. The exact form
of LtV and LtH depends on the probability space, the filtration and the control process
in the neighbourhood of t (which are summarized by the symbol dµt). Therefore, Equa-
tion (1.2) . essentially states the dynamic programming principle: at any instance when the
control is chosen optimally, either stopping is optimal (the first term is 0) or continuing is
optimal and the net continuation gain equals the loss from discounting (the second term
is 0).
For a simple example, letM be a family of Markov jump-diffusion belief processes,
characterized by the following SDE:





where pp, ν, σq : µt ÞÑ R` b ∆pSupppµqq bR|Supppµq|´1 are control parameters, Jtp¨q is a
Poisson counting process with Poisson rate p¨q, and Wt is a standard one-dimensional
Wiener process. Note that this example also nests all three families of strategies in Ex-
ample 1.1 . as special cases10 . Itô’s lemma implies an explicit form for the infinitesimal
generator:
10The admissible control sets in the second and third cases in Example 1.1 . are not exactly nested in
Equation (1.3). However, they can be viewed as mixed strategies of pure Poisson-jump processes defined
by Equation (1.3).
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LVpµq “ ppVpνq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpν´ µqqloooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon




flow value of diffusion
where ∇ and H are the gradient and Hessian operators, respectively. By replacing L in














On the other hand, when M is the jump-diffusion family, the jump-diffusion control
theory (see textbooks, e.g., Hanson (2007.)) provides a verification theorem that proves that
the value function for Equation (1.1) . is exactly characterized by HJB Equation (1.4) .
This simple example illustrates how a specific stochastic control problem relates to an
HJB equation. Now, consider the general problem Equation (1.2) . without any restriction
on the admissible belief process. First, we require a verification theorem stating that the
HJB Equation (1.2) . characterizes the solution of Equation (1.1) . Second, a representation
theorem for the abstract operator Lt is also necessary to make Equation (1.2) . practically
tractable. The existing theories on martingale methods have little power for both tasks.11 .
In Theorem 1.1 ., I achieve both goals by showing that the solution of Equation (1.1) . is
characterized by a simple parametric HJB equation:
Theorem 1.1. Assume H is strictly concave and Cp2q smooth on interior beliefs in ∆pXq, As-
sumptions 1.1 . and 1.2. are satisfied. Let Vpµq P Cp1q∆pXq be a solution12 . to HJB Equation (1.4).;
11First, the existing martingale methods verify the HJB equation for different sets of problems that do not
cover this specific problem. Moreover, the martingale method only states the existence of such LtV (for
example theorem 4.3.1 of Boel and Kohlmann (1980.)) and does not provide an explicit representation. This
issue is considered to be the main drawback of the martingale method (see discussions in Davis (1979.)).
12The Cp1q solution to the second-order ODE is not well defined. To be precise, V is a viscosity solution
(see Crandall, Ishii, and Lions (1992.)). In the viscosity solution, σTHVpµqσ is replaced by D2Vpµ, σq||σ||2,
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then Vpµq solves Equation (1.1).
Theorem 1.1 . first states that Vpµq is characterized by a HJB equation. More surpris-
ingly, Theorem 1.1 . also states that the HJB is exactly Equation (1.4) . As a direct corollary,
Equation (1.1) . can be solved by considering only the family of Markov jump-diffusion
processes characterized by SDE (1.3.). The compensated Poisson jump part and Gaussian
diffusion part in SDE (1.3.) each represents a simple learning strategy.
• Poisson learning: The DM uses Poisson learning or acquires a Poisson signal when a
compensated Poisson part exists in the belief process. A Poisson jump in the belief
process can be induced by observing non-conclusive news whose arrival follows a
Poisson process. The compensating belief drift is induced by observing no news
arriving. The control variables for Poisson learning are pp, νq, which represent three
endogenously relevant aspects of Poisson learning. The arrival rate p represents
the frequency of learning. The direction of belief jump represents the direction of
learning. The magnitude of belief jump represents the precision of learning.
• Gaussian learning: The DM uses Gaussian learning or acquires a Gaussian signal
when a diffusion part exists in the belief process. Gaussian diffusion in the be-
lief process can be induced by observing the realization of a Gaussian process, with
state x being the unobservable drift. The flow variance σ represents the signal pre-
cision.
Equation (1.4). suggests that to determine the optimal strategy in all relevant aspects,
the DM considers four types of trade-offs : (i) the standard continuing-stopping trade-
off in optimal stopping problems, captured by the outer-layer maximization; (ii) the in-
formation cost-utility gain trade-off, which determines the total cost spent on learning;
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(iii) the Poisson-Gaussian trade-off, which determines the proportion of cost allocated to
the Poisson signal pp, νq and the Gaussian signal σ; (iv) the precision-frequency trade-
off, which determines the marginal rate of substitution of signal frequency for precision.
These trade-offs, especially the precision-frequency trade-off, will be discussed in detail
to characterize the solution to Equation (1.4) . in Section 1.6.
The proof of Theorem 1.1 . uses an indirect method. I characterize Equation (1.1) . as
the limit of a series of auxiliary discrete-time problems. The discrete-time analyses are
presented in Section 1.5. Readers interested in the solution of HJB Equation (1.4). can
jump to Section 1.6 .
1.5 The auxiliary discrete-time problem
In this section, I introduce the steps for proving Theorem 1.1. using an auxiliary discrete-
time problem. First, in Section 1.5.1 . I introduce a discrete-time stochastic control problem
that converges to the continuous-time problem. Then I characterize the Bellman equation
for the discrete-time problem in Section 1.5.2 . In Section 1.5.3 ., I introduce a key lemma
that links all the discrete-time analyses and proves Theorem 1.1.
1.5.1 Discrete-time problem
I consider a stochastic control problem that is a discrete-time analog of Equation (1.1) .
Then I illustrate the discretization of the original problem. The discretization serves as a
useful intermediary showing that the discrete-time problem converges to the continuous-
time problem.
Decision problem: The primitives pA,X, u, µ, ρq are the same as those in Section 1.3 .
Time is discrete t P N, and the period length dt ą 0. The payoff delayed by t periods is
discounted by e´ρdt¨t.
Information: The DM chooses the posterior belief process xpµty in a nonparametric
way. xpµty is restricted to be a martingale. Let x pFty be the natural filtration of xpµty.
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dt. The per-period cost of information is
assumed to be CdtpErHppµtq ´ Hppµt`1q| pFtsq. Note that this is exactly the finite-difference
analog of the flow cost Cp´LtHpµtqq in the continuous-time problem.










Hppµtq ´ Hppµt`1q| pFtı¯
ff
(1.5)
wherexM is the set of discrete-timemartingales satisfying pµ0 “ µ, and τ is a x pFty´measurable
stopping time. Note that in this section, all discrete-time stochastic processes and random
variables are labeled with “hat” to differentiate them from continuous-time processes.
The purpose of analyzing the discrete-time problem is to characterize the continuous-
time value function Vpµq. Therefore, the first step is to show that Vdtpµq approximates
Vpµq. To study the relation between Vdtpµq and Vpµq, let us discretize the objective func-















where Ijdt “ E
”Hpµjdtq´Hpµpj`1qdtq
dt
ˇˇFjdtı. The objective function in Equation (1.1) . is defined
in the notion of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral as limdtÑ0Wdtpµt, τq. I call the martingale
xµty integrable if the limit limdtÑ0Wdtpµt, τq exists.13 . Unless otherwise stated, M is re-
stricted to contain integrable processes, an innocuous restriction that enables me to avoid
technical discussions of integrability.14 . Then it follows thatVpµq “ supxµtyPM,τ limdtÑ0Wdtpµt, τq.
13The standard definition for integrability also requires the limit to exist uniformly for all alternative
nonuniform discretizations of the time horizon and all alternative measurable stopping times. Here I use
the weaker integrability requirement for notational simplicity. The optimal strategy actually satisfies the
stronger integrability requirements, so the current definition can be used without loss. The discretization
of xIty is WLOG given the uniform convergence in the definition of DpHq.
14The detailed discussion of why restricting belief to be integrable is innocuous is in Remark A.2 .
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Now, consider the relation between Wdt and Vdt. I argue that the objective function
in Equation (1.5) . is equivalent to Wdtpµt, τq. This result can ben verified by noting that if
pxµty, τq and pxpµty, pτq jointly satisfy pµt “ µt¨dt and pτ “ rτ{dts, then:








Hppµtq ´ Hppµt`1q| pFtı¯
ff
Given feasible strategy pxµty, τq, such pxpµty, pτq can be constructed by simply discretiz-
ing the continuous-time strategy. Given feasible strategy pxpµty, pτq, such pxµty, τq can be
constructed by the Kolmogorov extension theorem. Therefore, it follows that Vdtpµq “
supxµtyPM,τ Wdtpµt, τq. Now that both V and Vdt are characterized using Wdt, Wdt can be














Clearly,V and limVdt are obtained by taking the limit ofWdt in different orders. Therefore,
Vdt approximates V when the two limits are interchangeable, which is indeed true as
proved in Lemma 1.1.:
Lemma 1.1. Given Assumption 1.1 ., @µ P ∆pXq, limdtÑ0Vdtpµq “ Vpµq.
1.5.2 Discrete-time Bellman equation
Equation (1.5) . is a discrete-time sequential optimization problem with bounded pay-
offs and exponential discounting. Therefore, standard dynamic programming theory ap-
plies and provides the Bellman equation that characterizes Vdt.
Lemma 1.2 (Discrete-time Bellman). Vdt is the unique solution in Cp∆Xq of the following
functional equation:
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where N “ 2|X|, p P ∆pNq, νi P ∆pXq.
Equation (1.6) . is a standard Bellman equation, except that it covers a restricted space
of strategies. The choice of signal structure is restricted to have support size no larger
than 2|X|, while the original space contains signal structures with an arbitrary number
of realizations. This simplification is based the generalized concavification methodology
developed in Theorem 2 of Chapter 4. The standard concavification methodology is an
application of the Carathéodory theorem to the graph of the objective function in the
belief space.15 . Equation (1.6) . involves an additional term CdtpHpµq ´
ř
piHpνiqq, which
makes the standard method inapplicable. The general method suggests that the maxi-
mum is characterized by concavifying a linear combination of Vdt and H.
1.5.3 Convergence and verification theorem








Theorem 1.1. Lemma 1.2.
Theorem 1.1 . is represented by the red dashed arrow on the left. The discrete-time prob-
lem’s value function Vdt is the solution of the Bellman equation Equation (1.6) . (the dou-
ble arrow on the right, proved in Lemma 1.2.). I have shown that Vdt converges to the
continuous-time optimal control value V (the arrow on the top, proved in Lemma 1.1.). In
15See Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1995.) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011.))
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the next lemma, I show that solution of HJB Equation (1.4) . is the limit of solution of Equa-
tion (1.6) . (the arrow on the bottom, to be proved in Lemma 1.3 .). Therefore, the function
solving HJB Equation (1.4). is the value function of the continuous-time stochastic control
problem Equation (1.1).
Lemma 1.3. Assume H is strictly concave and Cp2q on interior beliefs, Assumption 1.2. is satisfied.
Suppose Vpµq P Cp1q is a solution to Equation (1.4). Then Vdt L8ÝÝÝÑ
dtÑ0
V.
Lemma 1.3. proves that whenever Equation (1.4). has a solution, the solution is unique
and coincides with the limit of solution to discrete-time problem Equation (1.6) . Verifica-
tion theorem Theorem 1.1. is a direct corollary of Lemmas 1.1., 1.2. and 1.3.
1.6 Optimal information acquisition
In this section I prove the existence of the solution to the continuous-time HJB Equa-
tion (1.4) . and fully characterize the value and policy functions, assuming binary states
and two forms of flow cost function: a hard cap and a smooth convex function. In both
cases, the optimal strategies share the same set of qualitative properties. Then in Sec-
tion 1.6.2 ., I discuss the key trade-offs in the optimization problem and provide the intu-
ition for the optimal strategy. First, I introduce the assumptions for tractability:
Assumption 1.3.
1. (Binary states): |X| “ 2.
2. (Positive payoff): @µ P r0, 1s, Fpµq ą 0.
3. (Uncertainty measure): H2pµq ă 0 and locally Lipschitz on p0, 1q, lim
µÑ0,1 |H
1pµq| “ 8.
Assumption 1.3 . comprises three parts. First, I restrict the state space to be binary.
Therefore, the belief space is one dimensional, and I can use ODE theory to construct a
candidate solution. Although the existence of the solution technically relies on the binary
state assumption, the characterization generalizes to general state spaces, as discussed in
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Appendix A.1.3. Second, I assume that the utility from decisionmaking is strictly positive
so that “delay forever” is strictly suboptimal. This restriction is made without loss of
generality in the sense that we can always add a dummy “outside action” that gives ε
payoff. Third, I assume that H is sufficiently smooth, strictly convex (which rules out
free information) and satisfies an Inada condition (which guarantees a non-degenerate
stopping region).
1.6.1 Main characterization theorem
Theorem 1.1 . states that to characterize Vpµq, it is sufficient to find a smooth solution
to HJB Equation (1.4). I prove the existence of a solution and characterize the optimal
strategy under Assumption 1.2-a . or Assumption 1.2-b ., two slightly stronger variants of
Assumption 1.2.
Assumption 1.2-a (Capacity constraint). There exists c s.t. CpIq “
$’&’% 0 when I ď c`8 when I ą c
Assumption 1.2-a . restricts the cost function C to be a hard cap: information is free
when its measure is below capacity c and infinitely costly when it exceeds this capacity.16 .
This condition forces the DM to smooth the information acquisition process over time.
Theorem 1.2. Given Assumptions 1.1., 1.2-a. and 1.3., there exists a quasi-convex value function
V P Cp1qp0, 1q solving Equation (1.4). Let E “ tµ P r0, 1s|Vpµq ą Fpµqu be the experimentation
region. There exists policy function ν : EÑ r0, 1s satisfying:
ρVpµq “´ c Fpνpµqq ´Vpµq ´V
1pµqpνpµq ´ µq
Hpνpµqq ´ Hpµq ´ H1pµqpνpµq ´ µq
where νpµq is unique a.e. and satisfies the following properties. Dµ˚ P argminV s.t.
16limIÑ8 C1pIq is not well defined with Assumption 1.2-a. However, it is not hard to see that Assump-
tion 1.2-a . still satisfies the weaker formulation discussed in Footnote 7 . As a result, Theorem 1.1 . applies
with Assumption 1.2-a.
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1. Poisson learning: ρVpµq ą ´cV2pµqH2pµq @µ P Ezµ˚.
2. Direction: µ ą µ˚ ùñ νpµq ą µ and µ ă µ˚ ùñ νpµq ă µ.
3. Precision: |νpµq ´ µ˚| is decreasing in |µ´ µ˚| on each interval of E.
4. Stopping time: νpµq P EC (a successful experiment lands in the stopping region).
Theorem 1.2 . proves the existence of a solution to Equation (1.4) . and characterizes
the optimal policy function. The theorem first states that the optimal value function is
implemented by a Poisson signal, i.e., seeking a breakthrough that causes the belief to
jump to νpµq. Moreover, property 1 states that the Gaussian signal is strictly dominated,
except for at most one critical belief. Therefore, as discussed in Section 1.4., the optimal
strategy is Poisson learning, which can be characterized by three aspects of learning and
the stopping time.
Direction: Property 2 states that the optimal direction is confirmatory: when µ ą µ˚,
the DM holds a high prior belief for state 1 and acquires a signal whose arrival induces
an even higher posterior belief νpµq and vice versa for µ ă µ˚.
Precision: Property 3 states that the optimal precision measured by |νpµq ´ µ˚| is neg-
atively related to how certain the belief is (measured by |µ´ µ˚|). Since µ˚ P argmaxV, the
property equivalently states that precision is negatively related to the continuation value.
Frequency: With Assumption 1.2-a ., frequency is automatically determined given the
precision, according to ppµq “ ´ cHpνpµqq´Hpµq´H1pµqpνpµq´µq . Thus, the optimal frequency is
positively related to the continuation value.
Stopping time: Property 4 states that the image of ν is always in the stopping region.
In other words, the optimal stopping time is exactly the signal arrival time.
By combining these properties, we can qualitatively determine the optimal learning
dynamics. The DM seeks a signal that arrives according to a Poisson process. The arrival
of the signal confirms the DM’s prior belief and is sufficiently accurate to warrant an im-
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mediate action. Absent the arrival of a Poisson signal, the DM becomes less certain about
the state, following Bayes’ rule. The DM’s continuation value decreases correspondingly;
hence, she continues seeking a Poisson signal with lower frequency and higher precision.




Assumption 1.2-b. restricts the cost function C to be Cp2q smooth and strictly convex:
acquiring an additional unit of information is of strictly increasing marginal cost. The
condition on limC1pIq in Assumption 1.2 . is retained. If we replace Assumption 1.2 . with
Assumption 1.2-b., we obtain the following characterization theorem:
Theorem 1.3. Given Assumptions 1.1 ., 1.2-b. and 1.3., there exists a quasi-convex value function
V P Cp1qp0, 1q solving Equation (1.4). Let E “ ␣µ P r0, 1sˇˇVpµq ą Fpµq( be the experimentation
region. There D policy functions ν : EÑ r0, 1s and I P Cp1qpEq17 . satisfying:
ρVpµq “´ Ipµq ¨ Fpνpµqq ´Vpµq ´V
1pµqpνpµq ´ µq
Hpνpµqq ´ Hpµq ´ H1pµqpνpµq ´ µq ´ CpIpµqq
where ν and I are unique a.e. and satisfy the following properties. Dµ˚ P argminV s.t.




2V2pµq ´ Cp´12σ2H2pµqq @µ P Ezµ˚.
2. Direction: µ ą µ˚ ùñ νpµq ą µ and µ ă µ˚ ùñ νpµq ă µ.
3. Precision: |νpµq ´ µ˚| is decreasing in |µ´ µ˚| on each interval of E.
4. Stopping time: νpµq P EC.
5. Intensity: Ipµq is increasing in Vpµq .
With the exception of property 5, the optimal strategy has the same set of properties as
Theorem 1.2. Property 5 states that the informativeness measure I of the optimal signal
17Note that given ν, selecting I or p is equivalent. They uniquely pin down each other according to
equation Ipµq “ ppµqp´Hpνpµqq ` Hpµq ` H1pµqpνpµq ´ µqq.
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is higher when the continuation value is higher. Since the belief process drifts down-
ward the value function conditional on continuation, the DM invests less in information
acquisition as time passes.
The intuition for property 5 is discussed in Moscarini and Smith (2001.). The marginal
gain from experimentation is proportional to the continuation value while marginal cost
is increasing in I. Therefore, the optimal cost is increasing in the value function. This
property is called “value-level monotonicity” in Moscarini and Smith (2001.), where the
level (flow variance of the diffusion process) is a parameter for both the cost and precision
of a Gaussian signal. My analysis identifies this intuition separately from another impor-
tant trade-off between signal precision and frequency. I refer to property 5 as “value-
intensity monotonicity”. Here I rename parameter I the intensity of learning, which is
more intuitive and concise than “informativeness measure”.
Examples
In this section, I first provide a minimal working example that illustrates Theorem 1.3 .
in Example 1.2 . Then I provide supplementary examples to illustrate a rich set of impli-
cations of my model, including multiple phases of learning in Example 1.3. and learning
from a one-sided search in Example 1.4.
Example 1.2. Consider the problem studied in Example 1.1 . Fpµq “ maxt2µ´ 1, 1´ 2µu,
Hpµq “ ´µ logpµq ´ p1´ µq logp1´ µq, ρ “ 1, and CpIq “ 12 I2. No parametric assumption
is placed on the set of admissible belief process.
The solution is presented in Figures 1.5 . and 1.6. In Figure 1.5 .-(a), dashed lines depict
Fpµq, the blue curve depicts Vpµq, and the blue shaded region is experimentation region
E. Figure 1.5 .-(b) shows the optimal posterior νpµq as a function of the prior. As stated in
Theorem 1.3 ., the policy function is piecewise smooth and decreasing. The three arrows in
Figure 1.5 .-(a) depict the optimal strategies prescribed at three different priors. The arrows
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start at the priors and point to the optimal posteriors. The blue curve in Figure 1.5 .-(c)
shows the optimal intensity Ipµq as a function of the prior. Clearly, Ipµq is isomorphic to
Vpµq in the experimentation region.





















Figure 1.5: Value and policy functions
Figure 1.6 . illustrates the dynamics of the optimal policy. Figure 1.6 .-(a) depicts the op-
timal belief process. Conditional on no signal arrival, the posterior belief drifts towards
the critical belief level µ˚ “ 0.5. In this example, two phases of learning occur (represented
by different colors of shaded regions in Figure 1.6 .-(a)). In the first phase (blue region),
the DM seeks a Poisson signal to confirm the most likely state. As time passes, the signal
precision increases while signal frequency and learning intensity decreases (as in Fig-
ure 1.6 .-(b)&(c)). Eventually, the DM believes that the two states are equally likely and
switches to the second phase (gray region). In the second phase, she seeks two signals
that confirm each state in a balanced way such that before any signal arrives her posterior
belief is stationary.
Recall the three learning technologies in Example 1.1. They approximate the full solu-
tion in Example 1.2 . In general, the optimal signal is a confirmatory Poisson signal with
varying precision and frequency. However, in Example 1.1 ., the precision and frequency of
the confirmatory Poisson signal are exogenously fixed. Therefore, for very certain prior
beliefs, the ideal high-frequency Poisson signal is approximated by a Gaussian signal.
For very uncertain prior beliefs, the ideal signal is approximated by acquiring perfectly
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Figure 1.6: Dynamics of optimal policy
revealing breakthroughs with low frequency.
Example 1.3 (Multiple phases). Figure 1.7 . depicts an example with four actions, whose
expected payoffs are represented by the four dashed lines in Figure 1.7 .-(a). The two blue
dashed lines are called riskier actions, and the two red dashed lines are called safer ac-
tions. The upper envelope of the four lines is Fpµq. The experimentation region contains
three disjoint intervals. For the middle interval, in the red regions, the DM has a more
extreme belief and searches for a signal that confirms a safer action (red arrow). In the
blue region, the DM has a more ambiguous belief and searches for a riskier action (blue
arrow). Figure 1.7 .-(c) depicts the optimal belief process with a prior belief in the red re-
gion. The experimentation follows three phases, the DM searches for a safer action in
phase 1, searches for a riskier action in phase 2 and searches in a balanced way in phase
3.























Figure 1.7: Example with four alternatives
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Example 1.4 (One-sided search). Figure 1.8 . depicts an example where the optimal strat-
egy includes only one-sided search. A safe action with deterministic payoff and a risky
action whose payoff is higher than that of the safe action in state 1 exists. As illustrated in
Figure 1.8.-(a), both Fpµq and Vpµq are monotonically increasing. According to property
1, µ ą µ˚ in the entire experimentation region E. Figure 1.8 .-(b) shows that the optimal
strategy is always to search for a Poisson signal that induces a posterior belief higher than
the prior. Figure 1.8.-(c) shows that in this example, only one phase occurs. If no signal
arrives before the belief reaches to the critical belief, the optimal solution is for the DM to
stop learning and choose the safe action.
This example illustrates more precisely the definition of confirmatory evidence: the
optimal belief jump is in the direction of a more profitable state. The profitability of a
state depends jointly on its likelihood and the corresponding payoff of the actions. In this
example, consider a prior belief less than 0.5. Although state 0 is more likely, since it is
dominated by state 1 for any action, state 1 is unambiguously more profitable to learn
about. Therefore, the optimal confirmatory evidence is always revealing state 1.























Figure 1.8: Example with one-sided search
1.6.2 Proof methodology and key intuitions
In Section 1.3 ., I introduce four types of trade-offs. Now, I discuss the trade-offs in
detail and illustrate how they determine the optimal strategy in each salient aspect. I
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first derive a geometric characterization of the optimal policy in Section 1.6.2.1 . Then,
I discuss how the key trade-offs are represented by the geometric characterization and
provide intuitions for the optimal policy. In Section 1.6.2.2 ., I present the sketch of a proof
for Theorem 1.2 .
1.6.2.1 Geometric representation and key trade-offs
A though experiment is useful to gain intuition. Fix the value function V and consider





Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq˘´ C`p`Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq˘˘ (1.7)
Equation (1.7). is more restrictive than Equation (1.4). I assume that the DM acquires
only a Poisson signal. Let us temporarily ignore the Gaussian signal. Define:
$’’&’’%
Upµ, νq “ Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq “ Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq
The interpretation of Upµ, νq is the flow value per unit arrival rate from a Poisson signal
with posterior ν. Similarly, Jpµ, νq is the flow uncertainty reduction per unit arrival rate
from the Poisson signal. Then Equation (1.7) . can be rewritten as:
sup
pě0,ν







¨ I ´ CpIq
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The optimal posterior ν˚ maximizes Upµ,νqJpµ,νq—the value to uncertainty reduction ratio. Let
λ “ C1pI˚q “ max Upµ,νqJpµ,νq ; then, Upµ, νq ď λJpµ, νq and the equality holds at ν˚.18 . Define
Gpµq “ Vpµq ` λHpµq. I call Gpµq the gross value function. Then, the definition of U and V
impliesUpµ, νq´λJpµ, νq “ Gpνq´Gpµq´G1pµqpν´µq. Hence,Upµ, νq ď λJpµ, νq implies
that the gross value function has the following property:
$’&’%
Gpνq ď Gpµq ` G1pµqpν´ µq @ν P r0, 1s
Gpν˚q “ Gpµq ` G1pµqpν˚ ´ µq
(1.8)
Equation (1.8) . states that Gpνq is everywhere (weakly) below the tangent line of G at µ,
except Gpµq and Gpν˚q touch the tangent line. The tangent line is linear (hence concave)
and thus weakly dominates G’s upper concave hull copGq. Therefore, Gpµq “ copGqpµq
and Gpν˚q “ copGqpν˚q. See Figure 1.9. for a graphical illustration.
U




0 μ ν 1 μ
H
Uncertainty Measure
0 μ ν 1 μ
G
Gross value function
Figure 1.9: Concavification of the gross value function
18With Assumption 1.2-a., I˚ “ c and λ “ max Upµ,νqJpµ,νq is the Lagrangian multiplier for constraint I ď c.
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Figure 1.9 .-(a) and Figure 1.9 .-(b) depict the value function V and the uncertainty mea-
sure H, respectively. Figure 1.9 .-(c) depicts the gross value function G “ V ` λH, where
λ is calculated for the prior µ. As discussed, G touches the upper concave hull at both µ
and ν˚. When ν˚ is unique, µ and ν˚ are the two boundary points of the concavified region
(the interval pµ, νq on which G ă copGq).
Equation (1.8) . is called a concavification characterization as it is an analog to the con-
cavification method in Bayesian persuasion problems. The difference is that in a Bayesian
persuasion problem, the boundary points of a concavified region are optimal posteriors,
whereas in the current problem, the prior is also on the boundary of a concavified region.
This property has clear economic meaning. G is called the gross value function because
it integrates value function V and uncertainty measure H using marginal cost level λ.




ppGpνq ´ Gpµq ´ G1pνqpν´ µqq (1.9)
is equivalent to solving Equation (1.7). Whether Equation (1.9). yields a positive payoff
depends on whether Gpµq ă copGqpµq. Suppose Gpµq ă copGqpµq. Then, there is a strictly
positive gain from information and Equation (1.9) . is strictly positive. However, Equa-
tion (1.9) . is linear in the signal arrival rate p. As a result the DM has incentive to increase
p, which drives up marginal cost C1p¨q. Thus, when the optimum is reached, C1p¨q (or
λ) must be such that solving Equation (1.9). yields exactly zero utility: Gpµq “ copGqpµq.
This characterization illustrates that in the continuous time limit, information is smoothed
such that uncertainty is reduced by only an infinitesimal amount at every instant of time.
Now, suppose that the HJB is satisfied, i.e., Equation (1.7) . equals the flow discounting
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loss ρVpµq. Then applying I˚ “ p˚ ¨ Jpµ, ν˚q and C1pI˚q “ Upµ,ν˚qJpµ,ν˚q to the HJB implies:
ρVpµq “ p˚ ¨Upµ, ν˚q ´ Cpp˚ ¨ Jpµ, ν˚qq
ùñ ρVpµq “ I˚C1pI˚q ´ CpI˚q (1.10)
Combining Equation (1.8) . and Equation (1.10) . dentifies the value function V and cor-
responding strategies p, ν.19 . Now, I analyze key trade-offs in the dynamic information
acquisition problem by studying Equations (1.8). and (1.10).
1. Utility gain vs. information cost
Equation (1.10) . illustrates the utility gain vs. information cost trade-off. Since C is a
convex function, IC1pIq ´ CpIq is increasing in I20 ., that is, the optimal flow informative-
ness measure I is isomorphic in continuation value Vpµq. This property is exactly the
”value-intensity monotonicity“ I introduced in Section 1.6.1.
The intuition for this property is simple. The marginal cost of increasing the intensity
of the signal proportionately is IC1pIq. The marginal gain is obtained from increasing the
arrival rate proportionately (keeping the signal precision fixed, as in the envelope the-
orem). Increasing the arrival rate by a unit proportion reduces the waiting time by the
same proportion, so the marginal gain from increasing I by a unit proportion is discount
ρV plus cost CpIq. At the optimum, the maginal cost equals the margina gain; therefore,
we obtain Equation (1.10) . and the flow informativeness is monotonic in value function.
If we consider the case with Assumption 1.2-a ., then λ in Equation (1.8) . is replaced by
the shadow cost of increasing informativeness (see Footnotes 18 . and 19.). Equation (1.10) .
can be written as ρVpµq “ cλ. Although the intensity is fixed, in this case, a monotonicity
between the shadow cost and value function remains.
19 With Assumption 1.2-a ., CpI˚q “ 0 and I˚ “ c. Thereofre, ρVpµq “ λc.
20 d
dI pIC1pIq ´ CpIqq “ IC2pIq ě 0
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In summary, by studying the utility gain vs. information cost trade-off, I established
a monotonicity between the shadow/marginal cost λ and the continuation value Vpµq. (I
refer to both as the “value-intensity monotonicity” for notational simplicity.) Now that I
characterized λ, we can proceed to Equation (1.8).
2. Precision vs. frequency
A novel trade-off characterized by Equation (1.8). is the precision vs. frequency trade-
off. The value-intensity monotonicity determines I from the value function. Now, the
DM allocates total intensity I to precision (parametrized by the size of belief jumps) and
frequency (parametrized by the arrival rate of jumps). Equation (1.8). suggests that the
optimal signal precision can be solved by concavifying the gross value function Gpµq. In
this section, I illustrate how this trade-off changes for different priors and explain the
intuition.





0 μ' ν' 1 μ
G
Figure 1.10: Precision-frequency trade-off
Figure 1.10 . shows how varying λ affects the optimal jump size. In Figure 1.10 .-(a) the
blue curve is Gpµq, and the dashed curve is copGq. I call the blue region, where Gpµq ă
copGqpµq, the concavified region and the white region, where Gpµq “ copGqpµq, the globally
concave region. The prior µ and optimal posterior ν are on the boundary of a concavified
region. Consider G1 “ V`λ1H, where λ1 ą λ. Figure 1.10 .-(b) depicts both G (the dashed
curve) and G1 (the blue curve). Since G1 is G plus a strictly concave function, any belief in
the globally concave region of G is still in the globally concave region of G1. As a result, as
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λ increases, the white region is expands and the blue region contracts (see Figure 1.10 .-(c)).
Thus, the prior and optimal posterior move closer together. Recall that λ is monotonic in
V, which means the DM is more willing to choose a signal that induces shorter belief
jump when the continuation value is higher.
The intuition for this property is as follows. When the DM is more certain about the
state, the continuation value is higher; hence, the utility loss from discounting is higher.
The DM wants to receive a signal more frequently to benefit from the high value sooner.
In other words, the marginal rate of substitution of frequency for precision is increasing in
the continuation value. In this analysis, the continuation value is isomorphic to λ, which
controls the shape of G. The marginal rate of substitution of frequency for precision is
exactly captured by the global concavity of the gross value function; thus, the analysis
presented by Figure 1.10 . exactly illustrates the intuition.
Confirming vs. contradicting: The analysis above determines the magnitude of the op-
timal belief jump. The optimal jump direction remains to be determined to pin down the
optimal posterior. Now, I show that the precision-frequency trade-off also implies the
optimality of confirmatory learning.
Let us hypothetically consider a belief µ at which jumping toward the right is optimal
(weakly). In both panels of Figure 1.11 ., µ is the prior and νL, νR are optimal posteriors on
each side of µ. Jumping to νR (the black arrow) is better than jumping to νL (the dashed
black arrow). Let V be increasing around µ. Now consider the DM’s incentive at µ1
slightly larger than µ (in Figure 1.11 .-(a)). Although the corresponding optimal posteriors
could also move, keeping them fixed at νL and νR has only a second-order effect on utility.
We can compare νL and νR to pin down the optimal posterior for µ1. Since µ1 ą µ, νR is
closer to prior, and νL is farther from prior. Moreover, Vpµ1q ą Vpµq implies that the DM
has a stronger preference for frequency to precision with belief µ1. Since V1 ą 0, the effect
is first order. Therefore, νR is strictly preferred to νL at µ1. Consider µ2 slightly smaller
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than µ (in Figure 1.11 .-(b)). A similar analysis shows that now size of jump to νR is larger,
and the DM has a stronger preference for precision with belief µ2. Thus, νR is also strictly
optimal for µ2.
μνL νRμ1μ1 μνL νRμ2
Figure 1.11: Confirmatory v.s. contradictory
In this analysis, jumping in the direction of increasing value function means the sig-
nal is confirmatory. When value function is quasi-convex, this property is equivalent to
property 2 of Theorems 1.2 . and 1.3. Therefore, the precision-frequency trade-off implies
that the incentive for confirmatory learning is self-enforcing.
3. Poisson vs. Gaussian
Thus far, I have ignored the possibility of Gaussian signals. In fact, Gaussian signals





ùñ FOC : V2pµq ` λH2pµq “ 0
ðñ G2pµq “ 0 (1.11)
where λ “ C1p´σ2H2pµqq with Assumption 1.2-a . or λ “ ρcVpµq with Assumption 1.2-b .
Comparison of Equations (1.8) . and (1.11). shows that Equation (1.11). is exactly the limit of
Equation (1.8) . when optimal posterior ν converges to prior µ. This result is intuitive since
a Gaussian signal can be approximated as a Poisson signal with very low precision and
high arrival rate.
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The comparison of Gaussian and Poisson signals is effectively the comparison of a
special imprecise Poisson signal and other Poisson signals. Therefore, this trade-off is a
special case of the precision-frequency trade-off. Selecting a Gaussian signal is a corner
solutionwhen the DMwants to sacrifice almost all precision for frequency—a slightly less
patient DM is willing to avoid any waiting and stop immediately, while a slightly more
patient DM is willing to wait for a more precise Poisson signal. Therefore, the Gaussian
signal is optimal only on the boundaries of the experimentation regions. Given this in-
tuition, one could imagine that the Gaussian signal is generically suboptimal except for
special cases where the precision-frequency trade-off is invariant. Since the preference
between precision and frequency depends on the loss from delaying, the trade-off is in-
variant only when the DM does not discount future payoffs. This intuition is confirmed
in a no-discounting special case in Section 1.7.1., as well as in the model of Hébert and
Woodford (2016.).
4. Continuing vs. stopping
Consider the optimal stopping time. Theorems 1.2. and 1.3. states that repeated jumps
are suboptimal. I prove by showing that repeated jumps can be improved by a direct
jump. Let ν be the optimal posterior for prior µ (see Figure 1.12 .). Then, Equation (1.8) .
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Figure 1.12: Continuing vs. stopping
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Hypothetically, imagine that at ν, it is optimal to continue, and the optimal posterior
is ν1. Then, U1J1 “ λpνq, and λpνq ą λpµq by the confirmatory evidence property and value-





i.e., jumping to posterior ν1 directly is strictly better than a two-step jump. By elementary
geometry, there exists α s.t U11 “ αU0 and J11 “ αJ0.21 . Therefore, the value to uncertain
reduction ratio Upµ,ν
1q
Jpµ,ν1q “ U1`αU0J1`αJ0 is a weighted average of
U0
J0
and U1J1 , which is larger than
λpµq.
The intuition for the stopping rule is now clear. If we combine a two-step jump into
a direct jump, the flow utility gain is a weighted sum of that of the two jumps. The
flow uncertainty reduction is exactly the same weighted sum of that of the two jumps.
Therefore, the net value from a direct jump is a weighted average of the net values from
each jump. As a result, sequentially jumping to higher values is dominated by directly
jumping to the highest value.
Remark 1.1.
The intuition behind the value-intensity monotonicity is driven purely by convexity of
cost function h and is clearly independent of the formulation of the information measure.
The intuition behind the optimality of a Poisson signal over a Gaussian signal is the use of
the precision-frequency trade-off to compare a generic Poisson signal with an extremely
imprecise Poisson signal. The result does not depend on the exact form of I. I generalize
the optimality of a Poisson signal to the generic cost of information in Theorem 1.5 ., Sec-
tion 1.7.2 . I also discuss confirmatory evidence and immediate stopping properties with
generic cost functions in Section 1.7.2 .
The precision-frequency trade-off also does not depend on the size of the state space.
I confirm this result via a general characterization of optimal strategy with more states
21See Figure 1.12 . U0J0 “
U10
J10
“ λpµq implies U11J11 “ λpµq, hence,
U11
U0
“ J11J0 . I assume the ratio to be α.
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(Theorem A.3 .) in Appendix A.1.3 . However, the binary states assumption is crucial for
proving the existence of the solution to the HJB equation. A constructive proof of the
binary state case based on ODE theory is introduced in Section 1.6.2.2 .
Our discussion thus far does not rely on the exact form of λ. The qualitative properties
of all these trade-offs depend only on the monotonicity of λ in continuation value, which
is true with both Assumptions 1.2-a. and 1.2-b. Therefore, when I introduce the sketch of
the proof, I discuss only Theorem 1.2 ., and the proof extends to Theorem 1.3 .
1.6.2.2 Sketched proof of Theorem 1.2.
I prove Theorem 1.2. by construction and verification. I conjecture that the optimal
policy for Equation (1.4) . takes the form of Theorem 1.2 .: a single confirmatory signal as-
sociated with an immediate action. I first construct Vpµq and νpµq via three steps:
• Step 1. Determine µ˚. Since µ˚ P argminV, except for the special case whereV is strictly
monotonic, µ˚ is essentially the unique belief at which V1pµ˚q “ 0, and searching for








1` ρc Jpµ˚, νq
Vpµ˚q and νpµ˚q are pinned down correspondingly. The special case occurs when F
is strictly monotonic. Take F1 ą 0 for example. µ˚ is the smallest belief that ρFpµq ď
sup
νěµ
´c Fpνq´Fpµq´F1pµqpν´µqJpµ,νq , and vice versa for F1 ă 0.
• Step 2. Solve for the value function while holding the action fixed. Let a be the optimal
action for optimal posterior ν solved in step 1. Let Fapµq “ Eµrupa, xqs. Now, solve for
the value function given payoff Fapνq:
ρVpµq “ max
νěµ ´c
Fapνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Hpνq ´ Hpµq ´ H1pµqpν´ µq
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The primitives in the objective function are all sufficiently smooth in ν. Then, the first-
order condition w.r.t. ν yields a well-behaved ODE characterizing νpµq with initial
condition νpµ˚q. Therefore, we can solve for the optimal policy ν and calculate value
Vpµq accordingly for µ ě µ˚. Vpµq and νpµq for all µ ď µ˚ are solved by a symmetric
process.
• Step 3. Update the value function w.r.t. all alternative actions and smoothly paste the
solved value function piece by piece. This step begins with solving the ODE defined in
step 2 at µ˚. Then, I extend the value function towards µ “ t0, 1u. Whenever I reach
a belief at which two actions yield the same payoff, I setup a new ODE with the new
action. This process continues until the calculated value function Vpµq smoothly pastes
to Fpµq. This procedure generates a quasi-convex value function (minimized at µ˚).
Solving the ODE characterizing νpµq directly implies monotonicity of νpµq in each con-
nected experimentation region. Now, I need to verify the optimality of the constructed
strategy. The verification takes three steps, which rule out repeated jumps, contradic-
tory evidence and Gaussian signals. The intuition for the suboptimality of these three
alternative strategies is explained in Section 1.6.2 . The formal proof is relegated to Ap-
pendix A.2.3.
1.7 Discussion
In this section, I discuss, in detail, the assumptions Imake in the baselinemodel, which
can be categorized into three classes.
1. Economic assumptions:
• Discounting (positive ρ).
• Informativeness measure (Assumption 1.1.).
• Convexity of cost function (Assumption 1.2.).
2. Restrictive assumptions: Finite actions and binary states (Assumption 1.3.).
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3. Technical assumptions: Smoothness and positiveness assumptions (Assumption 1.3 .).
The economic assumptions are crucial for my results and deserve an in-depth dis-
cussion. To illustrate the role of discounting, in Section 1.7.1 ., I discuss the case with no
discounting but a flow waiting cost, and show that without discounting, the trade-off
between precision and frequency diminishes and the dynamics of information become
irrelevant. In Section 1.7.2 ., I generalize Assumption 1.1 . to general information measures
and show that a Poisson signal almost always strictly dominates a Gaussian signal. I also
explain that immediate action and confirmatory learning properties are tightly tied to As-
sumption 1.1. To illustrate the role of Assumption 1.2., I discuss the case where the cost
function is linear in Section 1.7.3. and show that without convexity, the optimal strategy is
static.
The restrictive assumptions do limit the generality of the model. However, relaxing
them does not fundamentally alter the key intuition, and the methodology generalizes.
The discussion of these assumptions is relegated to the appendix. In Appendix A.1.2 ., I
relax the finite action assumption and show that the problem with a continuum of ac-
tions can be approximated well by adding actions. In Appendix A.1.3., I relax the binary
state assumption. Although the constructive proof of existence no longer works with the
general state space, I show that all the properties in Theorem 1.2. extend. The technical as-
sumptions do not restrict my model in a meaningful way and are therefore not discusses.
1.7.1 Linear delay cost
As is discussed in Section 1.6.2., discounting is the key factor driving all the dynamics.
With exponential discounting, the trade-off between the arrival frequency and precision
of signals changes according to the continuation value. A sensible conjecture is that if
we replace exponential discounting with linear discounting, i.e., the DM pays a fixed
flow cost of delay, the time distribution of the utility gain and information cost no longer
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Theorem 1.4. Given Assumptions 1.1. and 1.2., suppose Vpµq solves Equation (1.12).; then:
Vpµq “ sup
PP∆2pXq,λą0
EPrFpνqs ´ m` Cpλq
λ
EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs
Theorem 1.4 . illustrates that solving Equation (1.12). is equivalent to solving a static ra-
tional inattention problem, with m`Cpλqλ being the marginal cost on the information mea-
sure (see Caplin and Dean (2013.) and Mateˇjka and McKay (2014.)). The optimal value
function can be obtained through various learning strategies. Assuming pP˚,λ˚q to be the
solution to the problem in Theorem 1.4 ., then all dynamic information acquisition strate-
gies that eventually implement P˚ (i.e., µ8 „ P˚) and incur flow cost λ˚ achieve the same
utility level Vpµq.22 .
Note that in Equation (1.12) ., the utility depends on the decision time only through ex-
pected delay Erτs. Therefore, the previous analysis implies that all dynamic information
acquisition strategies that eventually implement P˚ and incur flow cost λ˚ have the same
expected delay. This result suggests that the cost structure specified by Assumptions 1.1 .
and 1.2. has the property that all learning strategies are equally fast on expectation, but
theymight differ in terms of riskiness. The linear delay cost case is a knife-edge case where
the DM is risk neutral on the time dimension and, consequently, all learning strategies are
equally good.
When the DM discounts delayed payoffs, as is assumed in the main model, she is risk
loving on the time dimension; therefore, the DM prefers a riskier strategy. Intuitively,
22This result is stated and proved formally in Chapter 3 .
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the riskiest information acquisition strategy is a “greedy strategy” that maximizes the
probability of early decision (at the cost of a high probability of long delays as the ex-
pected delay is fixed). The confirmatory Poisson learning strategy exactly resembles such
a greedy strategy. The key property of the strategy is that all resources are used in verify-
ing the conjectured state directly, and no intermediate step exists before a breakthrough.
Alternative strategies, such as Gaussian learning and contradictory Poisson learning all
involve the accumulation of substantial intermediate evidence to conclude a success. The
intermediate evidence accelerates future learning and hence hedges the risk of decision
time. Moreover, the decision time is further dispersed by acquiring signals with decreas-
ing frequency.
Equation (1.12) . is the dynamic learning foundation provided in Hébert andWoodford
(2016.) to justify Gaussian learning.23 . The analysis of Equation (1.12). suggests that a linear
delay cost is a knife-edge case.
1.7.2 General information measure
Technically, Assumption 1.1 . helps throughout the entire analysis. The methodology
of concavifying ”the gross value function“ is possible only when the expected utility gain
and information measure take consistent forms. However, I want to show that one key
feature of the baseline model—the optimality of Poisson learning—does not depend on













s.t. pJpµ, νq ` κpµ, σq ď c
23In Hébert and Woodford (2016.), informativeness measures that are more general than Assumption 1.1 .
are also considered in the Appendix.
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The objective function of Equation (1.13) . is exactly the same as that of Equation (1.4) . with
Assumption 1.2-a . I assume that the DM controls a jump-diffusion belief process. The
gain from information is the same as before. I assume Jpµ, νq to be an arbitrary function
that is both prior and posterior dependent. The cost of the diffusion signal is κpµ, σq. I
impose the following assumptions on Jpµ, νq and κpµ, σq.
Assumption 1.4.
1. J P Cp4qp0, 1q2.
2. @µ P p0, 1q, Jpµ, µq “ J1νpµ, µq “ 0, and J2ννpµ, µq ą 0.
3. κpµ, σq “ 12σ2 J2ννpµ, µq.
First, J is assumed to be sufficiently smooth to eliminate technical difficulties. Jpµ, µq “
0 is the implication of “an uninformative Poisson signal is free”.24 . J1νpµ, µq “ 0 and
J2ννpµ, µq ą 0 are implications of “any informative Poisson signal is costly”. Within this
continuous time framework, these assumptions are imposed on J without loss of general-
ity. The crucial assumption is the third condition: κpµ, σq “ 12σ2 J2ννpµ, µq. This assumption
states that the cost functional is “continuous” in the space of the signal structures. Con-
sider a Poisson signal pp, νq. When νÑ µ, the utility gain from learning this signal is:
p
`
Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq˘ “ pˆ1
2
V2pµqpν´ µq2 `O|ν´ µ|3
˙
Therefore, pp, νq approximates a Gaussian signal with flow variance ppν ´ µq2. Mean-
while, the cost of this signal is:
pJpµ, νq “p
ˆ
Jpµ, µq ` J1νpµ, µqpν´ µq ` 12 J
2




ppν´ µq2 J2ννpµ, µq ` pOp|ν´ µ|3q
24In this setup, Jpµ, µq “ 0 is WLOG. If an uninformative signal has a strictly positive cost, we can always
shift the capacity constraint c to normalize Jpµ, µq to 0.
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Hence, if the cost of a Gaussian signal is consistent with the cost of imprecise Poisson
signals in the limit, κpµ, σq “ 12σ2 J2ννpµ, µq.
Theorem 1.5. Given Assumption 1.4 ., suppose V P Cp3qp0, 1q solves Equation (1.13)., and let




2Jp3qννµpµ, µq2 ` Jp3qνννpµ, µqJp3qννµpµ, µq
J2ννpµ, µq ` J
p4q
νννµpµ, µq ` Jp4qννµµpµ, µq




Vpµq ą Fpµq and Lpµq ‰ 0
)
, the set of µ s.t.:
ρVpµq “ c V
2pµq
J2ννpµ, µq
is of zero measure.
The interpretation of Theorem 1.5 . is that a Poisson signal is almost always strictly
superior to the diffusion signal. In the experimentation region where Lpµq ‰ 0, Vpµq
can be achieved by a diffusion signal only at a zero measure of points. Lpµq “ 0 is a
partial differential equation on Jpµ, νq in the diagonal of space. Therefore, the set of points
that Lpµq “ 0 could contain an interval only when Jpµ, νq is a local solution to the PDE.
The solution to a specific PDE is a non-generic set in the set of all functions satisfying
Assumption 1.4 . In this sense, for an arbitrary information measure Jpµ, νq, the optimal
policy function contains a diffusion signal almost nowhere.
A trivial sufficient condition for Lpµq ‰ 0 is Assumption 1.1 . Assumption 1.1 . implies
that Jp2qνν pµ, νq is invariant in µ. In this case Lpµq “ ρc J2ννpµ, µq2 ą 0 for certain. The first
corollary of Theorem 1.5 . characterizes D when J is almost locally posterior separable.
@ f P Cp1qp0, 1q2, define a norm ‖ f p¨q‖δ “ supxPrδ,1´δs
␣| f px, xq|, ‖∇ f px, xq‖L2(.
Corollary 1.5.1. Given Assumption 1.4 ., suppose V P Cp3qp0, 1q solves Equation (1.13).; then, for
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any δ ą 0, there exists ε s.t. if
∥∥∥Jp3qννµ∥∥∥
δ
ď ε, then in the interval rδ, 1´ δs the set of µ s.t.:
ρVpµq “ c V
2pµq
J2ννpµ, µq
is of zero measure.
The condition in Corollary 1.5.1 . states that J2ννpµ, νq is approximately constant over µ
for ν close to µ. This result verifies my analysis in Section 1.6.2.1. that the comparison
of Poisson and Gaussian signals relies only on the local properties of J. Another simple
sufficient condition for Lpµq ‰ 0 is high impatience or low learning capacity.
Corollary 1.5.2. Given Assumption 1.4 ., suppose V P Cp3qp0, 1q solves Equation (1.13). Then,
for any δ ą 0, there exists ∆ s.t. if ρc ě ∆, then in the interval rδ, 1´ δs, the set of µ s.t.:
ρVpµq “ c V
2pµq
J2ννpµ, µq
is of zero measure.
Corollaries 1.5.1 . and 1.5.2. complement the discussion in Section 1.7.1 . and illustrate the
complete picture of how the DM’s incentives pin down the optimal learning dynamics.
First, when Assumption 1.1 . holds, Theorem 1.4 . implies that the cost structure does not
favor any learning strategy. Any positive discount rate gives the DM incentive to choose
a Poisson signal. All learning strategies, including Gaussian learning, become equally op-
timal only when time preference is risk neutral. Second, when Assumption 1.1 . is violated
by a small amount, then even though the cost structure might favor a Gaussian signal,
the incentive is dominated by discounting. Third, when the cost structure provides arbi-




Although Poisson learning is generally optimal, immediate action and confirmatory evi-
dence are implications of Assumption 1.1. Imagine a case in which high-precision signals
are relatively inexpensive (e.g., Jpµ, νq is truncated both below and above). Then, when
the prior is close to the boundary of the stopping region, seeking confirmatory evidence
(with low precision and high frequency) results in very high cost, whereas seeking for a
precise contradictory signal is inexpensive. Searching for a contradictory signal causes
the belief to drift rapidly toward the more likely state, which effectively enables quick
confirmation. Therefore, the contradictory signal becomes optimal. In fact, this example
has the same intuition as the findings in Che and Mierendorff (2016.). In their setup, the
DM allocates limited attention to two exogenous Poisson signals, each revealing a state.
When the DM is more uncertain, their model predicts that the DM acquires a confirma-
tory signal. However, near the stopping boundary, their model predicts a contradictory
signal, as the contradictory signal approximates an infeasible confirmatory signal with
low precision and high frequency.
On the other hand, consider the immediate action property. Imagine a case in which
low-precision signals are inexpensive. Then, breaking a long jump into multiple short
jumps may be profitable. The immediate action property is called the single experiment
property (SEP) in Che and Mierendorff (2016.). In their paper, SEP is also shown not to be
a robust property in a generic Poisson learning model.
1.7.3 Linear flow cost
In this subsection, I study the case where the flow cost CpIq is a linear function. As-
sumption 1.2. is replaced by the following assumption:
Assumption 1.21 (Linear flow cost). Function h is defined by CpIq “ λI, λ ą 0.
The convexity of CpIq in Assumption 1.2 . gives the DM incentive to smooth the acqui-
sition of information. When CpIq is a linear function, the optimal value is achieved by
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acquiring all the information and immediately making a decision.
Theorem 1.6. Given Assumptions 1.1. and 1.21 ., suppose Vpµq solves Equation (1.1)., then:
Vpµq “ sup
PP∆2pXq
EPrFpνqs ´ λEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs (1.14)
The intuition for this result is simple. At any instant in time, suppose that the optimal
decision is to continue learning for a positive amount of time. The value is the discounted
future value at the next instant of time pt`dtq less the flow cost of information. Now, con-
sider moving the learning strategy at t` dt to the current period. Then, both the future
value at t ` dt and the cost are discounted by dt less. If the net utility gain from learn-
ing at t` dt is nonnegative, then this operation increases the current utility by reducing
the waiting time.25 . If the net utility gain from learning at t ` dt is negative, then stop-
ping learning immediately increases current utility. This operation can always be applied
recursively and strictly improves the strategy until all information is acquired at period
0.26 .
In fact, given Assumptions 1.1 . and 1.21 ., Equation (1.1) . is a variant of the more gen-
eral model in Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.), which considers a varying state and
repeated decision making. With linear cost function CpIq, no motivation for smoothing
the learning behavior exists. The dynamics in Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.) are a
result of the intertemporal dependence of decision problems.
25This step utilizes Assumption 1.21 ., which implies that the cost of a combined signal structure is the sum
of the cost of each of them.
26Strictly speaking, an immediate learning strategy is not admissible because its belief path is not cadlag.
However, there always exists a way to implement a signal structure in an arbitrarily short period of time,




1.8.1 Choice accuracy and response time
The two-choice sequential decision making problem has been extensively studied in
the psychological and behavioral studies. One of the key objective is to explain the data on
choice accuracy and response time from experiments. The drift-diffusion model (DDM)
has been the most popular theoretical model for these decision problems, for the reason
that DDM is very tractable and fits the accuracy/ response time data well. However,
accounting for the joint distribution of choice accuracy and response time remains a chal-
lenge for DDM. In this section, I apply my model to predict a systematic feature in the
data: the crossover of response time-accuracy relationship.
The crossover happens when the difficulty of decision problem varies: the error re-
sponses are faster than the correct responses when the task is easy; the error responses
are slower than the correct responses when the task is hard (see Luce et al. (1986.), Rat-
cliff, Van Zandt, and McKoon (1999.)). First, I illustrate the crossover of time-accuracy
relationship in Example 1.5.
Example 1.5. Consider the same decision problem as in Example 1.1. Fpµq “ maxt1´ 2µ, 2µ´ 1u
and ρ “ 1. Assume prior belief µ0 “ 0.5 and let H0pµq be the entropy function. Define
uncertainty measure Hpµq as:
Hpµq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
H0pµq if µ P r0.5, 0.65s
H0pµq ´ |µ´ 0.5|3 if µ ă 0.5
H0pµq ´ 4|µ´ 0.65|3 if µ ą 0.65
Hpµq is an asymmetric uncertainty measure, and Hpµq is slightly more concave than H0
when µ ă 0.5 or µ ą 0.65. The different difficulty levels are modeled as different capacity
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constraints on´LHpµtq, the higher the capacity constraint is, the easier the decision prob-
lem is. I study the joint distribution of choice and decision time conditional on the true
state being r (µ “ 1). Figure 1.13 . depicts the latency-probability (LP) and quantile-probability
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Left panel: The latency-probability function (the thin line) and the data points simu-
lated from 8 difficulty levels. Right panel: The quantile-probability functions (the thin
lines, from bottom to top: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 quantile) and the data points simulated
from 8 difficulty levels. The correct responses are to the right of 0.5, the errors are to
the left of 0.5. Red points: the errors have shorter response times. Blue points: the
errors have longer response time.
Figure 1.13: LP and QP plots
(QP) plots. The horizontal coordinates of the points to the right of p “ 0.5 shows the
choice probability of the action R (the correct choice). Each such point has a correspond-
ing point to the left of p “ 0.5 showing the remaining probability of the action L (the
error). The vertical coordinates of all points show the response time measured by mean
(in LP plot) or by quantiles (in QP plot).
The crossover of time-accuracy relationship is illustrated by the differently colored
points. The red points are data points where the errors happen earlier than the correct
responses (measured by both mean or quantiles). They are simulated with high capacity,
thus are of higher accuracy in general. On the contrary, the blue points are data points
where the errors happen later than the correct responses. They are simulated with low
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capacity, and of low accuracy in general. In fact, Figure 1.13 . is qualitatively the same as
the LP and QP plots documented in Ratcliff and Rouder (1998.) and Ratcliff, Van Zandt,
and McKoon (1999.).
μ*μ0

















Figure 1.14: The critical beliefs of different difficulty levels
The main reason for the crossover is explained in Figure 1.14 . When the capacity is
low (the task difficulty is high), the optimal size of belief jump is small. By construction
of Hpµq, when the posterior belief is not far away from µ0, learning the state L is more
costly than learning the state R. As a result, the critical belief µ˚ at which searching for
both direction is indifferent is biased toward left. Since µ0 ą µ˚, the correct responses
are font-loaded. Applying the same intuition, when the capacity is high, µ0 ă µ˚ and the
errors are font-loaded.
Applying the idea from Example 1.5 ., creating a crossover of µ˚ and µ0 is necessary for
creating a crossover of the response time-accuracy relationship.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose |A| “ 2, Assumption 1.2-a . is satisfied. H0pµq and Fpµq are symmetric
around µ0 “ 0.5 and satisfy Assumption 1.3 . @ partition of R` : t0, c1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ck,8u, there exists
uncertainty measure Hpµq satisfying Assumption 1.3. such that:
1. When c P tcku, µ˚ “ µ0, and the optimal strategy at µ0 is the sames as that with H0pµq.
2. When c increases on R`, the sign of µ˚ ´ µ0 alternates on each partition.
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Proposition 1.1. states that the flexible learning model can fit an arbitrary number of
crossovers of the response time-accuracy relationship at given difficulty levels. The stan-
dard DDM predicts identical decision time distribution for the correct responses and the
errors (Ratcliff (1981.)). To accommodate a non-trivial speed-accuracy trade-off/complementarity,
DDM with varying boundary (Cisek, Puskas, and El-Murr (2009.)) or DDM with random
starting point and drift (Ratcliff and Rouder (1998.)) are proposed, and there are a lot of de-
bate about which variation works better. Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2018.) shows
that the collapsing (expanding) boundary maps exactly to the complementarity (trade-
off), and in an uncertain-difference DDM with endogenous stopping, decision boundary
collapses to zero asymptotically and accuracy declines over time. These analyses sug-
gest that DDM is able to fit the crossover, however at the cost of adding trial dependent
parameters. Meanwhile, it remains to be disentangled which set of parameters in DDM
are task specific and which set are subject specific. On the contrary, the flexible learning
model predicts the crossovers clearly with varying only a task difficulty parameter, while
keeping the task payoffs and the learning technology constant across trials.
1.8.2 Radical innovation
An important question in the study of innovation is to understandwhat characteristics
of a firm foster innovation. The second application relates the radicality of firm’s R&D
and innovation to its safe option. I consider two firms: an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E).
They face the identical set of risky new products. The only difference between the two
firms is that the incumbent has a better existing safe product. I am interested in which
firm innovates more radically in the R&D process. Intuitively, there are two competing
incentives:
1. Impatience effect: The incumbent has an overall higher continuation value than the
entrant. Therefore, by the value-precision monotonicity, the more impatient incum-
62
1.8. Applications
bent should prefer the frequency of signal to the precision of signal. So the impa-
tience effect suggests that the entrant innovates more radically.
2. Threshold effect: The incumbent has a better outside option. Therefore, it has a higher
threshold of belief for accepting a risky option. The relative value of a precise signal
to an imprecise signal is higher for the incumbent. Therefore, the threshold effect
suggests that the incumbent innovates more radically.
I model the problem using the following setup. There is one safe product Ps and K
risky products tP1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , PKu. The state is x P tG, Bu. x “ G means the new technology is
good, and the new products are better than the safe product: @i, k uipPk,Gq ą uipPs,Gq.
When x “ B, the new technology fails, and @i, k uipPk, Bq ă uipPs, Bq. @x, k, uIpPk, xq “
uEpPk, xq and uIpPsq ą uEpPsq. The two firms share the same Hpµq function and capacity
constraint c.27 . Let νipµq be the two firms’ optimal strategies. I define that a firm is looking
for more radical innovation given belief µ iff |νipµq ´ µ| ą |ν´ipµq ´ µ|, namely firm i is
searching for a more precise Poisson signal.
Example 1.6. I calculate a simple example. There is only one risky product and K “ 1. The
incumbent’s safe option pays uIpPs, xq “ 0.3 and the entrant’s safe option pays uEpPs, xq “
0.15. The risky option pays 1 when x “ G and ´1 when x “ B. H is the standard entropy
function, ρ “ 1, c “ 0.3.
Figure 1.15. depicts the value functions (red curve: incumbent; blue curve: entrant).
The two dashed lines are the payoffs of the corresponding safe options. Figure 1.16 . de-
picts the policy functions (red curve: incumbent; blue curve: entrant). There is clearly a
crossover of the policy functions. In the union of the two firm’s experimentation regions,
27It is straightforward that if the cost of R&D is flexible, the incumbent invests (strictly) more as a di-
rect implication of the value-intensity monotonicity. So I fix the capacity and focus on the choice of signal
precision. It is not hard to extend the results to the flexible cost case.
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Figure 1.15: Value function







Figure 1.16: Policy function
when µ ă µc the entrant seeks more radical innovation, when µ ą µc the incumbent seeks
more radical innovation.
The result of Example 1.6 . can be summarized by the following proposition. Suppose
K “ 1, let E0 be the union of the two firms’ experimentation regions.
Proposition 1.2. There exists µc s.t. @µ P E0, µ ą µc ùñ |νIpµq ´ µ| ą |νEpµq ´ µ| and
µ ă µc ùñ |νIpµq ´ µ| ă |νEpµq ´ µ|. Moreover, E0Şp0, µcq ‰ H and E0Şpµc, 1q ‰ H.
Proposition 1.2 . first states that there exist a threshold belief that the incumbent looks
for more radical innovation if (and only if) the belief is higher than the threshold. More-
over, there exist none degenerate regions that either firm is innovating more radically
than the other. Therefore, the order of radically of the two firms’ innovations switches ex-
actly once when the belief changes. Here is the intuition for the crossover. The entrant’s
value function is always steeper than the incumbent’s, hence, the difference in the contin-
uation value is decreasing in the belief. As a result, the impatience effect is diminishing
when µ increases. On the other hand, when µ is higher, it is ex ante more likely that the
risky arm will be chosen. As a result, the threshold effect outweighs the impatience effect
when µ increases. Therefore, when µ increases, the incumbent is increasingly favoring a
more precise signal, comparing to the entrant. Thus, there is a crossover.
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Proposition 1.2. extends to multiple risky products as well. When K ą 1, the exper-
imentation regions are no longer simple intervals. Instead, they are unions of open in-
tervals. In any experimentation interval where V never touches Fs, the two firms use the
identical strategy (since the outside option is never triggered). So we only consider the
leftmost interval in each firm’s experimentation region. Let E0 be the union of the two
firms’ leftmost intervals of the experimentation region.
Proposition 1.3. There exists µc s.t. @µ P E0, µ ą µc ùñ |νIpµq ´ µ| ą |νEpµq ´ µ| and
µ ă µc ùñ |νIpµq ´ µ| ă |νEpµq ´ µ|. Moreover, E0Şp0, µcq ‰ H and E0Şpµc, 1q ‰ H.
1.9 Conclusion
This chapter provides a dynamic information acquisition framework which allows
fully general design of signal processes, and characterizes the optimal information ac-
quisition strategy. My first contribution is an optimization foundation for a family of
simple information generating processes: for an information acquisition problem with
flexible design of information, the optimal information structure causes beliefs to follow
a jump-diffusion process. Second, I characterize the optimal policy: seeking a Poisson
signal whose arrival confirms the prior belief is optimal. The arrival of the signal leads
to an immediate action. The absence of the signal is followed by continued learning with
increasing precision and decreasing frequency.
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Consider a decision maker (DM) who is making a one-shot choice of action. The pay-
off of each action depends on an unknown state of the world. The DM can design a
sequence of signal structures as her information source subject to a flow informativeness
constraint. The informativeness of a signal structure is measured by a posterior separable
measure. The DM is impatient and discounts future payoffs. Here I want to study the fol-
lowing question: fix a target information structure, what is the optimal learning dynamics
that implements this target information structure?
In Example 2.1 ., I analyze this problem in a very simple toy model. In the example,
I consider three simple dynamic signal structures: (i) pure accumulation of information
before decision making, (ii) learning from a decisive signal arriving at a Poisson rate and
(iii) learning from observing a Gaussian signal. This example suggests that different dy-
namic signal structures mainly differ in the induced decision time distribution. Since the
form of discounting function prescribes the risk attitude on the time dimension, the dis-
counting function (or time preference) is a key factor determining the optimal dynamic
signal structure.
Example 2.1. The unknown state of the world can take two possible values x “ t0, 1u.
Prior belief is µ “ 0.5 (the probabiltiy that x “ 1). Suppose that the target information
structure is full revelation (induced posterior belief is either 0 or 1). I consider a model
in continuous time. The flow information measure of belief process µt is assumed to be
Er´ ddtHpµtq
ˇˇFts (the uncertainty reduction speed, introduced in Chapter 1 .), where Hpµq “
1´ 4pµ ´ 0.5q2. Assume that the flow cost constraint is c ď 1. The DM has exponential
discount function e´t. I assume the utility from the optimal actions associated with each
state to be 1. In this example, I compare three different learning strategies:
1. Pure accumulation: the DM uses up all resources pushing her posterior beliefs towards
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the boundary. This strategy is a continuous time extension of the suspense maximizing
strategy introduced in Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015.). At each prior µ, the strategy




. The DM makes decision once her posterior arrives at 0 or 1. The posterior
belief will either drift along one of two deterministic iso-time curve or jump between












Figure 2.1: Belief trajectory
Figure 2.1 . illustrates the two iso-time curves (thick dashed curves) and a possible path
of belief (blue curve). By the standard property of compensated Poisson process, the
DM’s posterior belief drifts towards the boundary with speed 14p2µ´1q . Therefore, one




It is easy to solve that µptq “ 1`
?
t
2 . As a result, the DM’s decision time i.e. the time that
belief process hits 1 is deterministic at t “ µ´1p1q “ 1. Then the expected utility from




the pure accumulation strategy is discounted by one unit of time: VA “ e´1 « 0.368.
2. Gaussian learning: the DM observes a Gaussian signal, whose drift is the true state and
variance is a control variable. By the standard property of Gaussian learning, the DM’s
posterior belief process follows a martingale Brownian motion. The flow variance of
the posterior belief process satisfies the information cost constraint Er´ ddtHpµtq
ˇˇFts “
´12σ2H2pµq ď c. Therefore, we can solve for σ2 “ 14 when the constraint is binding.
It is obvious that it is optimal to have the constraint binding. The value function is















ùñ VG “ Vp0.5q « 0.459
3. Poisson learning: the DM learns the state perfectly at Poisson rate λ. If no information
arrives, her belief stays at the prior. By the flow informativeness constraint Er´ ddtHpµtq
ˇˇFts “
λpHpµtq ´ 12Hp1q ´ 12Hp0qq ď c ùñ λ “ 1. The value function is characterized by the
HJB:
ρVP “ λp1´VPq
ùñ VP “ 0.5
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Clearly:
VP ą VG ą VA
Now we introduce the intuition why the values are ordered in this way. First, all of
the three strategies induce the same expected decision time 1. This is due to the linearity
of posterior separable information measure in compound experiments. The measure of
a signal structure that fully reveals the state at prior 0.5 is exactly 1, and it must equal
the expected sum of the total learning costs. Since in each continuing unit of time flow
cost 1 is spent, expected learning time must be exactly 1. Therefore, what determines the
expected decision utility is the dispersion of decision time distributions. Since exponen-
tial discount function e´t is a strictly convex function, a learning strategy that creates the
most dispersed decision time attains the highest expected utility. Now let us study the
decision time distribution induced by the three strategies:
1. Pure accumulation: t “ 1 with probability 1. The decision time is deterministic.
2. Gaussian learning: The decision time is the first passage time of a standard Brownian









Bt “ 0 or 1
*
The distribution of τ is characterized by a heat equation with two-sided boundary
conditions at x “ 0, 1. This equation has no analytical solution (solution can be charac-
terized by series). Here I numerically simulate this process:
Figure 2.2 . depicts the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs over time. We
can see that at any time, the distribution over posteriors is a Normal distribution cen-
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Figure 2.2: Belief distribution of Gaussian learning
sored at the two absorbing barriers 2 . The normal part is becoming flatter over time
because learning leads to mean preserving spread of posterior beliefs.
3. Poisson learning: As is calculated, the Poisson signal arrives at a fixed arrival fre-
quency λ “ 1. The stopping time distribution can be calculated easily:
Fptq “ 1´ e´t
Evolution of posterior beliefs is shown in Figure 2.3.: Figure 2.3. depicts the evolution of
the distribution of posteriors over time. At any time, distribution over posteriors has
three mass points at the prior and the two target posteriors. The mass on prior is de-
creasing over time (following an exponential distribution) and the mass on posteriors
is increasing over time.
Obviously, pure accumulation is always the worst in this example since it induces
deterministic decision time. By comparing Figures 2.2 . and 2.3., one can easily see the dif-
2The distribution has point mass at 0, 1, represented by the straight lines in Figure 2.2 . The relative
height represents the size of the probability mass. But the point mass part and Normal part does not share
the same scale.
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Figure 2.3: Belief distribution of Poisson learning
ference between Gaussian learning and Poisson learning: Gaussian learning accumulates
some information that induces intermediate beliefs over time, while Poisson learning uses
up all resources to draw conclusive signals. It seems that Poisson learning induces higher
decision probability in the beginning while Gaussian learning induces higher decision
probability later on (when prior becomes more dispersed). Therefore, Poisson learning
has more dispersed decision time. We can verify this conjecture by plotting the PDFs and
the integral of CDFs:
















Figure 2.5: Integral of CDFs
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In figure Figures 2.4 . and 2.5., the black curves represent Poisson learning, the red
curves represent Gaussian learning and the dashed lines represent pure accumulation.
It is not hard to see from Figure 2.5 . that the decision time of Poisson learning is in fact
a mean-preserving spread of that of Gaussian learning. So Poisson learning dominates
Gaussian learning for not only exponential discounting, but also any other convex dis-
counting function.
In Example 2.1 ., I compare three kinds of dynamic learning strategies. These three
strategies are chosen to be representative. First, the three strategies are simple heuristics
that are very tractable. Second, these three strategies are also representative for three
kinds of learning frameworks widely used in the literature:
• Pure accumulation has a flavor of the static rational inattention models. Like in
Mateˇjka and McKay (2014.), decision is made once and there is no dynamics. Even
in dynamic rational inattention model like Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.), in-
formation is acquired in one period, and there is no smooth of information. In this
example, the belief processes induced by learning has neither time dispersion nor
cross-sectional dispersion when using the pure accumulation strategy.
• Gaussian learning itself is well studied in the literature, for example by Moscarini
and Smith (2001.), Hébert and Woodford (2016.). On the other hand, Gaussian learn-
ing is one kind of symmetric drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff and McKoon (2008.)).
Gaussian learning captures the idea of gradual learning both over time and over
beliefs.
• Poisson learning has been studied in Che and Mierendorff (2016.). Poisson bandit is
also used as a building block for strategic experimentation models (see a survey by
Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016.)). My example considers a simplest stationary Poisson
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stopping strategy that stochastically reveals the true state. Poisson learning is only
gradual over time, but is lump sum in the belief space.
Example 2.1 . suggests a key trade-off to be studied: gradual accumulation of infor-
mation v.s. seeking decisive evidence. I want to study how the choice between gradual
accumulation and decisive evidence seeking determines the decision time distribution.
In Section 2.2 ., I develop an information acquisition problem that imposes no restriction
on the specific form of information a decision maker can acquire. The DM can choose an
arbitrary random process as signals, and she observes the signal realizations as her infor-
mation. There are two constraints on the signal process. First, flow informativeness of the
process is bounded. Second, the signal distribution conditional on stopping is fixed. If
the DM chooses to learn gradually, then she is able to accumulate sufficient information
before making any decision. After accumulating information, she can run the target ex-
periment successfully with very high probability and achieves close to riskless decision
time. On the contrary, if the DM chooses to only seek decisive signals, then the signals
arrive only with low probabilities. So the corresponding decision time is riskier.
The main finding of this chapter is that among all decision time distributions induced
by feasible and exhaustive3 . learning strategies, the most dispersed decision time distri-
bution is induced by decisive Poisson learning–only decisive signals arrive as Poisson
process. Meanwhile, the least dispersed time distribution is induced by pure accumula-
tion, as I have already shown in Example 2.1.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 . setups a general discrete time infor-
mation acquisition framework. Section 2.3 . proves the main theorem. Section 2.4 . extends
the result to a continuous time model. Section 2.6. concludes.
3A feasible strategy is exhaustive if it is not leaving any capacity unused or acquiring unrelated infor-
mation.
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2.2 Setup of model
The model is in discrete time. Consider a decision maker who has a discount function
ρt decreasing and convex (both weakly) in time t and limtÑ8
ř8
s“t ρs “ 0. There is a finite
state space X and action space A. The prior belief of the unknown payoff-relevant state
is µ P ∆pXq. The DM’s goal is to implement a signal structure that induces distribution
pi P ∆2pXq over posterior beliefs4 . By implementing a target signal structure, I mean
conditional on stopping, the signal structure in the current period must be a sufficient
statistics for the target information structure. The informativeness of signal structure is
measured by a posterior separable function Ippi, νi|µq “
ř
pipHpµq ´ Hpνiqq. In each
period, the DM can acquire information for no more than c unit, i.e. E
“
Ippti , νti |µtq
‰ ď c.
The optimization problem is:
sup
St,T
ErρT upA,X qs (2.1)
s.t.
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq ď c
X Ñ St Ñ A conditional on T “ t
X Ñ St Ñ 1T ět
where T P ∆N is a random stopping time. St´1 is defined as summary of past infor-
mation pS1, . . . ,St´1q. S0 ” c0 is assumed to be degenerate. The objective function in
Equation (2.1) . is the expected discounted utility from taking the action. The first con-
straint is the flow information cost constraint, it states that conditional on any history, the
information cost incurred in a period is less than the constraint c. The second constraint
is the target information structure constraint. It states that at each period, conditional
on stopping the acquired information structure is statistically sufficient for the target ac-
4State and signal realization can be equivalently represented as a pair of random variables pX ,Aq.
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tion profile. The remaining constraint is a natural information process constraint (or the
standard measurability constraint for stopping time).
Remark 2.1. This model is restrictive in the design of information in the following sense:
At any instant in time, conditional on stopping, the information acquired must be statis-
tically sufficient for a time invariant random variable A. Other than this restriction, the
DM can freely choose her learning dynamics. The interpretation of this constraint is not
easy, as it is an aggregate constraint for each period, unconditional on the history of past
signals. This model does not necessarily cover Gaussian learning in general, but it does
in a symmetric cases (i.e. target posterior distribution and H are symmetric around prior
µ, like in Example 2.1 .).
The main reason for imposing this constraint is for tractability. I restrict learning dy-
namics in this way to abstract away from the fact that the optimal target information
structure itself is changing over time, which creates time varying incentive for search di-
rection, search precision and search intensity (highlighted in Chapter 1.). In the current
chapter, I want to focus on the trade-off between gradual information accumulation and
decision evidence seeking.
I assume that the DM follows the suggestion of signal structure A in choosing the
action. This is WLOG since given any signal structure, the induced optimal action itself
forms a Blackwell less informative signal structure. Therefore, the original learning strat-
egy is still statistically sufficient for the direct signal structure. So if we take the optimiza-
tion of A also into account, then it is WLOG to assume that A is a direct signal. Then the
optimal implementation of A still follows a solution to Equation (2.1) . The optimization




2.3.1 An auxiliary problem
Let I¯ “ IpA;X q and V˚ “ ErupA,X qs. Consider a relaxed problem which only tracks
the average accumulated information measure I at every time t, rather than the entire








p I¯ ´ Itqpt ` pIt`1 ´ Itqp1´ ptq ď c
Pt “ Pt´1 ` p1´ Pt´1qpt
P0 “ 0, I1 “ 0
where pt P r0, 1s and It ě 0. 1´ Pt´1 is the surviving probability at period t, pt is the
conditional stopping probability. It is the total expected information measure of the entire
path of non-stopping signals up to period t.
The constraints in the relaxed problem Equation (2.2) . capture a key feature of posterior
separable information measure: It is accumulated linearly over time and the information
measure required to implement S is exactly the remaining information measure I¯ ´ It.
It is more relaxed than Equation (2.1). in the following sense: in Equation (2.1)., the flow
informativeness constraint is imposed on all histories of St´1 and 1T ďt. However, in
Equation (2.2) ., the first constraint is imposed only on each period unconditional on the
history. In other words, the first constraint in Equation (2.2) . is an average version of the
flow informativeness constraint in Equation (2.1). pt can be interpreted as the expected
stopping probability and It’s as the expected accumulated informativeness.
Lemma 2.1. Equation (2.1). ď Equation (2.2).
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Lemma 2.1. verifies the previous intuition, that Equation (2.2). is a relaxation of Equa-
tion (2.1) . Now I first solve Equation (2.2) . Then we can use the auxiliary problem to
provide some clue for solving the original problem Equation (2.1) .
Theorem 2.1. pt ” cI¯ solves Equation (2.2).
Theorem 2.1 . states that the relaxed problem Equation (2.2). has a simple solution: no








˚. I prove Theorem 2.1 . by approximating the convex
discount function ρt with a finite summation of linear functions. Then for each linear
discount function, I prove by backward induction that choosing It ” 0 is optimal.
2.3.2 Optimal learning dynamics










is attainable by a feasible strategy in Equation (2.1) . Consider the following experimen-
tation strategy: A is observed with probability cI¯ in each period. If A is successfully
observed, the corresponding action is taken. If not, go to the next period and follow the




s0 with probability 1 if St´1 P AŤts0u
A with probability cI¯ if St´1 “ c0
c0 with probability 1´ cI¯ if St´1 “ c0
(2.4)
T “t if St P A
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Here signal s0 means stopping. Signal c0 means continuation. Any signal in A indicates

























IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq
“1St´1“c0 IpSt;X |tc0u, 1q ` 1St´1‰c0 Ips0;X |St´1, 0q




¨ I¯ ď c
• Decision time distribution:






I show that Equation (2.4) . implements the expected utility level Equation (2.3) ., hence
solves Equation (2.1) . It is easy to see that Equation (2.4) . induces expected decision time
I¯
c . By Lemma 2.2., which is stated below,
I¯
c is the lower bound of expected decision time
for all feasible strategies. In fact, the proof of Lemma 2.2 . suggests that ErT s ą I¯c only
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when there is some waste of information: either capacity constraint c is not fully used, or
St contains strictly more information than A conditional on taking action.
Lemma 2.2. Let pSt, T q be a strategy that satisfies the constraints in Equation (2.1)., then ErT s ě
I¯
c .
I call an information acquisition strategy exhaustive if the corresponding ErT s “ I¯c . The
decision time distribution Pt induced by strategy Equation (2.4) . is a exponential distribu-
tion with parameter cI¯ . Equation (2.4) . being the optimal strategy, independent of choice
of ρt implies that @ρt, @ information acquisition strategy p rSt, rT q:
Erρ rT upA;X qs ď ErρT upA;X qs
ùñ Erρ rT s ď ErρT s
Since ρt ranges over all positive decreasing convex functions, Pt as distribution over time
is second order stochastically dominated. Summarizing the analysis above, I get Theo-
rem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. Equation (2.4). solves Equation (2.1). The decision time distribution of any feasible
and exhaustive information acquisition strategy is ameas preserve contraction of Pt.
2.3.3 Gradual learning v.s. decisive evidence
My analysis illustrates the gradual learning v.s. decisive evidence trade-off in the
flexible learning environment. The trade-off is: the speed of future learning depends on
how much information the DM has already possessed. Accumulating more information
today speeds up future learning. So the DM is choosing between naively learning just for
today or learning for the future. If all resources are invested in seeking decisive evidence,
then signal arrives at a constant low probability, and the decision time distribution is
dispersed. If some resources are invested in information accumulation, then learning will
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accelerate, at a cost of lower (or even zero) arrival rate of decisive signals in the early
stage. As a result the decision time is less dispersed.
When the decision maker has convex discounting function, decisive evidence seeking
is optimal. The intuition behind this result is natural. Convex discounting functionmeans
that the decision maker is risk loving towards decision time. Seeking decisive evidence is
the riskiest learning strategy one can take: it payoffs quickly with high probability, but if it
fails, learning is very slow in future. In practice, evidence seeking is a very natural learn-
ing strategies. A researcher tends to form a hypothesis, then seeks evidence that either
confirms or contradicts the hypothesis. Usually there is a clear target of what to prove
(the hypothesis), and what kind of signals (data from experiments) proves/contradicts
the hypothesis. Running the research protocol itself is usually more mechanical than the
designing stage. What is common in natural science is that the principal investigator(PI)
designs the whole research plan. Then all experiments, data collections and computa-
tions are run by doctoral students. The PI usually has a permanent position and there is
no deadline, so he can enjoy the expected payoff from this risky project design.
Two elements in my framework are crucial to this result. The first is the flexibility in
the design of signal process. In contrast to my framework, if one considers a dynamic in-
formation acquisition problem with highly parametrized information process, then other
kind of trade-offs tied to the parametrization constraints might have first order effects.
For example, if one only allows Poisson learning or Gaussian learning, then the trade-off
of gradual learning and decisive evidence is directly assumed away. As a result the choice
among signal types (Che and Mierendorff (2016.),Liang, Mu, and Syrgkanis (2017.)) or the
trade-off between intensity and information cost (Moscarini and Smith (2001.)) becomes
first order important. If one only allows DM to choose between to learn or not to learn
in each period, then the trade-off between exploration and exploitation becomes first or-
der. Meanwhile, in my framework, the DM can freely design the optimal signal type, and
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hence the corresponding decision time5 . So the aforementioned trade-offs actually do not
exist, the trade-off between gradual learning and decisive evidence becomes central to
the analysis.
The second is the posterior separability assumption on information measure. Pos-
terior separability is equivalent to the linear additivity of compound signal structures
(see the discussion in Section 1.7.1 .). This assumption restricts the relative price between
gradual learning and evidence seeking. Any amount of informativeness invested today
to accumulate information transfers one-to-one to the amount of reduction of informa-
tion cost tomorrow. Lemma 2.2. shows that the expected decision time is identical for
all feasible and exhaustive learning strategy. As a result the trade-off between gradual
learning and decisive learning translates to choice of dispersion of decision time distribu-
tion. If one assumes either sub-additivity or super-additivity in informativeness measure,
then choosing different learning strategies might also change the expected decision time,
which makes my key trade-off entangled with other effects.
2.4 Continuous time model
In this section, I study a continuous time version of Equation (2.1) . Let ρt : R˚ Ñ R˚ be
a decreasing and convex discounting function. Let Fpµq “ supa Eµrupa, xqs, the expected















µ0 “ µ, µt
ˇˇ
τ“t „ pi
5The DM can affect the decision time distribution by choosing the information acquisition strategy.
However, not all decision time distributions are implementable.
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where τ is a stopping time measurable to the natural filtration of µt. The objective func-
tion of Equation (2.6) . is the same as that of Equation (2.1) . In the stochastic control prob-
lem, the decision maker chooses the optimal posterior belief process xµty and stopping
time τ, subject to the 1) stopping time is measurable to belief process. 2) belief process is
a martingale. 3) flow increase in informativeness measure is bounded by c. 4) conditional
on stopping time, µt has distribution pi.
It is not hard to see that Equation (2.6) . is a continuous time extension of Equation (2.1) .
I take a belief based approach when formulating Equation (2.6) . However, I did not for-
mally proof how a stochastic process of posterior beliefs can be induced by a stochastic
information acquisition strategy. Equation (2.6). is constructed by taking analog of Equa-
tion (2.1). Let V˚ “ EpirFpµqs. Then








I0 “ 0, It ě 0, 9It ď c´ ptp I¯ ´ Itq
P0 “ 0, 9Pt “ p1´ Ptqpt
where pt is a positive integrable function.
Theorem 2.3. pt ” cI¯ solves Equation (2.7).
Lemma 2.3. and Theorem 2.3. are exactly the continuous time analogs of Lemma 2.1.
and Theorem 2.1 . Lemma 2.3 . states that Equation (2.7) . is a relaxed problem of Equa-
tion (2.2) . Theorem 2.3 . characterizes the solution of Equation (2.7) .: no information should







V˚dt. Theorem 2.3 .
is proved by discretizing the continuous time problem and invoking the result of Theo-
rem 2.1.
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2.4.1 Implementation









can be attained in Equation (2.6). Consider the following information acquisition strategy.
Let ν be a random variable with distribution pi and define:$’&’%
dµt “ pν´ µtq ¨ dNt
τ “ t if dNt=1
(2.8)
where Nt a standard Poisson counting processes with parameter cI¯ and independent to ν.
xµty is by definition a stationary compound Poisson process. The jump happens when the
Poisson signal arrives and belief jumps to posteriors according to distribution pi. Once the
jump occurs, decision is made immediately. It is easy to verify:
• Martingale property: We know that each compensated Poisson process dNt ´ cI¯dt is
martingale, therefore:
Erdµt|µts “Erpν´ µtq ¨ dNts
“EpirErpν´ µq ¨ dNt|νss
“Epi
”











therefore, µt is a martingale. The second equality is the law of iterated expectation.
Third equality is by Erνs “ µ and dNt ´ cI¯dt being martingale.
• Capacity constraint: If Nt ě 1, then Er´dHpµtqdt |µts “ 0 ď c. If Nt ă 1, then by the Ito
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formula for jump process:















The second equality is the law of iterated expectation. The third equality is the
martingale property of dNt ´ cI¯dt.
• Decision time distribution:
Pt “ 1´ e´ cI¯ t






Lemma 2.4. Let pµt, τq be a strategy that satisfies the constraints in Equation (2.6)., then Erτs ě
I¯
c .
As in the discrete time case, I call an information acquisition strategy exhaustive if the
corresponding Erτs “ I¯c . Since Equation (2.8) . is optimal independent of the choice of
convex ρt, previous analysis implies Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 2.4. Equation (2.8). solves Equation (2.6). The decision time distribution of any feasible
and exhaustive information acquisition strategy is a mean preserving contraction of Pt.
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2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Optimal target signal structure
In this section, I solve for the optimal target signal structure in decision problem Equa-







´ cHpµq´EpirHpνqs tdt ¨ c ¨ EpirFpνqs
Hpµq ´ EpirHpνqs (2.9)
s.t. Epirνs “ µ
Define f pV1,V2q “ ş80 ρte´ cHpµq´V1 tdt ¨ c¨V2Hpµq´V1 . Then it is not hard to verify that f pV1,V2q
is differentiable6 . in V1,V2. Optimization problem Equation (2.9). fits in Theorem 4.2.
from Chapter 4 . Applying the theorem gives a necessary condition for pi˚ solving Equa-
tion (2.9).:













Notice that the objective function is the expectation of the linear combination of two belief









Then by the standard argument in Bayesian persuasion, pi˚ can by characterized by con-
cavifying the gross value function F ` pgpEpi˚rHpνqsq ¨ Epi˚rFpνqsqH. Moreover, by Theo-
6Differentiabiliy can be shown by definition, noticing that e
´ c
Hpµq´V1 t ¨ t is absolutely integrable. .
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rem B.1 ., there exists pi˚ with support size 2|X| solving Equation (2.9) . So I get the follow-
ing characterization:
Proposition 2.1. There exists pi˚ solving Equation (2.9). and |suppppi˚q| ď 2|X|. Let λ “
gpEpi˚rHpνqsq ¨ Epi˚rFpνqs, any maximizer pi˚ satisfies:
pi˚ P arg max
piP∆2pXq
Epirνs“µ
EpirFpνq ` λ ¨ Hpνqs
Suppose the discounting function is a standard exponential function: ρt “ e´ρt, then









t c ¨ Epi˚rFpνqs
Hpµq ´ Epi˚rHpνqsdt “
c ¨ Epi˚rFpνqs
c` ρpHpµq ´ Epi˚rHpνqsq
Therefore, the optimality condition becomes:










Equation (2.10) . is very similar to the optimality condition I derived in Chapter 1 ., where
the optimal posterior is solved from concavifying Vp¨q ` ρcVpµqHp¨q. The problem solved
in Chapter 1 . is the continuous time limit of Equation (2.1) . without the restriction on con-
stant target signal structure andwith exponential discounting. In both problems, ρcVpµq is
adjusting the concavity of the gross value function. Therefore, higher continuation value
corresponds to more concave gross value function and less informative signal structure.
This suggests that the monotonicity in precision-frequency trade-off is extended to our
model as well. In Chapter 1 ., the trade-off is illustrated as decrease in precision of target in-
formation structure at each decision time. In the current chapter, target information struc-
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ture is forced to be constant over time. However, if I endogenize the target information
structure, then at more extreme prior beliefs associated with higher decision value, less
informative target information structure is optimal (and corresponding expected waiting
time is shorter).
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I characterize the decision time distributions that can be induced by a
dynamic information acquisition strategy, and study how time preference determines the
optimal form of learning dynamics. No restriction is placed on the form of information
acquisition strategy, except for a time invariant target signal structure and a flow informa-
tiveness constraint. I find that all decision time distributions have the same expectation,
and themaximal andminimal elements bymean-preserving spread order are exponential
distribution and deterministic distribution. The result implies that when time preference
is risk loving (e.g. standard or hyperbolic discounting), Poisson signal is optimal since it
induces the riskiest exponential decision time distribution. When time preference is risk
neutral (e.g. constant delay cost), all signal processes are equally optimal.
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3.1 Introduction
Information plays a central role in economic activities. It affects both strategic in-
teraction in games and single agent decision making under uncertainty. Information is
often endogenously acquired by a decision maker, as opposed to being exogenously en-
dowed. Therefore, it is important to understand how information is acquired. This boils
down to a simple trade-off: the value of information and the cost of acquiring informa-
tion. The value of information is often unambiguous in a single agent decision problem
with uncertainty. It is measured by the increased expected utility from choosing optimal
actions measurable to informative signal realizations(see Blackwell et al. (1951.)). How-
ever, there has been less consensus on the proper form of information acquisition cost.
One (probably most) popular measure of informativeness being used in many informa-
tion acquisition models is the Entropy based mutual information and its generalizations.
This approached was initiated by Sims (1998., 2003.), and is applied to a wide range of
problems (Mateˇjka and McKay (2014.), Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.), Yang (2015a.),
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014.), etc.). Despite its great theoretical tractability, Entropy
based models suffer from criticism on its unrealistic implications, including prior depen-
dence, invariant likelihood ratio of action, etc.
Two approaches can be taken to build a solid foundation for studying information ac-
quisition. One approach is to fully characterize the behavior implications associated with
mutual information and its generalizations. Then we will be able to empirically test the
behavior validity of these models. Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2017.) takes this approach
and proposes testable axioms for the Shannon model of rational inattention and its gen-
eralizations. The other approach is to impose only minimal assumptions on the cost of
information and study the robust predictions in an information acquisition problem. In
this chapter I take the second robust approach and focus on a dynamic information acqui-
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sition problem: a decisionmaker acquires information about a payoff relevant state before
choosing an action. She can choose an arbitrary random process as observed information,
subject to cost on information and cost on waiting.
I accomplish two main goals. First, I characterize the “minimal assumptions” on a
(static) information measure if a decision maker can choose from not only all information
structures but also all sequential combinations of them to minimize expected information
measure. I show that an indirect information measure is supported by expected learning
cost minimization— given any general measure of information, and for any informa-
tion structure (Blackwell experiment), the DM minimizes the expected total measure of a
compound experiment which replicates the original information structure— if and only
it satisfies three simple conditions. 1) Monotonicity: Blackwell more informative experi-
ment has higher measure. 2) Sub-additivity: the expected total measure of a replicating
compound experiment is weakly higher than the measure of the original experiment. 3)
C-linearity: mixing uninformative experiment with a proportion of informative experi-
ment has measure proportional to the mass on the informative part.
Second, I solve a dynamic information acquisition problem with those assumptions
imposed on the flow information measure. I prove that solving the dynamic problem can
be divided into two steps. The first step is to solve a static rational inattention problem
for an optimal static information structure. The second step is to solve for the optimal
dynamic implementation of the solution from the first step. The optimal information
process involves direct Poisson signals: signal arrives according to a Poisson counting
processes and the arrival of signal suggests the optimal action directly. When no signal
arrives, posterior belief process stays at prior.
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Related Literature
This chapter is closed related to two sets of works that aim at understanding the mea-
sure of information. The first tries to characterize implications (testable or non-testable)
of commonly used information measures. Basic mathematical implications and charac-
terizations for Entropy and Entropy based mutual information was provided in standard
information theory text books like Cover and Thomas (2012.). Mateˇjka and McKay (2014.)
and Caplin and Dean (2013.) study the behavior implications of rational inattention model
based on Mutual information and posterior separable information measure respectively.
Caplin and Dean (2015.) studies the implications of rational inattention model based on
general information measure. A set of full behavior characterizations for mutual infor-
mation, posterior separable information cost and their generalizations are provided in
Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2017.), Denti (2018.), and Frankel and Kamenica (2018.). Mean-
while, the second set of works seeks to build a dynamic foundation for common informa-
tion measures. Morris and Strack (2017.) shows that the posterior separable function can
be represented as the induced cost from random sampling. Hébert and Woodford (2016.)
justifies a class of information cost function (including mutual information) based on a
continuous-time sequential information acquisition problem. This chapter contributes
to this literature by providing a new optimization foundation for posterior separabil-
ity. Posterior separability is actually equivalent to additivity — both sub-additivity and
sup-additivity — in the expected measure of compound experiments. I show that sub-
additivity is justified by expected information cost minimization.
This chapter is also closely related to the dynamic information acquisition literature,
in which the main goal is to characterize the learning dynamics. A common approach
in this literature is to model information flow as a simple family of random process.
The decision maker can control parameters which represents aspects of interest. Wald
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(1947.) first studies stopping problem with exogenous information process. Moscarini
and Smith (2001.) and Che and Mierendorff (2016.) go further by edogenizing information
process into optimization problem in Brownian motion framework and Poisson bandits
framework to study dynamics of learning intensity and direction respectively. Some re-
cent papers edogenize the random process family as well and give decision maker full
flexibility in designing information. Chapter 1 . studies flexible dynamic information ac-
quisition with a posterior separable information measure and shows that confirmatory
Poisson signal is optimal. Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.) studies a repeated rational
inattention problem with mutual information as cost. This chapter contributes by relax-
ing the restriction on information cost to only minimal assumptions. I show that when
impatience is measure by fixed delay cost, the dynamic problem is closely related to the
static rational inattention problem, and Poisson learning is robustly optimal.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 . introduces the characteriza-
tion of indirect information measure based on expected information measure minimiza-
tion. Section 3.3 . setups a dynamic information acquisition problem and characterizes the
solution.
3.2 Indirect information measure
3.2.1 Information structure and the measure of informativeness
In this subsection, I formally define “information” and a “measure of informative-
ness” in decision making problems. I extract key factors in any abstract “information”
that matters in a decision making problem and characterize a well defined equivalence
class that characterizes all information structures. Then, I use an “indirect information
measure” characterization to derive the minimal assumptions that we should impose on
an information measure.
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Definition 3.1.
1. Bayesian plausible posteriors: Let ∆X Ă R|X| be the belief space over X. Let ∆2X be
the space of probability measures over ∆X. Πpµq “ ␣pi P ∆2Xˇˇ ş νdpipνq “ µ( is the set of
Bayesian plausible posterior distributions. Let Γ “ ␣ppi, µq P ∆2X ˆ ∆Xˇˇpi P Πpµq(
2. Information structure: Let S be an arbitrary set (set of signals). Let p P ∆S ˆ X be a
conditional distribution over S on x P X. pS, pq is an information structure. pS, pq can be
equivalently represented as S , a random variable whose realization is determined by p.
I would like to study the “set” of all information structures as a choice set for deci-
sion maker. However, since S is an arbitrary set, the “set” of all possible S is not even a
well-defined object from the perspective of set theory. Instead, I use Πpµq to equivalently
characterize the “set” of all information structures. @ pS, pq, @s P S, the posterior belief
from observing s can be calculated according to Bayes rule. The distribution of all such
posteriors forms a Bayesian plausible distribution as defined in Definition 3.1 . Since dif-
ferent signals inducing the same posterior belief affect neither the choice of action nor the
expected utility, I claim that Πpµq already summarizes all possible information structures
(up to the equivalence of posterior beliefs). Γ is defined as the set of all pairs ppi, µqwhere
pi represents an information structure given prior belief µ.
Definition 3.2. An information measure is a mapping I : Γ Ñ R`. I will represent Ippi, µq
using IpS ;X |µq in an interchangeable way, where µ is the distribution of X and S induces belief
distribution pi.
Information measure I is defined as a mapping from prior-information structure pairs
in Γ to extended non-negative real numbers. The only (implicit) restriction I put on I is
that different information structures that induce the same distribution of posterior pi at µ
have the same measure. This restriction is actually without loss of generality because the
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induced distribution of posterior of an information structure is always a sufficient statis-
tics for any feasible decision rule. Suppose different information structures have different
measure, then the DM is always able to choose an appropriate information structure with
the lowest information measure.1 . Definition 3.2. is the same as information cost function
defined in Caplin and Dean (2015.). The only difference is that I explicitly modeled prior
dependence of I: µ is an argument in I. In Caplin and Dean (2015.) prior is chosen and
fixed in the beginning so there is no need to explicitly specify information cost function
for different priors.
From this point on, for simplicity I represent the choice set of DM with information
structures S . However, I don’t differentiate two information structures that induces same
distribution of posterior beliefs. By using notation ¨ˇˇS , I mean conditional on the posterior
beliefs induced by realization of S . The next step is to impose some restrictive assump-
tions on I. The restrictions I impose is about comparing measure of information structure
when they satisfies some information order. So first let’s formally define the information
order.
Definition 3.3 (Information processing constraint). Given random variables X ,S , T and
their joint distribution ppx, s, tq. Let ppt|sq, ppt|s, xq be the conditional distribution defined by
Bayes rule: ppt|sq “
ş
ppt,s,xqdxş
ppt,s,xqdxdt and ppt|s, xq “ ppt,s,xqş ppt,s,xqds and:
ppt|s, xq “ ppt|sq
for s, x with positive probability, then the triple X ,S , T is defined as a Markov chain:
X Ñ S Ñ T
1Discussing this issue formally leads to the problem of choosing inf from all possible S , which is not a well defined set. I avoid
dealing with this problem by making this restriction explicitly.
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The information processing constraint in Definition 3.3 . defines a most natural con-
straint in the acquisition of information: When decision time T is chosen based on in-
formation S , the choice should be purely a result of information. Therefore, conditional
on knowing the information, choice should not be dependent to the underlying state any
more. This is the key constraint I’m going to impose in Section 3.3 . The information
processing constraint has several equivalent characterizations:
Proposition 3.1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. X Ñ S Ñ T .
2. X and T are independent conditional on S .
3. S is a sufficient statistics for T w.r.t. X .
4. S is Blackwell more informative than T about X .
Proposition 3.1 . comes mostly from Blackwell et al. (1951.) and links the information
processing constraint to other well-known notions in probability theory and information
theory. It is intuitive that these notions are equivalent. They essentially all characterize
the fact that S carries more information about X than T . From this point on, I use the
four equivalent notions in an inter-changeable way.
Now I can define what I refer to as the minimal assumptions on the measure of infor-
mation.
Assumption 3.1. IpS ;X |µq satisfies the following axioms:
1. (Monotonicity) @µ, if X Ñ S Ñ T , then:
IpT ;X |µq ď IpS ;X |µq
2. (Sub-additivity) @µ, @ information structure S1 and information structure S2|S1 whose
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distribution depends on the realization of S1:
IppS1,S2q;X |µq ď IpS1;X |µq ` ErIpS2;X |S1, µqs
3. (C-linearity) @µ, @ information structure S „ pµi, piq. @λ P r0, 1s, consider Sλ „
pµi, µ,λpi, 1´ λq 2 ., then:
IpSλ;X |µq “ λIpS ;S |µq
Assumption 3.1. imposes three restrictions on the information measure I. Monotonic-
ity states that if an information structure S is Blackwell more informative than (statis-
tically sufficient for) information structure T , then the information measure of S is no
lower than that of T . Sub-additivity states that if one breaks a combined information
structure into the two components sequentially, then the information measure of the com-
bined information structure is no higher than the expected total measure of the two com-
ponents. C-linearity is a strengthen of sub-additivity in a special case: if a combined
information structure can be decomposed into pure randomness and an informative in-
formation structure, then its information measure is exactly the expected total measure of
these components.
With Assumption 3.1 ., mymodel nests some standardmeasures of information. Mono-
tonicity directly states that my information measure is consistent with the Blackwell par-
tial order of information (Blackwell et al. (1951.)). My model includes the mutual infor-
mation measure used in rational inattention models ( Sims (2003.), Mateˇjka and McKay
(2014.) etc. ) as a special case. Mutual information is a case where my sub-additivity
2Sλ is defined that with 1´ λ probability, the posterior is identical to the prior. With the remaining λ
probability, the distribution of posteriors is identical to that of S . That is to say, Sλ is obtained by mixing S
with a constant signal by weight pλ, 1´ λq.
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assumption is replaced by additivity and an extra logarithm structure is imposed on the
information measure. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014.) and Chapter 1 ., a posterior sep-
arable information measure, which is more general than mutual information is used to
model the cost of information. Posterior separability is equivalent to additivity (see the
discussion in Chapter 1.), thus a special case of sub-additivity. Generally speaking, As-
sumption 3.1. nests most information measures used in the recent “information design”
literature, where information is modeled in a non-parametric way. However, it still ex-
cludes many interesting settings. For example, it’s hard to verify whether Assumption 3.1 .
is satisfied in a parametric model. It also fails the prior independence, which is a very nat-
ural assumption when we think of information as objective experimentations.
3.2.2 Information cost minimization
Imagine that a decision maker is allowed to flexibly choose any information structure
to learn. The cost of information is captured by a general measure of information as de-
fined in Definition 3.2 . Consider the information measure as the cost paid by the DM.
Then if the decision maker is further allowed to choose any (sequential) combinations
of a set of information structures, then she might be able to replicate a single informa-
tion structure using a combination of information structures with paying a lower cost on
expectation. For each single information structure, I call the minimal expected sum of in-
formation measure of any sequential replication the Indirect information measure. In fact, if
we consider the indirect information measure as the effective measure of informativeness
of information structures, then Assumption 3.1. is without loss of any generality:
Proposition 3.2. Information measure I˚pS ;X |µq satisfies Assumption 3.1 . iff there exists an
information measure IpS ;X |µq s.t. @µ,S :






S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
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s.t. X Ñ
´
S1, . . . ,SN
¯
Ñ S
Proposition 3.2. states that when a DM can choose from all sequential combinations
of information structures that replicate a given information structure to minimize the ex-
pected total measure, then the effective measure for a piece of information satisfies As-
sumption 3.1 . The intuition for Proposition 3.2 . is quite simple. Consider the expected
information measure as a cost of information. If a Blackwell less informative information
structure has a higher measure, then it is never chosen because by choosing the more
informative structure, a DM can still accomplish any decision rule feasible with the less
informative structure and pays a lower cost. This implies both monotonicity and sub-
additivity. C-linearity is in fact an implication of sub-additivity when adding irrelevant
noise to information. On the one hand, combining noise with an information structure S ,
one can create Sλ, implying inequality from one direction. On the other hand, by repeat-
edly acquiring Sλ conditional on observing only noise, one can replicate S . Therefore,
additivity from both direction implies C-linearity.
In practice, there are many scenarios in which such minimization of expected infor-
mationmeasure is present. If we consider information as a product provided in a compet-
itive market, then the minimization problem in Proposition 3.2 . is very natural. The price
of information is the marginal cost of information. And cost minimization on the sellers’
side implies that the price of information satisfies Assumption 3.1 . ( In a monopolistic
market there might be positive markups and varying information rents so pricing might
be very different, as is discussed in Zhong (2018.). ) Another example is information pro-
cessing of a computer. Modern computer programs are designed to balance work loads
from independent processes onto nodes/threads. As a result what matters is the aver-
age informational bandwidth, (as opposed to the peak bandwidth or other measures). If
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we consider information as data processed by a computer, then in each CPU tick time,
an optimally designed algorithm will minimize expected bandwidth required to process
information.
3.3 Dynamic decision problem
In this section, I study the implication of the indirect information measure in a dy-
namic information acquisition problem. I consider a decision maker (DM) acquiring in-
formation about the payoffs of different alternatives before making a choice. She can
choose the information structure flexibly within each period, contingent on the history of
signals. The cost of information acquired within a period depends on an indirect infor-
mation measure, and the DM pays a constant cost of delay per period. The major finding
is that this model justifies learning by acquiring Poisson type signals.
3.3.1 Model
Assume that the DM faces the following dynamic information acquisition problem:
• Decision problem: The time horizon t “ 0, 1, . . . ,8 is discrete. Length of each time in-
terval is dt. The utility associated with action-state pair pa, xq is upa, xq. The DM pays
a constant cost m for delaying on period. If the DM takes action a P A at time t condi-
tional on state being x P X, then her utility gain is upa, xq ´mt. I assume that the utility
gains from actions are bounded: supa,x upa, xq ă 8.
• Uncertainty: Not knowing the true state, the DM forms a prior belief µ P ∆X about the
state. Her preference under uncertainty is expressed as von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility. I am going to use two essentially equivalent formulations to express
expected utility. 1) Given belief µ, the expected utility associated with each action a P A
is Eµrupa, xqs. 2) State and action are represented by random variables X ,A. Expected
utility is denoted by ErupA,X qs.
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• Information Cost: I use the information measure I defined as in Definition 3.2. as a flow
measure of information within a period, and define a time separable information cost
structure. In each period, with prior belief µ, the DMpays information cost f pIpS ,X |µqq
which transforms the measure of information acquired in the period into utility loss.
f : R` Ñ R` is a non-decreasing convex function which maps to extended real values.




















X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t
where T P ∆N, t P N. S´1 is defined as a degenerate random variable that induces
belief same as prior belief µ of the DM (just for notational simplicity). S t´1 is defined as
the summary of all past information
`S1, . . . ,S t´1˘. The DM chooses the decision time
T , the choice of action conditional on stoppingAt and the signal structure S t subject to
information cost, waiting cost and two natural constraints for information processing:
1. The information received in last period is sufficient for stopping in current period.
2. The information received in last period is sufficient for action in current period. 3 .
In Equation (P)., the DM is modeled as choosing the information process S t, decision time
T and choice of action At jointly, to maximize utility gain from action profile net waiting
cost and total information cost. Within each period, informativeness is measured by I and
incurs cost f pIq. Across period, information costs are aggregated by the expected sum
of f . Since the information measure is defined on information structure-prior pairs. It’s
3Noticing that in every period, the information in current period has not been acquired yet. So decision can only be taken based
on the information already acquired in the past. So the Markov chain property on information and action time/action will have
information lagged by one period. This within-period timing can be defined in different ways and it doesn’t affect the main results.
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important to define clearly how prior is determined. In each period, information measure
is evaluated conditional on the realization of past signals and choice of stopping. This is
a natural setup since past information plus whether action is taken in current period is
exactly what the DM “knows” in current period. Therefore this is the finest filter onwhich
she evaluates information cost.
Let me illustrate the cost structures of dynamic information acquisition with a simple
two period model: t P t0, 1u and the DM has prior belief µ. The timing is as following:
when t “ 0, the DM first chooses whether to take an action and which action to take.
Second she decides what information to acquire. When t “ 1, DM takes action based on
information acquired in period 0. First let’s consider deterministic continuation decision.
In period 0 no information has been acquired yet so if DM want to make a choice, her
expected utility will be calculated with the prior µ: Eµrupa,X qs and there is no waiting
or information cost. If DM wants to collect information before decision making, she can
acquire information structure S , now it’s for sure T “ 1 and X Ñ S Ñ A. Therefore she
gets expected utility ErupA,X qs, pays waiting cost m and information cost f pIpS ;X |µqq.
The problem becomes less trivial when continuation is random: suppose DM chooses
to continue with probability p (independent to states because she has no information yet
about state). Only conditional on continuation, she acquires S . Within my framework, to-
tal cost is p ¨ f pIpS ;X , µqq ` p1´ pq ¨ 0 by calculating conditional cost on 1T ď0. One might
think that just conditional on information but not continuation decision, the same infor-
mation structure is essentially Sp and cost is f
`
I
`Sp;X |µ˘˘. However, this is saying that
when DM is choosing information after decision making in period 0, she acquires a signal
correlated to her previous choice of continuation. This piece of randomness (whether to
continue) is already resolved. Since our DM can not revert time, this case is physically
impossible. f pIpSp;X |µqq will be the right cost if the decision of continuation is delayed
to the next period.
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3.3.2 Solution
In this section, I solve the dynamic information acquisition problem Equation (P). un-
der Assumption 3.1. on the informationmeasure. First, I characterize the optimal expected
utility as a solution to a simple static information acquisition problem. Second, I provide
a simple stationary strategy that implements the expected utility from choosing any in-
formation and action strategy in the equivalent static problem.
Theorem 3.1. If I satisfies Assumption 3.1 ., @µ P ∆X, suppose the expected utility level Vpµq

















The first superemum is taken over a, the second superemum is take over both λ and A.
Theorem 3.1 . states that solving the optimal utility level in Equation (P). is equivalent
to solving a static problem under Assumption 3.1 . In the static problem, the DM pays
a fixed marginal cost
´
m
λ ` f pλqλ
¯
on each unit of information measure IpA;X |µq. Notice
that the optimal parameter λ depends on only m, f when the constraint IpA;X |µq ě λ
doesn’t bind. There is an explicit algorithm to solve Equation (3.1) .:
Proposition 3.3. If I satisfies Assumption 3.1 ., Vpµq solves Equation (P). if and only if it solves
















ErupA,X qs ´m´ f pIpA;X |µqq (3.3)
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Proposition 3.3 . states that the value function in Equation (P). can be solved by solv-
ing three static problems. The first value V0 is a no-information benchmark when value
equals expected utility from choosing the optimal action according to only the prior. The
second problem Equation (3.2). is a standard rational inattention problem with marginal
cost mλ˚ ` f pλ
˚q
λ˚ on informationmeasure I. The interpretation is that under Assumption 3.1 .,
the dynamic information acquisition problem is separable in two parts. The first part is
the dynamic allocation of information, keeping the aggregate information fixed. Marginal
cost of increasing the aggregate information is reflected by mλ˚ ` f pλ
˚q
λ˚ , which measures
both the impatience and the smoothing incentive jointly. The second part is a static prob-
lem that optimizes the aggregate information. The third problem Equation (3.3) . is a spe-
cial case when there is under-smoothing. This happens onlywhenwaiting is so costly that
it is optimal for decision maker to scale up information cost and wait for less than one pe-
riod. Since fractional period length is not feasible, in this case decision maker solves a
one-period problem.
Once the static problems Equations (3.2). and (3.3). are solved, let A be an optimal in-
formation structure of the static problem, then A can be modified to construct an optimal
dynamic information structure in Equation (P).
Proposition 3.4. If I satisfies Assumption 3.1., @µ P ∆X, A P ∆AˆX and λ˚ ă IpA;X |µq, let









PA, IpA;X |µq is defined as lim sup IpAi ,X |µq
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`S t,At, T ˘ be defined by5 .:
1. S´1 “ c0.
2. S t “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
s0 if S t´1 P AŤts0u
A with probability λ˚IpA;X |µq if S t´1 “ c0




At “ S t´1





















`S t;X ˇˇS t´1, 1T ďt˘˘
ff
Proposition 3.4 . complements Theorem 3.1 . by showing that the optimal value from
Equation (3.1) . can be implemented using a simple stationary experimentation strategy
that is feasible in Equation (P). The information structure S t explicitly codes three kinds
of signals: Stop s0,Wait c0 and Action in A. The first condition defines the initial informa-
tion. The second condition defines the information structures in the following periods by
induction: If S t´1 “ s0 orA it means that action is already taken and information acquisi-
tion stops from now on so S t “ s0 and so on so forth. If S t´1 “ c0 it means that do nothing
and delay all decision to the current period. Conditional on continuation, S t realizes as
A with λ˚IpA;X |µq probability. And in the next period the action is taken according to the
realization of S t. With 1´ λ˚IpA;X |µq probability c0 realizes and the decision is delayed to
the next period. The Third condition explicitly defines T : when action is taken in period t
as indicated by S t´1, then T “ t. It’s easy to verify the information processing constraints
5s0 and c0 are chosen to be distinguishable from any element in action set A.
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in Equation (P). are satisfied. First, conditional on S t´1, the distribution of 1T ďt is degen-
erate. When S t´1 “ c0 it’s 0 and 1 otherwise. So S Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ď t. Second, conditional
on S t´1 and knowing T “ t, At is also degenerate. It is exactly the realization of S t´1.
Therefore X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At.
Sketched proof.
Here I provide a simplified proof which illustrates the main intuition for Theorem 3.1 .
and Proposition 3.4 . Since there is no discounting on the utility gain from actions, given
an action profile AT , the expected utility is completely determined by 1) the aggregate
distribution of actions A. 2) the expected waiting time ErT s. How actions are allocated
over time doesn’t affect the expected utility at all. Since actions are driven by information,
this observation indicates that solving Equation (P). can be divide into three steps: Step 1 is
to solve for the optimal distribution of information over time to minimize the information
cost given any aggregate information structure and expected waiting time. Step 2 is to
solve for the optimal waiting time given any fixed aggregate information structure. Step
3 is to solve for the optimal aggregate information structure and the associated action
profile.
Step 1. Given any strategy
`S t,At, T ˘, the DM can implement the same action distri-
butionAT and expectedwaiting time ErT swith a information process of lower cost. First,

























`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘˘‰
ErT s












`S t;X |S t´1˘˘‰
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The second inequality is first by monotonicity of f then by convexity of f . That is to say:
there is incentive to combine small information (by sub-additivity of I) and smooth infor-
mation over time (by convexity of f ). The last inequality is from IpS ;X |µq ď IpA;X |µq






information acquisition every period.
Then I implement the aforementioned information cost using a strategy defined as






. On the other hand, taking action with probability 1ErT s in each period ex-
actly the implements aggregate action distributionA and the expected waiting time ErT s.
Then it is WLOG to consider:
sup
A,T





where ErT s is replaced by T for notational simplicity.
Step 2. Maximizing over ErT s (or T in the simplified problem). This can be done easily
by solving the first order condition w.r.t. T: ´m´ f ` IT˘` IT f 1` IT˘ “ 0. Replace λ “ IT , we











The formal theorem covers general cases without smoothness assumption so f 1 is re-
placed with sub-differentials B f .
Step 3. I will refer to the Weierstrass theorem to show the existence of solution. See
Proposition 3.5. for detailed discussion.
In the sketched proof I implicitly assumed f to be differentiable, first order condition
has solution and optimal T ě 1. The formal proof for more general cases is provided in
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Appendix D.2.1.
3.3.3 Existence and uniqueness
In this section, I first show a general existence result for the solution of Equations (3.2) .
and (3.3). Then I established its uniqueness in different dimensions. By toggling the
inequalities defining the monotonicity of I, the concavity of f and the sub-additivity of
I to strict inequalities, my model predicts unique belief profile, unique information cost
allocation and unique strategy correspondingly.
Proposition 3.5. If A,X are finite sets, I satisfies Assumption 3.1., then
• Existence: @ε ą 0, let ∇ε “ tA|Pra|xs ě εu, then there exists a non-empty, convex and
compact set of solutionAε to Equation (3.1). subject to A P ∇ε.
– If Dε ą 0,AεŞ∇oε ‰ H, thenŤε1ďεAε1 is the maximizer of Equation (3.1).
– If @ε ą 0,AεŞ∇oε “ H, then any sequence inśAε approaches Vpµq.
• Uniqueness:
– If I satisfies strict-monotonicity, then posterior belief νpaq associated with any action
a is unique for all optimal A.
– If f p¨q satisfies strict-convexity, then @ optimal strategy `S t,At, T ˘ to Equation (P).,
I
`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘ is the same.
– If I satisfies strict-sub-additivity, then the solution
`S t,At, T ˘ to Equation (P). is
unique.
Proposition 3.5 . first states the existence of solution to Equation (3.1) . and the unique-
ness of different aspects of the solution. First, with Assumption 3.1 ., very mild extra as-
sumptions (finite A and X) can guarantee the existence of solution to Equation (3.1) . (and
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solution to Equation (P). as well). Second, when strictly more informative information
structure has strictly larger information measure, the belief inducing each action can be
uniquely pinned down by optimization. Third, when the information cost function f
is strictly convex, then the optimal cost level incurred in each experimentation period
is constant over time. Finally, if a combination of informative experiments has strictly
larger measure than the expected summation of each component’s measure, then whole
dynamic strategy is uniquely pinned down.
The existence result is non-trivial in the sense that I don’t impose any continuity as-
sumption on I. However, I being an indirect information measure function actually guar-
antees it to be convex in an appropriate space. In Equation (3.1)., the strategy space is all
random variable A. If we consider the space of all conditional distribution over A on X
(Markovian transition matrices), then this is an Euclidean space and any indirect infor-
mation measure I is a convex function on this space: if S is a linear combination of S1
and S2, then S can be implemented as randomly using S1 or S2 (and not knowing the
choice of experiment). Therefore, monotonicity and sub-additivity guarantees S to have
weakly lower measure than the linear combination of measures of S1, S2. Convexity of
I implies both objective function to be continuous and choice set to be compact on any
interior closed subset of the strategy space.
The incentive for inter-temporal smoothing of information is clearly illustrated in the
proof of Proposition 3.4 . and Theorem 3.1 .: The convexity of information cost f implies the
incentive to smooth the cost over time. Sub-additivity of I implies incentive to smooth
the choice of information structure over time. The incentive for choice of aggregate infor-
mation structure is illustrated in the proof of existence: monotonicity and sub-additivity
implies a concave objective function. Now if any of aforementioned incentives is strict,
then the solution is uniquely pinned down in the corresponding aspect. First, consider
the proof for convexity of I in the last part. Randomly using S1 or S2 (and knowing
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choice of experiment) carries strictly more information than S (which discards informa-
tion about which experiment is used). Therefore, strict monotonicity implies that he ob-
jective function is strict concave (except when S1 and S2 have the same row vectors).
Second, consider step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.1 . Suppose f is strictly convex, when-
ever information cost is not constant over time, the total cost is strictly dominated by a
stationary strategy. Third, when there is strict sub-additivity, then any non-stationary ex-
perimentation strategy is dominated by the stationary one I constructed. Moreover, the
objective function in Equation (3.1) . is strictly concave w.r.t any A. In this case, the whole
solution is uniquely pinned down.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explore the robust predictions we can make when the measure of
signal informativeness is an indirect measure from sequential cost minimization. I first
show that an indirect information measure is supported by sequential cost minimization
iff it satisfies: 1) monotonicity in Blackwell order, 2) sub-additivity in compound experi-
ments and 3) linearity in mixing with no information. In a sequential learning problem,
if the cost of information depend on an indirect information measure and delay cost is
fixed, then the optimal solution involves direct Poisson signals: arrival of signal directly
suggests the optimal action, and non-arrival of signal provides no information. I also
characterize the existence and uniqueness of the optimal learning dynamics.
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4.1 Introduction
Let X be a non-empty finite set (state space). ∆pXq P R|X| is the set of all probability
measures on X. Let µ denote an element in ∆pXq. ∆2pXq is the set of all probability





i“1 be a finite set of continuous functions on ∆pXq. Let f : Rn Ñ R denote a
continuous function. Let Dpµq : ∆pXqÑ Rn be a closed valued correspondence.















Suppose n “ 1 and D ” R, then Equation (4.1). can be solved by concavifying V1pµq (Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2011.), Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1995.)). And Theorem 4.8 .
implies that it is without loss to consider information structures with nomore than |X| sig-
nals. This gives tractability both analytically and computationally. However, even when
n “ 2, with a general f or a nontrivial constraint D, concavification no longer works and
we might need to search over an infinite dimensional space to solve Equation (4.1) .
To solve Equation (4.1) ., I study the set of all possible expected valuation vectors that
can be implemented by designing the information structure P — the information design
possibility set. In Section 4.3 ., I proved a two-step concavification method: First, the in-
formation design possibility set itself can be implemented by combining finite number of
information structures that implement its extreme points. Second, each extreme point can
be implemented by concavifying a linear combination of Vi’s, hence involving only finite
number of signals.
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The general concavificationmethod developed in this chapter can be applied to a wide
range of information design problems. In Section 4.4 ., I first provide two applications
on static information acquisition and dynamic information acquisition to show that the
optimal solutions have a nice Lagrange multiplier characterization. Then I provide an
application on persuading receivers with outside options to illustrate how the Lagrange
characterization can simplify the optimal persuasion problem. Finally I provide an ap-
plication of Lemma 4.1 . on screening using information structures, to illustrate how the
theory developed in this chapter reduces the dimensionality of the problem and makes
the problem tractable.
4.2 Information possibility set
Notations used in this section: given a convex set C, let extpCq be the set of all extreme
points of C, let extkpCq be the set of all k-extreme points of C 1 . Let exppCq be the set of
exposed points of C. FpCq is set of faces of C.
Definition 4.1. Information possibility set Vpµq P Rn is defined as:
Vpµq “
"´
EPrV1s, . . . , EPrVns
¯ˇˇˇˇ
P P ∆2pXq, EPrνs “ µ
*
Lemma 4.1. @µ, Vpµq is a compact and convex set. @v P extkpVpµqq, there exists P P ∆2pXq
such that: $’’&’’%
v “ `EPrV1s, . . . , EPrVns˘
|supppPq| ď pk` 1q|X|
Proof. First of all, we prove that Vpµq is compact and convex.
1extpCq “ ext0pCq and C “ Ťkďn extkpCq.
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• Boundedness: @P P ∆2pXq, minµP∆pXqVipµq ď EPrVis ď maxµP∆pXqVipµq. Therefore,
@v P Vpµq, it is bounded from 0 by maxµP∆pXq,i
ˇˇ
Vipµqˇˇ by sup norm. So Vpµq is a
bounded set.
• Convexity: @v1, v2 P Vpµq, there exists P1, P2 P D2pXq s.t. vi “
`
EPirV1s, . . . , EPirVns
˘
.
Since ∆2pXq is a linear space and expectation operator is linear functional, @β P r0, 1s,
Pβ “ βP1 ` p1´ βqP2 P ∆2pXq and:
vβ “
´








EP2rV1s, . . . , EP2rVns
¯
“βv1 ` p1´ βqv2
Therefore, βv1 ` p1´ βqv2 P Vpµq so Vpµq is a convex set.
• Closeness: ∆pXq is a finite dimensional simplex. If we consider the Prokhorov met-
ric on ∆2pXq, then ∆2pXq is a complete and separable space (Theorem 6.8 of Billings-
ley (2013.)). Now since ∆pXq is compact, by Theorem 4.9 ., ∆2pXq is a compact, com-
plete and separable space with the Prokhorov metric. Prokhorov metric induces a
topology equivalent to weak˚ topology(by Theorem 6.8 of Billingsley (2013.)). So
@vk P Vpµq, if vk Ñ v, then consider the sequence Pk such that vk “ EPk
“pViq‰. By
compactness of ∆2pXq, pick a subsequence Pk w´
˚ÝÝÝÑ P. Then @Vi, since Vi is contin-
uous, EPkrVis Ñ EPrVis. So v P Vpµq and Vpµq is a closed set.
• Compactness: Vpµq is a finite dimensional bounded and closed set, so it is compact.
@v P extkpVpµqq, v is an interior point of a k-dimensional face F of Vpµq. Then by
Theorem 4.7., v P convpextpFqq. By Theorem 4.8 ., there exists ␣vj(k`1j“1 Ă extpFq andřpij “ 1
s.t.
ř
pijvj “ v. By Lemma 4.4 .,
␣
vj
( Ă extpVpµqq. The next step is to prove that @j, there
exists Pj P ∆2pXq s.t. vj “
`
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Lemma 4.2. @µ, @v P exppVpµqq, DP P ∆2pXq and |supppPq| ď |X| s.t. v “ EP
“pViq‰.
Proof. By definition of exposed points, there exists a linear function l P LpRnq s.t.
lpvq ą lpv1q @v1 P Vpxq, v1 ‰ v
In finite dimensional space, a linear function lpvq can be equivalently written asřλivi` c.








s.t. EPrνs “ µ
By Theorem 4.8 ., Equation (4.2) . can be solved by convexifying the graph of
ř
λiVipµq ` c.
The maximum is achieved by a P s.t. |supppPq| ď |X|. Of course EPrpViqs P Vpµq. Then




. On the other hand, there exists P1 P ∆2pXq s.t.
v “ EP1
“pViq‰, by optimality of P, lpvq ď EP“řλiVi ` c‰. Therefore, since v is the unique
element in Vpµq achieving lpvq, we have EPrpViqs “ v and |supppPq| ď |X|. 
@vj P extpVpµqq, by Theorem 4.6 ., there exists ␣vjl(8l“1 Ă exppVpµqq and limlÑ8 vjl “ vj.
By Lemma 4.2 ., there exists Pjl P ∆2pXq s.t. ˇˇsupppPjlqˇˇ ď |X| and vjl “ EPjl“pViq‰. Now




























is in finite dimensional vector space, there exists a subsequence converging
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ipµjtq “ vji @i
Therefore, vj is implemented by Pj P ∆2pXq and ˇˇsupppPjqˇˇ ď |X|. So P “ řpijPj P
∆2pXq and |supppPq| ď pk ` 1q ¨ |X|. By linearity of expectation operator, EP
“pViq‰ “ř
pijEPj
“pViq‰ “ řpijvj “ v. 
Lemma 4.3. Correspondence V : ∆pXqÑ Rn is continuous. GrpVq is convex and compact.
Proof.
• Boundedness: ∆pXq is a bounded set. @µ P ∆pXq, V is uniformly bounded by ra-
dious maxµP∆pXq,i
ˇˇ
Vipµqˇˇ by sup norm. So GrpVq is bounded.
• Convexity: @pµ1, v1q, pµ2, v2q P GrpVq. @α P r0, 1s. Since ∆pXq is convex, µα “
αµ1 ` p1´ αqµ2 P ∆pXq. Now we prove that vα “ αv1 ` p1´ αqv2 P Vpµαq. By defi-
nition, there exists P1, P2 P ∆2pXq s.t. EP1r
`
Vi
˘s “ v1, EP1rνs “ µ1 and EP2“pviq‰ “ v2,
EP2rνs “ µ2. Define Pα “ αP1 ` p1 ´ αqP2, then by linearity of the expectation
operator, EPαrνs “ αEP1rνs ` p1 ´ αqEP2rνs “ µα. EPα
“pViq‰ “ αEP1rpViqs ` p1 ´
αqEP2rpViqs “ vα. Therefore, vα P Vpµαq. So pµα, vαq P GrpVq.
• Closedness: @␣pµj, vjq( Ă GrpVq, suppose µj Ñ µ, vj Ñ v. Want to show that
µ P ∆pXq and v P Vpµq. First of all, since ∆pXq is complete, µ P ∆pXq. Now by
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ipνkj q “ vij
Now since pj P ∆ppn` 1q|X|q and νj P ∆pXq are both compact spaces. Consider
stadard Euclidean metric on product space ∆ppn` 1q|X|q ˆ ∆pXqpn`1q|X|, it is also























ipνkj q “ limjÑ8 vij “ vi
Therefore, pp, νq implements v at µ. So v P Vpµq.
• Compactness: Since GrpVq is closed and bounded, it is compact.
• Continuity: Since GrpVq is compact, Vpµq is upper hemicontinuous. Now we only
need to show lower hemicontinuity. @pµmq Ă ∆pXq, µm Ñ µ P ∆pXq. @v P Vpµq. By
Lemma 4.1., v is impelemnted by pp, νq with support size pn` 1q|X|. There exists a




















when k “ l
´µlqjlqjk
p2j
when k ‰ l
Therefore, since each pj ą 0, when µm is sufficiently close to µ, corresponding








4.3.1 Existence and finite support




i“1 Ă C∆pXq, f P CRn. @µ P ∆pXq, suppose
VpµqŞDpµq ‰ H, then there exists P˚ P ∆2pXq solving Equation (4.1). and |supppP˚q| ď
pn` 1q ¨ |X|.
Proof. By definition of Vpµq, Equation (4.1). is equivalent to the following problem:
sup
vPDŞVpµq f pvq (4.3)
By Lemma 4.1., Vpµq is a compact set. Then VpµqŞDpµq is compact and non-empty. By
Weierstrass’s theorem, there exists v˚ P VpµqŞDpµq solving Equation (4.3) . Then by
Lemma 4.1., there exists P˚ P ∆2pXq s.t. v˚ “ `EP˚rV1s, . . . , EP˚rVns˘ and |supppP˚q| ď
pn` 1q ¨ |X|. Therefore, P˚ solves Equation (4.1) . 
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4.3.2 Necessary condition for the maximizer




i“1 Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn Ñ R is differentiable.
Let D ” Rn. Then a necessary condition for P˚ solving Equation (4.1). is:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
∇ f pEP˚rV1s, . . . , EP˚rVnsq ¨
´
EPrV1s, . . . , EPrVns
¯
(4.4)
Proof. Solving Equation (4.1) . is equivalent to solving Equation (4.3) . Suppose by contra-
diction that Equation (4.4) . is violated at optimal P˚. Then it is equivalently saying that
there exists v P Vpµq such that:
∇ f pv˚q ¨ v˚ ă ∇ f pv˚q ¨ v
By Lemma 4.1 ., Vpµq is a convex set. Therefore vα “ p1 ´ αqv˚ ` αv P Vpµq. Consider
hpαq “ f pvαq. Then h1p0q “ ∇ f pv˚q ¨ pv´ v˚q ą 0. So there exists α1 ą 0 s.t. hpα1q ą hp0q.
Then f pv˚q ă f pvα1q. Contradicting optimality of v˚. 




i“1 Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn`m Ñ R is constant
in the last m arguments. Let D ” ␣v|vi ě 0 @i ą n(. Then there exists P˚ solving Equation (4.1).
and λ P Bm`n such that:
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Proof. @P˚ solving Equation (4.1) ., let v˚ be corresponding value. Define:
vα “ v˚ ` αp0, . . . , 0loomoon
n
, 1, . . . , 1loomoon
m
q
Then by definition f pvαq “ f pv˚q. v0 “ v˚ P Vpµq. Since Vpµq is bounded, for large
enough α, vα R Vpµq. Then since Vpµq is compact, there exists α s.t. vα P BVpµq. Since Vpµq
is convex, there exists l P LpRm`nq s.t. vα P argmaxvPVpµq lpvq. Let l “
ř
λivi, then:




Let Pα be the corresponding information structure implementing vα (existence of Pα guar-
anteed by Lemma 4.1 .). Then







Since f pvαq “ f pv˚q, Pα solves Equation (4.1). as well. 
4.3.3 Convex optimization




i“1 Ă C∆pXq, D ” tv|gpvq ě 0u. If both
f and g are quasi-concave and continuous, then there exists P˚ solving Equation (4.1)., v˚ “
pEPrVisq and λ P Bn such that:
$’’’’&’’’’%







v˚ P arg min




Proof. First, by Theorem 4.1 ., P˚ solving Equation (4.1) . exists. Then by optimality of P˚:
Vpµq
č
tv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚qu “ H
Since f and g are quasi-convex, tv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚qu is a convex set. Then by separating
hyperplane theorem, there exists c and λ s.t. @v P Vpµq, v1 P D and f pv1q ą f pv˚q:
λ ¨ v ď c and λ ¨ v1 ą c
By continuity of f and g, v˚ P clptv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚quq. So λ ¨ v˚ “ c. Then it is easy to
verify that λ satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4.4 . 




i“1 Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn Ñ R is quasi-
concave. Let D ” tv|gpvq ě 0u, g is quasi-concave. If f and g are both differentiable, then there
exists P˚ solving Equation (4.1)., v˚ “ pEPrVisq and γ, η ě 0 such that:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
pη∇ f pv˚q ` γ ¨ Jgpv˚qq ¨
´
EPrV1s, ¨ ¨ ¨ , EPrVns
¯
Proof. By Theorem 4.4.:
v˚ P arg min
f pvqě f pv˚q,vPD
λ ¨ v (4.5)
It is easy to verify that Equation (4.5) . as a dual problem is a convex optimization problem.
Since both f and g are differentiable, by Kuhn-Tucker condition, there exists γ, η ě 0 such
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that:
λ´ η ¨∇ f pv˚q ´ γ ¨ Jgpv˚q “ 0
Then by definition of λ:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
pη∇ f pv˚q ` γ ¨ Jgpv˚qq ¨
´








i“1 Ă C∆pXq, f P CRn. Suppose Dpµq is
a continuous correspondence and @µ P ∆pXq, VpµqŞDpµq ‰ H. Let κpµq be the maximum of
Equation (4.1). and Ppµq be the maximizer of Equation (4.1)., then κpµq is continuous and Ppµq
is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous2 .
Proof. Theorem 4.5. is an application of the maximum theorem. Since by Lemma 4.3.
Vpµq and Dpµq are both continuous, VpµqŞDpµq is non-empty, compact valued and con-
tinuous. Equation (4.1). is equivalent to maximizing f pvq on VpµqŞDpµq. Therefore, by
maximum theorem, κpµq is continuous and the argmax correspondenceV˚pµq is comapct-
valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Now we show that Ppµq is compact valued and upper hemicontinuous.
• compactness: (sequential comapctness will be sufficient) @tPmu Ă Ppµq, consider
vm “ EPm
“pViq‰. Then vm P V˚pµq, so there exists subsequence (without loss assume
2with respect to Prokhorov metric.
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to be vqm itself) vm Ñ v P V˚pµq. Then since ∆2pXq is compact by Theorem 4.9., there
exists subsequence Pm
w´˚ÝÝÝÑ P P ∆2pXq. Then EPrpViqs “ lim EPmrpViqs “ lim vm “
v P V˚pµq. So P P Ppµq.
• upper hemicontinuity: @µm Ñ µ, Pm w´
˚ÝÝÝÑ P and Pm P Ppµmq. Then vm “ EPmrpViqs P
V˚pµmq. By definition of w-˚ convergence, vm Ñ v “ EPrpViqs. By upper hemiconti-
nuity of V˚pµq, v P V˚pµq. Therefore, P P Ppµq.

4.4 Applications
4.4.1 Costly Information acquisition
A direct application of Theorem 4.1 . is costly information acquisition problems. Con-
sider a variant of the rational inattention model. Decision utility at each belief is Fpµq “
maxa Eµrupa, xqs. The information measure of any experiment P is IpP|µq “ EPrHpµq ´
Hpνqs where H is the standard entropy function. Assume that the cost of experiments is




EPrFpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq (4.6)
In a standard rational inattention problem, f is linear. Then standard concavification
method suggests that optimal experiment involves signals no more than |X|. The reason
why we want to deviate from a linear f is that standard RI has two kind of debatable pre-
dictions: 1) prior invariant choice of optimal posteriors (see Caplin and Dean (2013.)). 2)
no dynamics if we allow repeated experiments (see Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017.)).
However, when f is more general, say convex, we knew little about how to solve Equa-
tion (4.6). Theorem 4.2. becomes useful.
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Proposition 4.1. There exists P˚ solving Equation (4.6)., |supppP˚q| “ 2|X|. Moreover, if f is
differentiable, P˚ solves:





Fpνq ´ f 1pEP˚rHpµq ´ Hpνqsq ¨ Hpνq
‰
4.4.2 Dynamic information design











EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C
Proposition 4.2. If F,H P C∆pXq, f P CR. Fpxq, f pxq,C ě 0. Then there exists unique
V P C∆pXq solving Equation (4.7).











EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C
By Theorem 4.1 ., the max operator is well defined. When P “ δµ, EPrνs “ µ and EPrHpµq´
Hpνqs “ 0 so the sup operator is also well defined. Now we prove that T is a contraction
mapping on pZ , L8q.
• TpZq Ă Z : First of all, given the outter max operator in Equation (4.8) ., TpVqpµq ě
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Fpµq. Then @P P ∆2pXq such that EPrνs “ µ and EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C:




First inequality is from f being non-negative, second inqeuality is from V being
non-negative, e´ρdt ă 1 and V ď copFq. Last equality is from copFq being linear.
Last step is to show TpZqpµq P C∆pXq. This is directly implied by Theorem 4.5 .
• TpVq is monotonic: Suppose Upµq ě 0 and U `V P Z If TpVqpµq “ Fpµq, then by
construction TpV `Uq ě Fpµq “ TpVqpµq. If TpVqpµq ą Fpµq, let P be solution to
Equation (4.8) . at µ for V:
TpV `Uqpµq ěe´ρdtEPrVpνq `Upνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
“TpVqpµq ` e´ρdtEPrUpνqs
ěTpVqpµq
And constraints EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C and EPrνs “ µ are independent of choice of
V so still satisfied.
• TpVq is contraction. We claim that TpV ` αqpµq ď TpVqpµq ` e´ρdtα. Suppose not
true at µ. Obviously TpV` αqpµq ą Fpµq. Then let P be the solution of Equation (4.8) .
at µ for V ` α.
TpVqpµq ěe´ρdtEPrVpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
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“e´ρdtEPrVpνq ` αs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq ´ e´ρdtα
“TpV ` αqpµq ´ e´ρdtα
ąTpVqpµq
Similar to last part, constraints EPrHpµq´Hpνqs ď C and EPrνs “ µ are still satisfied.
Contradiction.
Therefore, by Blackwell condition, TpVq is a contraction mapping on Z . There exists a
unique solution V P Z solving the fixed point problem TpVq “ V. 
4.4.3 Persuade voters with outside options
Consider a politician who can strategically design a public signal to voters to influence
their voting behavior (the setup in Alonso and Câmara (2016.)).
Voting game: There are n ě 1 voters who chooses from a binary policy set A “ ta0, a1u.
There are two states X “ tx0, x1u. Each voter gets Bernoulli utility uipa, xq from voting
for the policy a. Assume that a1 is unanimously preferred to a0 when x1 is the true state
and vice versa. The politician has state independent utility over policies and prefers a1
strictly to a0. I assume that a0 is a default policy. For a1 to be proved, the politician
needs more than m pm ď nq voters to voter for a1. The politician can design a signal
structure to influence voters’ decisions. Equivalently, I assume that the politician chooses
a distribution over posterior beliefs P P ∆2pXq.
Outside option: Different from Alonso and Câmara (2016.), where number of potential
voters is fixed, I assume that each voter has opportunity cost ci of participating in the
voting game. Therefore, to approve the new policy, the politician should first attract at
least m voters to the game and then persuade them to vote for a1.
To simplify notation, I write all voter’s utility as functions of belief Fipµq. Let µi be the















Notice that in Equation (4.9)., the politician doesn’t necessarily need to exclude voters
outside of ti1, . . . , iku, so the maximum from Equation (4.9) . must be weakly larger than
the politician’s optimal utility. On the other hand, for any strategy in Equation (4.9).,
potentially including more voters to the voting game can only make the politician better
off. So Equation (4.9). exactly characterizes the politician’s optimization problem.
For any voter, except for µi, there is another critical belief rµi:
rµi ´ µrµi Fip0q ` µrµi Fiprµiq “ ci
Suppose voter observes information structure inducing posterior belief 0 and rµi, then the
voter is exactly indifferent between paying the opportunity cost and entering the voting
game and not.
Proposition 4.3. Let µ˚ be the smallest belief s.t. #ti|µi ě µ˚u ě m and #ti|rµi ě µ˚u ě m, then




and ti1, . . . , iku “ ti|mintrµi, µiu ě µ˚u.
Proposition 4.3. states that when voters must pay opportunity cost to enter the voting
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game, then there are potentially two pivotal voters. One is the one who’s most difficult to
persuade to adopt a1, and the other is the one who’s most difficult to attract to the voting
game. Both difficulty levels are measured by the location of the critical beliefs.
Proof. The key step of proving Proposition 4.3. is to apply Corollary 4.4.1 . to Equation (4.9).
Notice that the objective function is Equation (4.9) . is in fact an indicator function with
some threshold belief level (say µ1, which is the lowest belief to persuade at least m voters
to vote for a1). So Corollary 4.4.1 . is directly applicable to Equation (4.9) ., and the objective







It is easy to see that Equation (4.10) . is a convex function on µ P r0, µ1s and a linear function
on µ P rµ1, 1s (there is no point to include voters who will never vote for a1.). So optimal
persuasion strategy must induce either belief 0 or interior belief ν ą µ1. Of course since at
least m voters are included and persuaded, ν ě µ˚. On the other hand, it is easy to verify
that the strategy define by µ˚ induces at least m voters to participate, so µ˚ is optimal. 
4.4.4 Screening with information
Consider a problem of Bayesian persuasion with unknown receiver types. Let Θ be
the set of receiver types, X be the finite set of states and A be the set of actions. @θ P Θ,
decision utility at each belief is Fθpµq “ maxa Eµrupa, x, θqs. Sender’s utility at each belief
given receiver type θ is Vθpµq. Assume that the type distribution is pipθq P ∆pΘq. The
sender can screen the receivers by providing a menu of information structures. Then by









EPθ rFθs ě EPθ1 rFθs @θ, θ1 P Θ
EPθ rνs “ µ @θ P Θ
When Θ and A are both infinite, solving Equation (4.11) . is difficult due to the dimension-
ality of strategy space. When A is finite, it is WLOG to restrict the sender to use direct
message which suggests the actions being played conditional on the state. Then Equa-
tion (4.11) . reduces to a screening problem with finite dimensional strategy function (plus
a few more obedience constraints). In the remaining case where Θ is finite but A is infi-
nite, it is still unclear whether it is WLOG to consider only finite dimensional screening
mechanisms.




EPrVis, EPrF1s, . . . , EPrFNs
ˇˇˇˇ






vi`1i ě vi`1j @i, j
)





By Lemma 4.1 ., each Vipµq is compact set. Therefore, Dpµq
ŞˆVipµq is compact. It is easy
to see that DpµqŞˆVipµq is non-empty. By Weierstrass’s theorem, there exists v˚ solving
Equation (4.12). Then by Lemma 4.1 ., there exists Pi˚ P ∆2pXq s.t. vi˚ “
´





ˇˇ ď pN ` 2q ¨ |X|. Therefore, `P1˚ , . . . , PN˚˘ solves Equation (4.11) . and we get
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.4. If Θ is finite, then @µ P ∆pXq, there exists `P1˚ , . . . , PN˚˘ P ∆2pXqN solving
Equation (4.11). and each
ˇˇ
supppPi˚ q
ˇˇ ď pN ` 2q ¨ |X|.
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Proposition 4.4 . states that it isWLOG to consider onlymechanismswith finite support
when solving Equation (4.11). Therefore, it is sufficient to maximize over NpN ` 2q ¨ |X|
posterior beliefs and NpN` 2q ¨ |X| corresponding probabilities to solve constrained opti-
mization problem Equation (4.11) ., which is a computationally tractable problem.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the set of all possible combinations of expected valuations that
can be implemented by designing information. I show that the set can be implemented
only using information structures with finite realizations, and all extreme points of the
set can be characterized using a concavification characterization. I developed a Lagrange
method in the information design setup, and applied the results to various applications
including static and dynamic information acquisition, persuasion of receivers with out-
side options and screening using information.
4.6 Theorems used in proof
Here I list the key theorems used for my proof. Theorem 4.6. is Straszewicz’s theorem
(Straszewicz (1935.), see Theorem 18.6 of Rockafellar (1969.)). Theorem 4.7. is Krein-Milman
theorem(see Theorem 3.23 of Rudin (1991.)). Theorem 4.8 . is Carathéodory’s theorem
(Carathéodory (1907.)).Theorem 4.9 . is Prokhorov’s theorem (see Theorem 5.1 of Billingsley
(2013.))
Theorem 4.6. Let C P Rn be a closed convex set, clpexppCqq “ extpCq.
Theorem 4.7. Let C P Rn be a compact and convex set, C “ convpextpCqq.
Theorem 4.8. Let C P Rn, if x P convpCq then x P convpRq for R Ă C, |R| ď n` 1.
Theorem 4.9. A tight setΠ of probability measures on Borel sets of metric topological space X is
relative compace in weak-˚ topology.
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Lemma 4.4. Let C be a convex set in Rn. Then @F P FpCq, extpFq Ă extpCq.
Proof. @x P extpFq there exists affine f defining face F. @y, z P C. Suppose y P F, then
f pxq “ f pyq. If there exists α P p0, 1q s.t. αy ` p1´ αqz “ x, then α f pyq ` p1´ αq f pzq “
f pxq ùñ f pzq “ f pxq “ f pyq so z P F. Since x P extpFq, x P ty, zu. Suppose y R F,
then f pxq “ α f pyq ` p1 ´ αq f pzq ă f pxq by definition of f , contradiction. To sum up,
x P extpCq. 
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In Appendix A.1 ., I first discuss the convergence of discrete-time optimal policy in
Appendix A.1.1. It is shown that the discrete-time optimal policy’s support as a corre-
spondence of prior belief converges to that of the continuous-time optimal policy. Then I
complete the discussion in Section 1.7 . by generalizing each of the restrictive assumptions.
Appendix A.1.2 . generalizes the finite actions assumption and shows that the solution of
a problem with infinite actions can be approximated by solutions to a series of problems
with increasing number of actions. Appendix A.1.3. generalizes the binary states assump-
tion in Assumption 1.3. and shows that the properties of optimal policy in Theorem 1.2. all
extend in a problem with general finite state space. The proofs of theorems stated in this
section are relegated to Appendix B.5 .
A.1.1 Convergence of policy
By Theorems 1.2 . and 1.3., the optimal policy solving Equation (1.4) . is essentially unique
in the jump-diffusion class. However, Theorem 1.1 . does not rule out other possible op-
timal policies for the original stochastic control problem Equation (1.1) . To get behavior
predictions from my model, additional refinement of optimal policy of Equation (1.1) . is
necessary. In this discussion, I show that the discrete-time optimal policy of Equation (1.6) .
converges to the solutions defined in Theorems 1.2 . and 1.3. I define a modified version of
Lévy distance that characterizes the difference between two policy correspondences:
Definition A.1 (Lévymetric). Let F,G: r0, 1s Ñ 2r0,1s be two correspondences. The Lévy metric
dL pF,Gq is defined as:






dHpFpxq,Gpyqq ď ε, @x P r0, 1s
*
where dH is the standard Hausdorff metric on R.
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dL pF,Gq “ ameans that @µ P r0, 1s, @y P Fpµq, there exists some µ1 in a-neighbourhood
of µ such that y is in the a-neighbourhood of Gpµ1q. When G is continuous at µ, and a is
sufficiently small, it simply states that the images of F and G at µ are close to each other
(measured by dH). If dL pF,Gq “ 0 then F and G are identical.
Theorem A.1 (Convergence of policy). Given either Assumptions 1.1 ., 1.2-a. and 1.3. or As-
sumptions 1.1., 1.2-b. and 1.3., let νpµq be the policy correspondence solving Equation (1.4). Let
Npµq “ tµuŤ νpµq. Let Ndtpµq be the support of optimal posteriors solving Equation (1.6). Then:
lim
dtÑ0
dL pN,Ndtq “ 0
Theorem A.1. states that the graph of policy function of discrete-time problem Equa-
tion (1.5’) . converges to the graph of the continuous solution defined in Theorems 1.2 .
and 1.3. The convergence is illustrated in Figure A.1 . I calculate the discrete-time policy
function using parameters in Example 1.2. The red, blue and green lines represent the
set of optimal posteriors as functions of prior when Vdt ą F with dt “ 10´5, 10´3 and
10´2. As is shown in the figure, when dt Ñ 0, one of optimal posterior is converging to
the prior, and the other optimal posterior is converging to the continuous time solution.
The posterior converging to prior captures a drift term and the other posterior captures a
Poisson jump in the limit.
A.1.2 Infinite action space
In this section, I extend my model to accommodate infinite actions (or even contin-
uum of actions) in the underlying decision problem, i.e. |A| “ 8. Mathematically, the
difference is that the value from immediate action Fpµq “ supaPA Erupa, xqs is no-longer a
piecewise linear function. There are several technical problems arising from a continuum
of actions. For example whether the supremum is indeed achieved and whether F has
140
A.1. Further discussions







Figure A.1: Convergence of policy function
bounded subdifferentials. I impose the following assumption to rule out these technical
issues:
Assumption A.1. Fpµq “ maxaPA Erupa, xqs has bounded subdifferentials.
Assumption A.1 . rules out two cases. The first case is that the supremum is not achiev-
able. The second case is that some optimal action being infinitely risky: the optimal action
with belief approaching x “ 0 has utility approaching´8 at state 1 (and similar case with
states swapped). A sufficient condition for Assumption A.1. is:
Assumption A.11. A is a compact set. @x P X, upa, xq P CpAqŞTBpAq.
It is useful to notice that the proof of Theorem 1.1 . does not rely on the fact that Fpµqis
piecewise linear. Actually the only necessary properties of Fpµq are boundedness and
continuity in Lemma 1.2 ., which prove the existence of solution to discrete time func-
tional equation Equation (B.1) . Therefore Assumption A.1 . guarantees that Lemma 1.2 .
and Lemma B.8 . still hold when there is a continuum of actions. With Assumption A.1 ., the
problem with continuum of actions can be approximated well by a sequence of problems
with discrete actions. I first define the following notation: @F satisfying Assumption A.1.,
VdtpFq is the unique solution of Equation (1.6). and VpFq “ limdtÑ0 VdtpFq1 .
1The existence of limit is guaranteed by monotonic convergence theorem.
141
Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 1 .
Lemma A.1. Given Assumption A . and Assumptions 1.2. and A.1., V is a Lipschitz continuous
functional under L8 norm.
Lemma A.1. implies that a problem with continuum of actions can be approximated
well by a sequence of problemswith discrete actions in the sense of value function conver-
gence. Next, I push the convergence criteria further to the convergence of policy function.
Theorem A.2. Given Assumptions 1.1 ., 1.2-a., 1.3. and A.1., let tFnu be a set of piecewise linear
functions on [0,1] satisfying:
1. ‖Fn ´ F‖8 Ñ 0;
2. @µ P r0, 1s, lim F1npµq “ F1pµq.
Then |VpFq ´ VpFnq| Ñ 0 and:
1. VpFq solves Equation (1.4).
2. @µ s.t. Vpµq ą Fpµq, if each νn is maximizer of VpFnq and ν “ limnÑ8 νn exists, then ν is
the optimal posterior in Equation (1.4). at µ.
Theorem A.2. states that to solve the problem with a continuum of actions, one can
simply use both value function and policy function from problems with finite actions to
approximate. As long as the immediate action values Fn converge uniformly in value
and pointwise in first derivative, the optimal value functions have a uniform limit. The
limit solves Equation (1.4) . and the optimal policy function is the pointwise limit of policy
functions from the finite action problems.
Figure A.2 . illustrates this approximation process. On both panels, only µ P r0.5, 1s is
plotted (policy and value on r0, 0.5s are symmetric). On the right panel, the thin black
curve shows a smooth Fpµq associated with continuum of actions. Since optimal policy
only utilizes a subset of actions, I approximate the smooth function only locally as the
upper envelope of dashed lines (each represents one action). The optimal value function
with continuous actions is the blue curve and the discrete action approximation is the red
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Left panel shows the optimal policy function of discrete actions
(red) and continuous actions (blue). The dashed line is ν “ µ.
Right panel shows the optimal value function. The thin black
line is value from immediate action Fpµq, the dashed lines are
discrete approximations of the continuous function F.
Figure A.2: Approximation of a continuum of actions
curve. The left panel shows the approximation of policy function. The blue smooth curve
is the optimal policy of the continuous action problem and the red curve with breaks is
the optimal policy of the discrete action problem.
To approximate a smooth Fpµq, one can simply addmore andmore actions to the finite
action problem and use F’s supporting hyper planes to approximate it. Then the optimal
policy functions have more and more breaks as optimal policys involve more frequent
jumps among actions. In the limit, as number of breaks grows to infinity, the size of
breaks shrinks to zero and approaches a continuous policy function.
A.1.3 General state space
In this section, I extend the size of state space. The constructive proof for Theorems 1.2 .
and 1.3. relies on the ODE theory to guarantee existence of solution. With a larger state
space, construction of value function relies on existence of PDE. There is no general theory
ensuring existence of solution.2 . Nevertheless, the verification part still works. In fact, the
2The maximization problem can be translated into a PDE system. What is problematic is the bound-
ary conditions. In fact, to solve for Vpµq searching over one action, I need to use the value function at
regions where DM is indifferent between two actions as a boundary condition. That boundary condition is
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discussion in Section 1.6.2. seems to extend to higher dimensional spaces in a natural way.
I formalize a partial characterization theorem in the section.
Let n “ |X|. Consider value function Vpµq on ∆pXq. Let Vpµq P C∆pXq and Cp2q








s.t. ´ppHpνq´Hpµq´∇Hpµq¨pν´µqq´σTHHpµqσ ď c
where ν P ∆psupppµqq, p P ∆I and σ P R|supppµq|. Equation (A.1). comes from applying
Assumption 1.2-a. and smoothness condition to Equation (1.4). 3 . I only discuss Assump-
tion 1.2-a . because the intuition is the same and similar proof methodology can be applied
to Assumption 1.2-b . to show an analog result.
Theorem A.3. Let E “ tµ P ∆pXq|Vpµq ą Fpµqu be the experimentation region. Suppose there
exists Cp2q smooth Vpµq on E solving Equation (A.1)., then D policy function ν : E ÞÑ ∆pXq s.t.
ρVpµq “ ´c Fpνpµqq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpνpµq ´ µq
Hpνpµqq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpνpµq ´ µq
and ν satisfies the following properties:




2. Direction: Dνpµq´µVpµq ě 0.
3. Precision: Dµ´νpµqνpµq ¨HHpνqpν´ µq ď 0.
4. Stopping time: νpµq P EC.
There exists a nowhere dense set K s.t. strict inequality holds on EzK in property 1,3 and 4.
unknown, in contrast to the one dimensional analog Vpµ˚qwhich can be easily calculated.




Theorem A.3 . states that if a solution Vpµq to Equation (A.1) . exists, then Vpµq can be
solvedwith only Poisson signals. The four properties are extensions to the four properties
in Theorem 1.2 . respectively. Property 1 and 4 are exactly the suboptimality of Gaussian
signal and the immediate action property. Property 2 and 3 are weaker than the cor-
responding properties in Theorem 1.2 . Property 2 is the extension to the confirmatory
signal property. It states that optimal direction of jump is in the myopic direction that
value function increases. Property 3 is the extension to the increasing precision property.
Dµ´ννpµq is the direction ν is moving when µ is moving against ν. HHpνqpν ´ µq is the
direction pν ´ µq distorted by a negative definite matrix HHpνq. In a special case when
Hpµq “ ‖µ´ µ0‖22, HHpνqpν ´ µq is in the same direction as pµ ´ νq, which implies (to-
gether with property 3) that the distance between µ and ν is increasing when µ is drifting
against ν. In a generic case, this property does not directly predict how ‖ν´ µ‖ changes.
Figure A.3: Value function with 3 states
Figures A.3. and A.4. illustrate Theorem A.3 . in a numerical example. There are three
states and three actions. Belief space is a two-dimensional simplex. Fpµq is assumed to
be a centrally symmetric function on belief space (Figure A.3 .-(a)). Value function Vpµq is
the meshed manifold in Figure A.3 .-(c). Each blue curve in Figure A.3 .-(b) shows a drifting
path of posterior beliefs. Take a prior in lower right region. The optimal policy is to
search for one posterior (red points in lower right corner of Figure A.4.-(c)), and posterior
belief conditional on receiving no signal drifts along the curve in arrowed direction as
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in Figure A.4 .-(c). Once belief reaches the boundary, optimal policy becomes searching
for two posteriors in a balanced way and posterior drifts towards center of belief space
(see Figure A.4.-(b), arrowed blue curve is belief trajectory and dashed arrows points to
optimal posterior). Finally, if belief reaches center, optimal policy is to search for three
posteriors in a balanced way (Figure A.4.-(a)).
























Dashed arrows start from priors and point to optimal posteriors. Blue arrows repre-
sents drift of posrtior beliefs conditional on no signal arrival. Left panel shows a point
at which a balanced search over three posteriors is optimal. MIddle panel shows a
curve alongwhich searching over two posteriors is optimal. Right panel shows curves
along witch searching over one unique posterior is optimal.
Figure A.4: Policy function with 3 states
A.1.4 Discrete-time information acquisition
In this section, I introduce a general discrete-time information acquisition problem. In
the general problem, information is explicitly modeled as state-dependent signal process,
and the cost of information is defined using a posterior separable function. I show that the
discrete-time auxiliary problem Equation (1.5) . introduced in Section 1.5.1 . is a reduced
form of the general problem. In Appendix A.1.4.1., I axiomatize posterior separability.
Decision problem: Time is discrete t PN. Period length is dt ą 0. The other primitives
pA,X, u, µ, ρq are the same as in Section 1.3 . The Bernoulli utility of action-state pair pa, xq
in period t is e´ρdt¨tupa, xq.
Strategy: a strategy is a triplet pS t, τ,Atq. S t is a random process correlated with
the state, called an information structure. The realization of S t is called a signal history.
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The signal history up to period t is denoted by S t. Each S t specifies the signal structure
acquired in period t conditional on all histories up to period t.4 . τ is a random variable
whose realization is in N. τ specifies a random decision time. The action choice At is a
random process whose realization is in A. EachAt specifies the joint distribution of action
choice and state conditional on making decision in period t. Let the marginal distribution
of the state be denoted by random variable X .




dt. The per-period cost of information is
CdtpIpS t;X |S t´1, 1τďtqq,5 . where the measure of signal informativeness I is defined as:
Assumption A. IpS ;X |µq “ EsrHpµq ´ Hpνp¨|sqqs, where ν is the posterior belief about x
according to Bayes rule.
It is not difficult to see that IpS t;X |S t´1, 1τďtq is exactly the finite difference formulation
of ´LtHpµtqdt. Assumption A . is called (uniform) posterior separability in the literature. If
H is the standard entropy function, then I is the mutual information between signal S t
and unknown state X (conditional on history).











`S t;X |S t´1, 1τďt˘˘ff (1.5.’)
s.t.
$’&’%
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1τďt
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At conditional on τ “ t
The two constraints in Equation (1.5’) . are called the information processing constraints. No-
tation X Ñ S Ñ T means X |ù T |S . The first constraint states that signal history prior
4S´1 is defined as a degenerate random variable that induces belief same as prior belief µ for notation
simplicity.
51τďt is an indicator whether learning is already stopped up to current period, which is known to the
DM. So pS t´1, 1T ďtq summarizes all knowledge of the DM.
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to action time is sufficient for action time. The second constraint states that signal history
prior to period t is sufficient for action at time t.6 . They are extensions to the standardmea-
surability requirement, allowing randomness unrelated to unknown state to be added.
Equation (1.5’). is more general than Equation (1.5). in that it explicitly models the fully
flexible choice of information. Take any strategy in Equation (1.5) ., if we consider belief
as direct signal, then it resembles a special kind of strategy which is feasible in Equa-
tion (1.5’) . These special strategies involve no irrelevant randomness and unused informa-
tion, which are permitted in Equation (1.5’) . In fact, Equation (1.5’) . is more general than
Equation (1.5) . only in permitting irrelevant randomness and unused information. It is
quite intuitive that allowing those more general strategies doesn’t improve utility at all.
In fact, it is proved in Lemmas B.4 . and B.5. that Vdt defined by Equation (1.5’) . is identical
to that defined by Equation (1.5) ., for which reason I do not differentiate the notation.
Given the discussion above, Equation (1.5’) . serves as a formal justification for using a
belief based approached to model dynamic information acquisition. Moreover, it also re-
lates Assumption 1.1 . to posterior separable function — a measure for information widely
used in rational inattention problems. In addition to existing attempts to axiomatize or
microfound Assumption A ., I provide a different axiomitization based on sequential in-
formation decomposition in Appendix A.1.4.1 .
A.1.4.1 Axiom for Assumption A.
Theorem A.4. IpS ;X |µq is a non-negative function of information structure and prior belief. I
satisfies Assumption A. if and only if the following axiom holds:
Axiom: @µ, @ information structure S1 and information structure S2|S1 whose distribution de-
6Notice that in every period, the information in current period has not been acquired yet. So decision can only be taken based
on the information already acquired in the past. As a result in the information processing constraints information is advanced by one
period. This within period timing issue does not make a difference when going to continuous-time limit.
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pends on realization of S1:
IppS1,S2q;X |µq “ IpS1;X |µq ` ErIpS2;X |S1, µqs
Theorem A.4 . states that the chain rule (the name for a key property of mutual informa-
tion in Cover and Thomas (2012.)) is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient
condition for posterior separability. Given any experiment, we can divide it into multiple
stages of “smaller“ experiments. This axiom requires that the total informativeness of
this sequence of small experiments is ”path-independent“: it always equals to the infor-
mativeness of the compound experiment.
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A.2 Omitted proofs
A.2.1 Roadmap for proofs
Figure A.5: Roadmap for proofs
Theorem B.1., P186. Corollary of Theorem 4.4., Chapter 4.
Theorem 1.1 ., P26. Lemma 1.2 ., P30. Lemma B.4 ., P202. Lemma B.1 ., P185.
Lemma B.5 ., P205.
Lemma B.6 ., P207.
Theorem B.1 ., P186.
Lemma 1.1 ., P30. Lemma 1.2 ., P30.
Lemma B.3 ., P194.
Lemma B.8 ., P210. Lemma B.3 ., P194.
Lemma 1.2 ., P30.
Lemma 1.3 ., P32. Lemma B.9 ., P214.
Lemma B.10 ., P218.
Lemma B.7 ., P209.
Theorem 1.2 ., P33. Lemma A.2 ., P177.
Lemma A.3 ., P180. Lemma B.16 ., P226. Lemma B.15 ., P224.
Lemma B.17 ., P231.
Lemma A.31 ., P233. Lemma B.161 ., P234. Lemma B.15 ., P224.
Lemma B.171 ., P234.
Lemma B.18 ., P235.
Lemma B.181 ., P239.
Lemmas B.11 ., B.12., B.13. and B.14., P221.
Theorem 1.3 ., P35. Lemma B.20 ., P250.
Lemma B.21 ., P254. Lemma B.22 ., P257.
Lemma B.211 ., P260. Lemma B.221 ., P261.
Lemma B.23 ., P261.
Lemma B.231 ., P265.
Lemmas B.11 ., B.12. and B.13., P221.
Lemma B.19 ., P242. Lemmas B.11 . and B.12., P219.
Theorem 1.4 ., P52.
Theorem 1.5 ., P55.
Theorem 1.6 ., P58.
Theorem A.1 ., P140. Lemma B.25 ., P287.
Theorem A.2 ., P142. Lemma A.1 ., P142. Lemma 1.3 ., P32.
Lemma B.27 ., P297. Lemma B.26 ., P296. Lemma A.2 ., P177.Theorem A.3 ., P144.
Theorem A.4 ., P148.
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Figure A.5 . illustrates the roadmap for proofs in Chapter 1 . Each node in the figure
displays a theorem/lemma’s name and its page number. Proof of each node depends
(indirectly) on all nodes linked (indirectly) to it on the right. From top to bottom, the
nodes are ordered by order of proofs: each node only depends on nodes on the right of
it or above it. So it is clear that there is no circular argument. Dependent nodes that
have been proved earlier are boxed by dashed lines. From left to right, the nodes are
ordered by importance. Lemmas in the first layer are conceptually important and are
directly supporting the proof for theorems. Lemmas in the second layer or above are
more technical lemmas.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1.
The general road map for proving Theorem 1.1. is introduced in Section 1.5.3. The
proof relies on three lemmas. Lemma 1.1. proves that the value function Vdt of discrete-
time optimization problemEquation (1.5’). converges to the value functionV of continuous-
time optimization problem Equation (1.1). as dt Ñ 0. Lemma 1.3. proves that the solution
of discrete time Bellman Equation (1.6) . converges to the solution of continuous time HJB
Equation (1.4) . as dt Ñ 0. Lemma 1.2 . proves that Vdt is also the solution of Bellman Equa-
tion (1.6). Therefore, V is the solution of HJB Equation (1.4) .
Among the three lemmas, Lemmas 1.1 . and 1.2. are quite standard, and the proofs are
mostly variations of standard arguments. In Appendices A.2.2.1 . and A.2.2.2., I discuss
only the main proof ideas and some non-standard details and relegate the standard parts
and purely technical details to Appendix B.2.1.
Lemma 1.3. is the key lemma for Theorem 1.1., as it provides an important link between
discrete time Bellman and continuous time HJB. Proof of Lemma 1.3 . is provided in details
in Appendix A.2.2.3 . The discussion also formalizes the definition of HJB Equation (1.4) .
by clarifying the notion of viscosity solution I am using.
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A.2.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1.
RemarkA.1. The proof of Lemma 1.1 . uses Lemma 1.2 . for someminor technical arguments.
However the main proof idea does not conceptually depend on Lemma 1.2 . So I show the
proof of Lemma 1.1. first.











HereWdtpµt, τq is defined in Section 1.5.1 . as the discretized payoff of continuous time strat-
egy xµty, τ. The inner limit of LHS in Equation (A.2). is then by definition the payoff of
strategy xµty, τ in the continuous time problem Equation (1.1) . So the LHS is Vpµq. The
inner limit of RHS is Vdtpµq (as the problem optimizing Wdt is a discrete time problem
equivalent to Equation (1.5’)., formally shown in Lemma B.5., a dependence lemma for
Lemma 1.2 .). So RHS is limVdt (a technical lemma Lemma B.8 . guarantees existence of
such limit).
I prove by showing inequality in two directions. The direction Vpµq ď limVdtpµq is
trivial since Wdtpµt, τq ď Vdtpµq for all xµty, τ, dt. The key is to prove the other direction
Vpµq ě limVdtpµq. I prove this claim by showing that @dt ą 0, there exists a continuous
time strategy that achieves a payoff in Equation (1.1). no less than Vdtpµq.
Given time period dt, by Lemma 1.2 . there exists discrete time optimal solution µt˚ and
τ˚, where µt˚`1|Ft has support size N. The goal is to construct an admissible continuous-
time belief process xµty, which satisfies two properties: 1) at each discrete time idt, µt
has exactly the same distribution as µi˚ , 2) within each dt period, uncertainty reduc-
tion speed of µt is exactly ErHpµi˚ q ´ Hpµi˚`1q|Fis{dt. Such xµty with stopping time τ˚
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achieves higher payoff than Vdtpµq. Now this construction can be done by a technique
introduced in Lemma B.3. @i and conditional on Fi, apply Lemma B.3. to the distribution
of µi˚`1 to smooth it on ridt, pi` 1qdts. Lemma B.3. states that there exists a continuous-
time martingale xrµty (with a corresponding probability space) satisfying: @s, t P r0, 1s,
s ą t: ErHpµtq ´ Hpµsq|Fts “ ps´ tqErHpµi˚ q ´ Hpµi˚`1q
ˇˇFis. For t P ridt, pi` 1qdts, define
µt
ˇˇFidt “ rµ t´idt
dt

















Let τ “ τ˚dt. It is easy to see that by construction τ is measurable to the natural




















































Second inequality is from 1´ e´x ď x. Therefore, Vpµq ě limVdtpµq. 
Remark A.2 (Non-integrable xµty). In fact, the integrability requirement introduced in
Equation (1.1). (defined as existence of limWdt in Section 1.5.1.) is not necessary for my
analysis of Theorem 1.1 . Suppose now I extend the set of admissible belief profilesM to
153
Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 1 .
satisfy only the first two conditions: cadlag path, martingale property and initial value
µ0 “ µ. Then the limit of finite Riemann sum Wdtpµt, τq might not exist (although each
finite Riemann sum is always well defined). Whenever this is the case, I define the payoff











SinceWdtpµt, τq is bounded above by max F, Equation (A.3) . is always well defined. Equa-
tion (A.3) . is the essential upper-bound of payoff of an ill-behaved strategy, and when xµty
is integrable it is consistent with the original definition of V. Obviously, such extension of
admissible strategy set weakly increases the value of Vpµq. Here I call the extended value





In the proof of Theorem 1.1 ., Lemmas 1.2 . and 1.3. are not affected at all since they are
about the discrete-time problem and corresponding value function Vdt. If Lemma 1.1 . can
be extended to pVpµq “ limdtÑ0Vdt, then Theorem 1.1. still holds with V replaced withpV. This extension is quite trivial by observing @xµty, τ, dt, Wdtpµt, τq ď Vdtpµq ùñ
lim supWdtpµt, τq ď limVdtpµq ùñ pVpµq “ lim sup ď limVdtpµq.
To sum up, if we extend the admissible strategy set, and relax the definition of the ob-
jective function to its essential upper-bound, a solution to HJB Equation (1.4) . still achieves
the value function. Therefore, it isWLOO to eliminate all those ill-behaved strategies from
the admissible control set.
A.2.2.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2.
Remark A.3. The proof presented here is stronger than the statement of Lemma 1.2 . in Sec-
tion 1.5.2 . It proves that the Bellman Equation (1.6) . characterizes both Equations (1.5) .
and (1.5’). (while Lemma 1.2. only states that Equation (1.5). is characterized by Equa-
tion (1.6).). The first step of the proof shows that Vdt defined by Equations (1.5). and (1.5’).
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are identical (Lemmas B.4. and B.5.), and can be rewritten as a recursive problem (Lemma B.6.).
To proof the Lemma 1.2 . exactly stated in Section 1.5.2 ., one can simply skip Lemmas B.4 .
and B.5. and start with Lemma B.6., noticing that Equation (B.9). is simply rewriting Equa-
tion (1.5).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1.2. is mostly the standard theory of discrete-time dynamic
programming with a few tweaks. The proof involves 4 steps:
Step 1. Rewrite the sequential problem into the recursive problem. The technical de-
tails of the rewriting of problem is shown in Lemmas B.4 ., B.5. and B.6. The only non-
standard analysis is to show that in Equation (1.5’) ., St may contain unused information/
randomness which can be discarded without loss of utility. Then the sequential prob-
lem without any redundant information can be represented in the belief space and easily
written as a recursive problem.
Step 2. Verify the standard transversality condition. This is trivial as the payoff is
bounded by max F and discounted exponentially.
Step 3. Verify the Blackwell contract mapping condition. The contraction parameter
in Equation (1.6) . is trivially the discount factor e´ρdt. The non-standard analysis is to
show that the optimization operation is into the domain Cp∆Xq. To show this I invoke a
maximum theorem in information design problems (Theorem 4.5. of Chapter 4., it shows
the existence of maximum as well).
Step 4. With steps 1-3, I invoke the standard contract-mapping fixed point theorem and
show that value function Vdt is the unique solution to Equation (1.6) . The final bits show
that I can restrict the optimal strategy of Equation (1.6) . to have support size N. This part
is proved using a generalized concavification result: Notice that the objective function
in Equation (1.6) . is not in the standard “expected valuation” form as in the literature of
information design (see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011.)). Instead, there is an extra Cdtp¨q
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term. However, intuitively this problem can be handle using a Lagrange method and
take the term inside Cdtp¨q to combine it with ErVs linearly. This intuition is formalized
by Theorem B.1 ., which is a corollary of a more general result in Chapter 4 . 
A.2.2.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3.
Before going to the proof of Lemma 1.3., I first formally rewrite the problem to accom-




V : ∆pXq ÞÑ R`
ˇˇˇˇ
@µ P ∆X, µ1 P ∆psupppµqq, lim sup
µ1Ñµ
|Vpµ1q ´Vpµq|
‖µ1 ´ µ‖ P R
+
where ‖¨‖ is Euclidean norm on ∆X. By definition, L is the set of pointwise Lipschitz
functions on ∆pXq. Two technical lemmas Lemmas B.8 . and B.9. guarantee that limVdt is
well defined, and there exists V P L which is the uniform limit of Vdt. Now I show that





















pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµq ¨ pνi ´ µqq ´ 12pσT ¨HHpµq ¨ pσ
˙+
∇ and H denote gradient and Hessian operator (well-defined on all interior points). Since
V is not necessarily differentiable, I use operator D and D2 to replace the Jacobian and
Hessian operators on V. D and D2 are defined as follows. @y P B|supppxq|´1 (Unit ball in
|supppxq| ´ 1 dimensional space):
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Definition A.2 (General differentials). @ f P L:
$’’&’’%
D f px, yq “ lim infδÑ0 f pxq´ f px´δyqδ‖y‖
D2 f px, yq “ lim supδÑ0 2 f px`δyq´ f pxq´δ¨D f px,yq¨‖y‖δ‖y‖2
Notice that if f P Cp1qp∆Xq, then D f px, yq “ ∇ f pxq¨y‖y‖ . If f P Cp2qp∆Xq then D2 f px, yq “
yT¨H f pxq¨y
‖y‖2 . It is not hard to verify that for C
p1q smooth value function Vpµq, Equation (A.4) .
is equivalent to Equation (1.4).
Proof.
Consider Lemma 1.3 . by replacing Equation (1.4) . with Equation (A.4). If the statement
is proved with Equation (A.4) ., then since V “ V is Cp1q smooth, V is smooth and Equa-
tion (1.4) . automatically holds. I prove by induction on dimensionality of supppµq. First
of all, Lemma 1.3 . is trivially true when µ “ δx since Vpµq “ Vpµq “ Fpµqwhen the state is
deterministic. Now it is sufficient to prove V “ V on interior of ∆X conditional on V “ V
being true on B∆X (boundary of ∆X).
The proof takes three steps. Before going to the details, I introduce the steps briefly.
The first step is to show that V is unimprovable in HJB Equation (A.4) . The proof is quite
standard as any continuous-time strategy that improves V can be approximated by a
discrete-time strategy. The second step showsV ě V. Proof is by a standard contradiction
argument. If V ă V, then there exists a belief s.t. the same strategy implements strictly
higher HJB with V, which violates unimprovability. The last and most difficult step is to
show that V ě V.
Unimprovability: First I show that V is unimprovable in Equation (A.4) . Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that V is improvable at interior µ, then there exists pi, νi,pσ, I
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˘´DVpµ, µ´ÿ piνiq∥∥∥ÿ piνi ´ µ∥∥∥`ÿD2Vpµ,pσjq‖pσ‖2j ´ CpIq
where I “ ´
ÿ
pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµq ¨ pνi ´ µqq ´
ÿpσTj HHpµqpσj





˘´DVpµ,ř piνi ´ µq‖ř piνi ´ µ‖
´ř pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµq ¨ pνi ´ µqq ; D
2Vpµ,pσq‖pσ‖2
´pσTHHpµqpσ






˘´DVpµ,ř piνi ´ µq‖ř piνi ´ µ‖
´ř pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµq ¨ pνi ´ µqq ą ρI Vpµq ` CpIqI















where δ is sufficiently small that µ0 “ µ´ δpř piνi ´ µq P ∆Xo. Then by construction, if
we assume: $’’&’’%
p10 “ 11`δ












where 0 is also included in indices i’s. Replacing terms in Equation (A.5) . and let















Vpµq ` εIpνi|µq (A.6)
It is easy to verify that Ipνi|µq is continuous in δ and it is zero when δ “ 0. So δ can be
















Ipνi|µqk ¨ Ipνi|µq ď εIpνi|µq4 sup F (A.7)





























Ipνi|µq is a second order small term. Then we can pick δ
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CpIq ě Vpµq ` ε
8
Ipνi|µq
From now on, we fix ε and δ. Pick dt “ Ipνi|µqI , dtm “ dtm . By uniform convergence, there
























That is to say we find a feasible experiment, whose cost can be spread into m periods
(the split of experiment is done by applying Lemma B.3 .). This experiment strictly dom-
inates the optimal experiment at µ for discrete time problem with dtm. Contradiction.
Therefore, V must be unimprovable at µ.
• Case 2:
D2Vpµ,pσq‖pσ‖2
´pσTHHpµqpσ ą ρI Vpµq ` CpIqI
Then by the definition of operator D2 in Definition A.2., there exists pσ, δ, ε ą 0 s.t.:
Vpµ` δpσq ´Vpµq ´ δDVpµ,pσq‖pσ‖
´Hpµ` δpσq ` Hpµq ` δ∇Hpµq ¨ pσ ě ρI Vpµq ` CpIqI ` 2ε
Then by the definition of operator D in Definition A.2., there exists δ1 s.t.:
Vpµ` δpσq ´Vpµq ´ δVpµq´Vpµ´δ1pσqδ1

















CpIq ` εIpνi|µq (A.9)
Noticing that Equation (A.9) . is exactly the same as Equation (A.6) . in Case 1. Then using
same argument, This case is also ruled out.
Equality: I show that @ smooth function V solving Equation (A.4)., V “ V. Notice that
this automatically proves the uniqueness of solution of Equation (A.4). I prove inequality
from both directions for µ P ∆pXqo:
• Vpµq ě Vpµq: Suppose not, then consider Upµq “ Vpµq ´ Vpµq. Since both V and
V are continuous, U is continuous. Therefore argminU is non empty and minU ă
0 according to our assumption. Choose µ P argminU (µ P ∆Xo since V “ V on
















pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpνi ´ µqq ´ 12pσTHHpµqpσ
˙
Now compare DV and DV:
Vpµq ´Vpµ1q
‖µ´ µ1‖ “




ùñ lim inf Vpµq ´Vpµ
1q
‖µ´ µ1‖ ď lim
Vpµq ´Vpµ1q
‖µ´ µ1‖
ùñ DVpµ, µ1 ´ µq∥∥µ1 ´ µ∥∥ ď ∇Vpµq ¨ pµ1 ´ µq
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Compare D2V and D2V:
Vpµ1q ´Vpµq ´DVpµ, µ1 ´ µq‖µ1 ´ µ‖
‖µ1 ´ µ‖2 ě
Vpµ1q ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµq ¨ pµ1 ´ µq `Upµ1q ´Upµq
‖µ´ µ1‖2
ùñ D2Vpµ,pσq ěD2Vpµ,pσq















pipHpνiq ´ Hpµq `∇Hpµqpνi ´ µqq ´ 12pσTHHpµqpσ
˙
ďρVpµq
The first inequality comes from replacing DV and D2V with DV and D2V. The second
inequality comes from Upνiq ´Upµq ě 0 and unimprovability of V. Contradiction.
• Vpµq ě Vpµq: I prove by showing that @dt ą 0, V ě Vdt. Suppose not, then there
exists µ1, dt s.t. Vdtpµ1q ą Vpµ1q. Let dtn “ dt2n . Since Vdtn is increasing in n, there exists
ε ą 0 s.t. Vdtnpµ1q ´Vpµ1q ě ε @n P N. Now consider Un “ V ´Vdtn . Un is continuous
by Lemma 1.2 . and Unpµ1q ď ´ε. Pick µn P argminUn. Since ∆pXq is compact, there
exists a converging sequence lim µn “ µ. By assumption, Unpµnq ď ´ε, therefore since
Upµq “ limUnpµnq ď ´ε, µ must be in interior of ∆pXq. So without loss, µn can be




pni Vdtnpνni q ´ dtnCpInqÿ








By definition of Unpµq:
ÿ


















ěρdtnε` ρdtnVpµnq ` eρdtndtnCpInq
ùñ ρVpµnq ď´ ρε`
ÿ pni
dtn
pVpνni q ´Vpµnqq ´ eρdtnCpInq
ùñ ρVpµnq ď´ ρε`
ÿ pni
dtn
pVpνni q ´Vpµnqq ´ CpInq (A.11)
The first equality is by the definition ofUn. The first inequality is from µn P argminUn.
The second inequality is from ex ´ 1 ě x. The third inequality is from Unpµnq ď ´ε.
Now since the number of posteriors νni is no more than 2|X|, we can take a subsequence
of n such that all lim νni “ νi. Partition νni into two kinds: lim νni “ νi ‰ µ, lim νnj “ µ.
Since V is unimprovable, @c,pσ we have D2Vpµ,pσq‖pσ‖2 ď ´pσTHHpµqpσ´ρIVpµq ` CpIqI ¯.
Since V P Cp1q, H P Cp2q, @η, there exists δ s.t. @|µ1 ´ µ| ď δ:
$’’&’’%
‖HHpµq ´HHpµ1q‖ ď η
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ă δ, |µn ´ µ| ă δ. Now I want to do a second-
order approximation of Vpνnj q ´Vpµnq ´∇Vpµnqpνnj ´ µnq. To apply Taylor expansion
to a not necessarily twice differentiable function V, I invoke a technical Lemma B.10 . to
gpαq “ Vpανnj ` p1´ αqµnq:



































∥∥∥νnj ´ µn∥∥∥2 (A.12)






































Notice that Equations (A.12) . and (A.13). are true uniform to I, so we can replace I with
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Hpµnq ´ Hpνni q ` H1pµnqpνni ´ µnq








pni pVpνni q ´Vpµnq ´∇Vpµnqpνni ´ µnqq ď
´











Then we study term
ř
























∥∥∥νnj ´ µn∥∥∥2 (A.16)































In ` pσnTHHpµnqpσn¯ˆ ρInVpµnq ` CpInqIn
˙
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∥∥∥νnj ´ µn∥∥∥21` CpInq2In η
“
´
















∥∥∥νnj ´ µn∥∥∥21` CpInq2In η
ďρVpµnq ` CpInq ` 1dtn
ÿ
pnj
∥∥∥νnj ´ µn∥∥∥2ˆ1` ρVpµq ` 2CpInq2In
˙
η ` ρη
The first inequality is Equation (A.13). The second inequality comes fromEquation (A.15).
and Equation (A.16). The next equality comes from definition of pσ2n. The last inequal-
ity comes from canceling out terms and ´pσnTHHpµnqpσn ď In (Notice the difference
between Vpµq and Vpµnq). Then by plug into Equation (A.11).:



























ùñ ρε ď 1
2







By Lemma B.7., CpInq is uniformly bounded above. Since H is strictly concave infσ |σ
THHpµqσ|
‖σ‖2
is positive. The inequality holds when η is chosen smaller than infσ
|σTHHpµqσ|
‖σ‖2 . By tak-
ing η Ñ 0, the LHS is eventually larger than the RHS. Contradiction. Therefore:




A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1.2.
Proof. I prove Theorem 1.2 . by guess and verification. To simplify notation, I define a
flow version of information measure:
Jpµ, νq “ Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq
Then total flow information cost is p ¨ Jpµ, νq. Let Fm “ Eµrupam, xqs and reorder am s.t. F1m
is increasing in m. Let µ
k






the smallest index s.t. F1m ě 0.
Algorithm:
In this part, I introduce the algorithm for constructing Vpµq and νpµq. I only discuss the
case µ ě µ˚. The remaining case µ ď µ˚ follows by a symmetric method. The main steps
are illustrated in Figure A.6. The first step is to find critical the belief µ˚ at which two
sided stationary Poisson signal is optimal (µ˚=0.5 in a symmetric problem). Then value
function is solved by searching over optimal posterior beliefs, given choosing an action
(say am). Then the remaining actions are added one by one to consideration. And value
function is updated when each additional action is added. Finally, after all actions have
been considered, I complete the construction of value function.
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The two black (dashed and solid) lines are Fm´1pµq, Fmpµq.
The blue line is optimal value function from taking immediate action m.
The red line is optimal value function from taking immediate action m´ 1.
Figure A.6: Construction of optimal value function.








1` ρc Jpµ, νq
In Lemma A.2 . I analyze the technical details of V` and V´. The main property is that:
V` is increasing and V´ is decreasing. There exists µ˚ P r0, 1s s.t. V`pµq ě V´pµqwhen
µ ě µ˚ and V´pµq ď V´pµqwhen µ ď µ˚. Define Vpµq “ max␣V`pµq,V´pµq(.
• Step 2: I construct the first piece of Vpµq to the right of µ˚. There are three possible cases
of µ˚ to be discussed (I omitted µ˚ “ 1 by symmetry).






1` ρc Jpµ˚, νpµ˚qq
Initial condition
`
µ0 “ µ˚,V0 “ Vpµ˚q,V10 “ 0
˘
satisfies Lemma A.3 ., which states that





Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
This refers to Figure A.6 .-1. Define
Vµ˚pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ď µ˚
Vmpµq if µ ě µ˚
Be Lemma A.3 ., when Vµ˚pµq ą Fpµq, Vµ˚ is smoothly increasing and optimal νpµq is
smoothly decreasing.
Now update Vµ˚pµq with respect to more actions (in the order of decreasing index m).





Fm´1pνq ´Vµ˚ppµmq ´V1µ˚ppµmqpν´ pµmq
Jppµm, νq (A.17)
At pµm, searching posterior on Fm´1 first dominates searching posterior on Fm7 . This
step refers to Figure A.6 .-2. pµm is the smallest intersection point of blue curve (Vµ˚pµq,
LHS of Equation (A.17) .) and thin red curve (RHS of Equation (A.17) .). If Vmppµmq ą
Fm´1ppµmq then solve forVm´1 with initial condition µ0 “ µˆm,V0 “ Vmpµˆmq,V10 “ V1mpµˆmq
7Existence is guaranteed by smoothness of Vµ˚ and J. Noticing that Vmpµˆmq ě Fm´1ppµmq. Otherwise,
there will be a pµ1m ă pµm s.t. Vmppµ1mq “ Fm´1ppµ1mq and it is easy to verify that Vm is weakly larger than the
maximum. So there is an even smaller pµm, contradiction.
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according to Lemma A.3 . and redefine Vµ˚pµq “ Vm´1pµqwhen µ ě pµm. Otherwise skip
to looking for pµm´1. If m ´ 1 ą m, continue this procedure by looking for µˆm´1 and
update Vµ˚ |µěpµm´1 with corresponding Vm´2 . . . until m “ m (No action with the slope
of F1m being negative is considered). This refers to Figure A.6.-3. Now suppose Vm first
hits Fpµq at some point µ˚˚ (µ˚˚ ą µ˚ sinceVmpµ˚q ą Fpµ˚q). Vµ˚ is a (piecewise) smooth
function on rµ˚, µ˚˚s such that:
Vµ˚pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ď µ˚ or µ ě µ˚˚
Vkpµq if µ P rpµk, pµk´1s8 .
By construction, optimal posterior νµ˚pµq is smoothly decreasing on each ppµk`1, pµkq and
jumps down at each pµk9 . Notice that it is not yet proved that this order of value function
updating is WLOO. It is possible that optimal policy function is non-monotonic. This
is taken care of by Lemma B.18 ., which proves the order of updating being WLOO.
I relegate the proof of Lemma B.18 . to supplemental materials to conserve space, but






Fkpνq ´Vµ˚pµq ´V1µ˚pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq (A.18)
Case 2: Suppose µ˚ P p0, 1q but Vpµ˚q “ Fpµ˚q, let µ˚˚ “ inf␣µ ě µ˚|Vpµq ą Fpµq(.





Fkpνq ´ F1pµq ´ F11pν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
8Define pµm`1 “ µ˚ and pµm “ µ˚˚ for consistency.
9Since Fk´1 always crosses Fk from above, when indifference between choosing Fk´1 and Fk, the posterior
corresponding to Fk´1 must be smaller.
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Define, µ˚˚ “ inf
!
µ|rVpµq ą F1pµq). By Assumption 1.3 ., limµÑ0|H1pµq| “ 8, then there
exists δ s.t. @µ ă δ, @ν ě µ
2
, sup FJpµ,νq ď inf F. Therefore µ˚˚ ě δ ą 0. This step refers to
Figure A.6.-4.





Fkpνq ´ Fpµ˛q ´ F1´pµ˛qpν´ µ˛q
Jpµ˛, νq (A.19)
Let m be the index of optimal action. Solve for Vm with initial condition µ0 “ µ˛,V0 “
Fpµ˛q,V10 “ F1´pµ˛q. 10 . Then take same steps in Step 2 and solve for pµk and Vk´1
sequentially until Vm0 first hits F. This step refers to Figure A.6 .-4,5. Now suppose Vm0
first hits Fpµq at some point µ˛˛ (can potentially be µ), define:
Vµ˛pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ă µ˛ or µ ą µ˛˛
Vkpµq if µ P rpµk`1, pµks11 .
By Lemma A.3 ., Vµ is piecewise smooth are pasted smoothly. So Vµ is a smooth func-
tion on rµ, µ2s. Optimal posterior νµ˛pµq is smoothly decreasing on each ppµk`1, pµkq and





Fkpνq ´Vµ˛pµq ´V1µ˛pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq (A.18.)
Let Ω be the set of all such µ˛’s.
10By definition of µ˚˚, µ0 is bounded away from t0, 1u and Equation (A.19) . implies conditions in
Lemma A.3. are satisfied.
11Define pµm`1 “ µ˛ and pµm0 “ µ˛˛ for consistency.
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• Step 4: Define:
Vpµq “
$’’&’’%






if µ ě µ˚˚
(A.20)
In the algorithm, I only discussed the case µ˚ ă 1 and constructed the value function on
the right of µ˚. On the left of µ˚, V can be defined using a totally symmetric argument by
referring to Lemma A.31 . and Lemma B.181 .
Smoothness:
I need to verify that Vpµq that defined as Equation (A.20). is a Cp1q smooth function on
r0, 1s. This claim is purely for technical use (for example, the validity of using V1 and
V2). I relegate this technical proof to Appendix B.2.1 . in Lemmas B.11 ., B.12., B.13. and B.14.
In addition, it is shown in Appendix B.2.1. that there exists a set of µ0 such that on each
interval when Vpµq ą Fpµq, Vpµq is defined as one Vµ0 .
Unimprovability:
Finally, I prove unimprovability of Vpµq.











ν ě µ when µ ě µ˚
ν ď µ when µ ď µ˚
Equation (P-C). is the maximization problem over all confirmatory evidence seeking
with immediate decision making upon arrival of signals. Equation (P-C) . is implied by
Equation (A.18) . for µ P E. So it is sufficient to prove Equation (P-C) . for µ P EC. Suppose
for the sake of contradictoin that there exists µ ě µ˚ s.t. Equation (P-C). is violated. Let
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F1kpνq ´ Fkpµq ´ F1kpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq ą Fkpµq
Consider µ
k
(the intercection of Fk and Fk´1). By Lemma B.11 ., there exists Ik s.t. µk P Ik.
At bk “ sup Ik, Upbkq ď Fkpbkq. Therefore, since Upµq is continuous, by intermediate
value theorem there exists largest µ1 between µ
k
and µ s.t .Upµ1q “ Fkpµ1q. Then Equa-
tion (A.19) . is satisfied at µ1 so consider Vµ1 . Sicne Vµ1pµq ď Vpµq “ Fkpµq, there exists
µ2 P pµ1, µq s.t. Vµ1pµ2q ď Fkpµ2q and V1µ1pµ2q ď Fkpµ2q. Therefore Upµ2q ą Fkpµ2q im-
plies Vµ1pµ2q ą Fkpµ2q, contradiction. Apply a symmetric argument to µ ď µ˚, I prove
Equation (P-C).











ν ě µ when µ ě µ˚
ν ď µ when µ ď µ˚
Equation (P-D) . is the maximization problem over all confirmatory learning strategies.
It has less constraint than Equation (P-C).: when a signal arrives and posterior belief ν
is realized, the DM is allowed to continue experimentation instead of being forced to
take an action.
I only show the case µ ě µ˚ and a totally symmetric argument applies to µ ď µ˚.









Vpν1q ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν1 ´ µq
Jpµ, ν1q (A.21)
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Let rV “ Vpµq. Suppose the maximizer is ν,m. Optimality implies first order conditions
Equation (A.27). and Equation (A.26) .:
$’&’%
F1m ` ρc




rVHpνq¯´ ´Vpµq ` ρ
c




We define LpV,λ, µqpνq and GpV,λqpµq as:
$’’&’’%
LpV,λ, µqpνq “ pVpµq ` λHpµqq ` pV1pµq ` λH1pµqqpν´ µq
GpV,λqpνq “ Vpνq ` λHpνq
(A.22)







rV, µ¯pνq ´ G´Fm, ρc rV¯pνq






rV, µ¯pνq ´ G´Fm1 , ρc rV¯pνq






rV, µ¯pν1q ´ G´V, ρ
c
rV¯pν1q “ ´´Vpν1q ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν1 ´ µq ´ ρ
c
rVJpµ, ν1q¯ ă 0
Therefore L
´
V, ρc rV, µ¯pνq ´ G´V, ρc rV¯pνq has strictly negative minimum. Suppose it’s





















rV, µ¯pνprµqq ´ G´Fm, ρc rV¯pνprµqq
`Vprµq ´Vpµq ` ρ
c
rVpHprµq ´ Hpµqq ´ ´V1pµq ` ρ
c
rVH1pµq¯prµ´ µq
ěVprµq ´Vpµq ` ρ
c








rV¯prµq ´ L´V, ρ
c
rV, µ¯prµq ą 0
In the first equality I used Equation (A.27) . at rµ. In first inequality I used suboptimality












rV, rµ¯pνprµqq ´ G´Fm1 , ρc rV¯pνprµqq
` ρ
c
pVprµq ´ rVqpHprµq ´ Hpνprµqq ` H1prµqpνprµq ´ rµqq
ąρ
c
pVprµq ´ rVqJprµ, νprµqq
Contradiction. Therefore, I proved Equation (P-D).
• Step 3: I show that V satisfies Equation (A.4) ., which is less restrictive than Equation (P-
D). by allowing 1) diffusion experiments. 2) evidience seeking of all possible posteriors
instead of just confirmatory evidence.
First, since V is smoothly increasing and has a piecewise differentiable optimizer ν,
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ùñ V2pµq ` ρ
c
VpµqH2pµq ă 0





Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq









V´pµq is by definition the utiltiy gain from searching contradictive evidence, given
value function Vpµq. By definition of µ˚, V´pµ˚q “ Vpµ˚q and whenever Vpµq “ V´pµq
V´1pµq ă 0. Therefore, V´pµq can never cross Vpµq from below — V´pµq is lower than









s.t. pJpµ, νq ` 1
2
H2pµqσ2 ď c
To sum up, I construct a policy function νpµq and value function Vpµq solving Equa-
tion (A.4) . Now consider the four properties in Theorem 1.2 . First, by my construction
algorithm, in the case µ˚ P t0, 1u, I can replace µ˚ with µ˚˚ P p0, 1q. Therefore WLOG
µ˚ P p0, 1q. Second, E “ ␣µ P r0, 1sˇˇVpµq ą Fpµq( is a union of disjoint open intervals
E “ Ť Im. By my construction, Vpµq “ Vµmpµq|µPIm . On each Im, νµmpµq is sctrictly de-
creasing and jumps down at finite pµk’s. Finally, uniqueness argument in Lemma A.3 .
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implies that ν is uniquely determined by FOC. Therefore, except for those discountinous
points of ν, ν is uniquely defined. Number of such discontinuous points is countable,
thus of zero measure. 








1` ρc Jpµ, νq
There exists µ˚ P r0, 1s s.t. V`pµq ě V´pµq @µ ě µ˚; V`pµq ď V´pµq @µ ď µ˚.
Proof. I define function Um` and Um´ as follows:
Um`pµq “ maxνěµ
Fmpνq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq
Um´pµq “ maxνďµ
Fmpνq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq
First of all, I solveUm` ,Um´ on interior µ P p0, 1q. Since Fmpµq is a linear function, Jpµ, νq ě 0
is smooth, the objective function is a continuous function on compact domain. Therefore
both maximization operators are well defined. Existence is already guaranteed, therefore















H1pνq ´ H1pµq˘ (A.24)
First discuss solving for ν ě µ. Since p1 ` ρc Jq ą 0, H2 ă 0, H1pνq ´ H1pµq ď 0 and
inequality is strict when ν ą µ. Therefore, if F1m ă 0, FOC being held will imply SOC
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being strictly positive at ν ą µ. So @F1m ă 0, optimal ν is a corner solution. Moreover:
Fmpµq
1` ρc Jpµ, µq
“ Fmpµq ą Fmp1q ą Fmp1q
1` ρc Jpµ, 1q
So Um`pµq “ Fmpµq. If F1m “ 0, then @ν ą µ:
Fmpµq
1` ρc Jpµ, µq
“ Fmpµq “ Fmpνq ě Fmpνq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq
Therefore @F1m ď 0, Um`pµq “ Fmpµq. Then consider the case F1m ą 0. It can be easily
verified that SOC is strictly negative when FOC holds and ν ą µ. Therefore solution of




mp1` ρc Jpµ, νqq ` Fmpνq
ρ
c




mp1` ρc Jpµ, νqq ` Fmpνq
ρ
c
pH1pνq ´ H1pµqq “ ´8
Therefore be intermediate value theorem a unique solution ν P pµ, 1q exists by solving
FOC. Since FOC is a smooth function of µ, ν and SOC is strictly negative, implicit function






1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘2 ą 0
Moreover, Equation (A.23). is strictly positive when ν “ µ. This implies Um`pµq ą Fmpµq
when F1m ą 0.
New consider limit ofUm` when µÑ 0, 1. When µÑ 1,Um`pµq ď maxνěµ Fmpνq “ Fp1q.
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H1pνq ´ H1pµq˘ “ ´8
Therefore, when µÑ 0, optimal νÑ 0. Therefore Fmpνq
1` ρc Jpµ,νq
ď Fmpνq Ñ Fmp0q. To conclude,
Um`pµq “ Fmpµqwhen µ “ 0, 1. Let m be the first F1m ą 0 (not necessarily exists). Let:
U`pµq “ max
měmUm`pµq
Then U`pµq is a strictly increasing function when m exists. Symmetrically I can define m
to be last F1m ă 0 and:
U´pµq “max
mďmUm´pµq
There are three cases:
• Case 1: when F is not monotonic, then both U` and U´ exists. Moreover, Fp0q ą
Fmp0q and Fp1q ą Fmp1q. Therefore,U`p0q ă U´p0q andU`p1q ą U´p1q. There must
exists unique µ˚ P p0, 1q s.t. U`pµ˚q “ U´pµ˚q.
• Case 2: when F1 ě 0, then define µ˚ “ 0.
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V´pµq “ max␣Fpµq,U´pµq(
Vpµq “ max␣V`pµq,V´pµq(
Given our construction, µ˚ always exists and satisfies the conditions in Lemma A.2 .

Lemma A.3. Assume µ0 ě µ˚, F1m ě 0, V0,V10 ě 0 satisfies:$’’&’’%





Fmpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq





Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq (A.25)
and initial condition Vpµ0q “ V0,V1pµ0q “ V10. Maximizer νpµq is Cp1q and strictly decreasing
on tµ|Vpµq ą Fmpµqu.




Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq2
`















Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
˘ ď 0
If feasibility is imposed:
Vpµq “ c
ρ




FOC and SOC reduces to:
FOC: F1m ´V1pµq ` ρcVpµqpH




H2pνqVpµq ď 0 (A.28)
Let us proceed as follows. I use FOC and feasiblity to derive an ODE system with in-
tial value defined by V0,V10. Then I prove that the solution V must be strictly positive.
Therefore, SOC is strict at the point where FOC is satisfied, the solution must be a lo-
cal maximizer. Moreover, since H1pνq ´ H1pµq ă 0, when FOC is negative, SOC must
be strictly negative, then FOC can cross zero only from above and hence the solution to
FOC is unique. Therefore the solution I get from the ODE system is the maximizer in
Equation (A.25).
$’’&’’%
Equation (A.26) . ùñ Vpµq “ Fmpνq ´V
1pµqpν´ µq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq





1´ ρc Jpν, µq
V1pµq “ F1m `
ρ
c FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
(A.29)





1´ ρc Jpν, µq
` BBν
Fmpµq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
9ν “ F1m `
ρ
c FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
(A.30)
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Simplifying Equation (A.30) .:
F1m
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
`
ρ
c FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq`
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
˘2 ` ρc FmpµqH2pνqpµ´ νq`1´ ρc Jpν, µq˘2 9ν
“F
1
m ` ρc p´F1m Jpν, µq ` FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqqq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
ùñ FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq ` FmpµqH2pνqpµ´ νq 9ν
“ p´F1m Jpν, µq ` FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqqqp1´ ρc Jpν, µqq
ùñ FmpµqH2pνqpµ´ νq 9ν “ ´F1m Jpν, µqp1´ ρc Jpν, µqq ´
ρ
c
Jpν, µqFmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq




1´ ρc Jpν, µq
˘` ρc FmpµqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
FmpµqH2pνqpν´ µq
Since I want to solve for V0 on rµ0, 1s, I solve for ν0 at µ0 as the initial condition of ODE
for ν. The technical details proving the existence of solution to the ODE is relegated to
Lemma B.16 ., which checks standard conditions and invokes the Picard-Lindelof theorem.
Lemma B.16. requires an inequality condition and I show it here:













































SinceV0 “ Fmpµ0q1´ ρc Jpν0,µ0q ě 0, LHS isweakly positive. This satisifes the condition in Lemma B.16.
Then Lemma B.16 . guarantees existence of unique νpµq, and νpµq is continuously decreas-







1´ ρc Jpνpµq, µq
if µ P rµ0, µmq
Fmpµq if µ P rµm, 1s
Then I prove the properies of V:
1. V is by construction smooth except for at µ. When µ Ñ µm, νpµq Ñ µ. Therefore
Jpν, µq Ñ 0. This implies Vpµq Ñ Fmpµq. So V is continuous.
2. By Equation (A.29)., when µ P rµ0, µmq:
V1pµq “ F1m ` FmpµqpH
1pνpµqq ´ H1pµqq
c
ρ ´ Jpνpµq, µq
When µ Ñ µm, H1pνpµqq ´ H1pµq Ñ 0, Jpνpµq, µq Ñ 0. Thus V1pµq Ñ F1m. So V1 P
Crµ0, 1s ùñ V P Cp1qrµ0, 1s.





1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
(A.31)
According to proof of Lemma B.16 ., V1pµq ą 0 @µ P pµ0, 1s. Moreover since V0 ě 0,
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B.1 Proofs in Section 1.5.
This section contains formal proofs for theorems and lemmas in Section 1.5.
B.1.1 Useful lemmas
I first establish a useful Lemma B.1 . Lemma B.1 . is an analog to three key theorems on
mutual information proved in Cover and Thomas (2012.), generalizing the log-sum struc-
ture in mutual information to any function while keeping the key posterior separabiltiy.
B.1.1.1 Information theory resutls
Lemma B.1. Information measure IpS ;X |µq satisfies the following properties:
1. Markov property: If X Ñ S Ñ T , then IpT ;X |Sq “ 0.
2. Linear additivity: IpS , T ;X |µq “ IpS ;X |µq ` ErIpT ;X |S , µqs.
3. Information processing inequality: If X Ñ S Ñ T , then IpT ;X |µq ď IpS ;X |µq.
Proof.
1. Markov property: Suppose the signal realization of S , T are denoted by s, t. Then:
IpT ;X |Sq “ EsrHpµpx|sqq ´ EtrHpµpx|t, sqq|sss
“ EsrHpµpx|sqq ´ EtrHpµpx|sqq|sss
“ 0
First equality is by definition of I. Second equality is by T KX ˇˇS , then conditional on
s, t will not shift belief of X at all.
2. Chain rule: Suppose the signal realization of S , T are denoted by s, t. Then:
IpS , T ;X |µq “ Es,trHpµq ´ Hpµpx|s, tqqs
“ Es,trHpµq ´ Hpµpx|sqq ` pHpµpx|sqq ´ Hpµpx|s, tqqqs
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“ pHpµq ´ EsrHpµpx|sqqsq ` pEsrHpµpx|sqq ´ EtrHpµpx|s, tqq|sssq
“ IpS ;X |µq ` ErIpT ;X |S , µqs
First equality is by definition. Second equality is trivial. Third equality is by chain rule
of conditional expectation.
3. Information processing inequality:
IpS ;X |µq “ IpS , T ;X |µq ´ IpT ;X |S , µq
“ IpS , T ;X |µq
“ IpT ;X |µq ` IpS ;X |T , µq
ě IpT ;X |µq
First and third equalities are from chain rule. Second equality is fromMarkov property.

B.1.1.2 Concavification theorem
Theorem B.1 (Concavification). Let X be a finite state space, V P Cp∆Xq, µ P ∆X. H P Cp∆Xq
is non-negative. f : R` ÞÑ R` continuous, increasing and convex. Then there exists P s.t.
|supppPq| ď 2|X| solving:
sup
PP∆2X
EPrVpνqs ´ f pHpµq ´ EPrHpνqsq (B.1)
s.t. EPrνs “ µ
Let I˚ “ Hpµq ´ EPrHpνqs, there exists λ P d f pI˚q such that:
copV ` λHqpµq “ EPrpV ` λHqpµqs
186
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Proof. Theorem B.1 . is a corollary of Lemma 4.1. and Theorem 4.4 . of Chapter 4 .
Support size: since objective function is monototic in pEPrVs, EPrHsq, optimal solution
must be on the boudary of set tpEPrVs, EPrHsq|EPrνs “ µu. Lemma 4.1 . implies that there
exists P solving Equation (B.1) . and |supppPq| ď 2|X|.
Concavification: Suppose f pIq “ 8 ðñ I ą I. Since v ´ f pHpµq ´ hq is a concave
function in pv, hq, and Hpµq ´ h ď I is a linear constraint, we can apply Theorem 4.4. of
Chapter 4.: let V˚ be maximum of Equation (B.1) ., there exists λ s.t.
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%








Then by Kuhn-Tucker condition (generalized to subgradients), there exists η,γ ě 0 such
that: $’&’%
λ1 “ η
λ2 P ´ηB f pI˚q ´ γ
If η “ 0, then γ ą 0 and Pmaximizes EPrγHs, then optimal P is uninformative and I˚ “ 0,
contradiction. So η ą 0. If γ “ 0, then we can normalize pλ1,´λ2q to p1,λq and λ P B f pI˚q.
If γ ą 0, the complementary slackness condition implies that I˚ “ I and λ2{η P B f pI˚q.
So we can also normalize pλ1,´λ2q to p1,λq and λ P B f pI˚q. 
B.1.1.3 Decomposition of information
In this section, I prove two important lemmas. Lemmas B.2 . and B.3. shows that any
static information structure can be decomposed into a continuous time belief process on
unit time interval such that the flow reduction of informativeness is constant.
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Lemma B.2. @µ P ∆pXq, @pi P ∆2pXq, ş pipνqdν “ µ and |pi| is finite. Then there exists
probability space pΩ,F ,Pq and stochastic process xµty s.t.:
1. xµty is a Markovian martingale.
2. µ0 “ µ, µ1 „ pi.
3. @t1, t2 P r0, 1s and t1 ă t2, ErHpµt1q ´ Hpµt2q|Ft1s “ pt2 ´ t1qErHpµ0q ´ Hpµ1qs.
Proof. Define pipνq as pνi,piiqNi“1. Let M “
ř
piiHpνiq ´ Hpµq. Consider the space ∆pNq.
Let xi “ p0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0, 1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0q, which is an N dimensional vector with only ith element
being 1. Then txiuNi“1 is an orthogonal normal base of ∆pNq. Let xµ “ ppi1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,piNq. Then
it is easy to see that xµ P ∆pNq. @λi P r0, 1s, let xi,λi “ λixµ ` p1´ λiqxi P ∆pNq.
Define map f : ∆pNq Ñ ∆pXq as f pxq “ řNj“1 xjνj ( f is a linear map). Then consider
Qipλiq “
ÿ
xji,λipHp f pxi,λiqq ´ Hpνjqq (B.2)
Now consider properties of Qi. First of all, since H is continuous and f is linear, Qipλiq is
continuous in λi. Second, suppose λ1i ą λi and λi,α “ αλi ` p1´ αqλ1i, consider:
Qipλi,αq ´ αQipλ1iq ´ p1´ αqQipλiq









“Hp f pxi,λi,αqq ´ αHp f pxi,λiqq ´ p1´ αqHp f pxi,λ1iqq
“Hp f pαxji,λi ` p1´ αqx
j
i,λ1i
qq ´ αHp f pxi,λiqq ´ p1´ αqHp f pxi,λ1iqq
“Hpα f pxji,λiq ` p1´ αq f px
j
i,λ1i
qq ´ αHp f pxi,λiqq ´ p1´ αqHp f pxi,λ1iqq
ě0
The first equality is by definition of Qi. The second and third equalities is from linearity
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of xi,λi in λi. The forth equality is from linearity of f . The last equality is from concavity
of H. Hence, Qipλiq is concave in λi. It is easy to verify that when λi “ 0, xi,λi “ xi and
f pxi,λiq “ νi so Qip0q “ 0. When λi “ 1, xi,λi “ xµ and f pxi,λiq “ µ so Qip1q “
ř
pijpHpµq ´
Hpνjqq “ M. Since Qi is concave, the only possibility is that Qi is first increasing then
decreasing. Since Qi is a continuous function, @t P r0, 1s, there exists λi in increasing
region of Qi s.t.:
Qipλiptqq “ p1´ tqM
Since p1´ tqM is strictly decreasing M, λiptq is strictly decreasing in M. When t P p0, 1s,






























“ f pxµq “ µ
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1q if i ‰ j
λiptq ´ λipt1q
1´ λipt1q piipt
1q ` 1´ λiptq
1´ λipt1q if i “ j
























λipt1qxµ ` p1´ λipt1qqxi
˘` λiptq ´ λipt1q
1´ λipt1q xµ
˙
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The second equality is from Equation (B.4) . Now define the stochastic process xµty. First,
I complete the definition of µiptq and piiptq. Let µp0q “ µ, piipt|µp0qq “ piiptq. @t ą 1, define
µiptq “ νi, pijpt|µip1qq “ 1i“j. Define Si “ tµiptq|t P p0, 1su. Since νi are distinct, Si are
disjoint sets. Since λiptq is strictly decreasing, µiptq is a one-to-one map from p0, 1s to Si.
Let S “ pŤ SiqŤtµu. Define: τ : SÑ r0, 1s:
τpνq “
$’&’%
µiptq´1pνq if µ P Si
0 if ν “ µ





We verify the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation: @x, z P S, t, s P R`:
• If τpxq ` t` s ď 1, then:
ż





τpµjpτpxq ` tqq ` s|µjpτpxq ` tq
˘
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1z“µipτpxq`s`tqpiipτpxq ` t` s|xq
“Pt`spx, zq
The second equality is fromdefinition of τ. The third equality is fromEquation (B.5) .
• If τpxq ` t “ 1, then:
ż


















1z“µipτpxq`t`sqpiipτpxq ` t` s|xq
“Pt`spx, zq
• If τpxq “ 1, then the C-K equation is trivially satisfied:
ż
Ptpx, yqPspy, zqdy “
ÿ
i,j
1z“νi1νi“νj1νj“x “ 1z“x “ Pt`spx, zq
• Now for any general case τpxq ă 1 and τpxq ` t` s ą 1, we can add 1, and apply
the C-K equation in the last two cases jointly to establish the C-K equation in the
general case.
Since we verified the C-K equation for Markov transition kernel Ptp¨, ¨q, it is easy to see
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that @t1, . . . , tn, the measure given by:
Pt1,...,tnpx1, . . . , xnq “ Pt1pµ, x1q
ź
Pti`1´tipxi, xi`1q
satisfies the conditions in Daniell-Kolmogorov theorem (see Dellacherie andMeyer (1979.)).
Then, a simple corollary of Daniell-Kolmogorov theorem states that there exists a proba-
bility space pΩ,F ,Pq and stochastic process xµty such that any finite dimensionalmarginal
distribution of xµty is given by P. Now Equation (B.3) . implies xµty is a martingale and the
C-K equation implies that xµty is Markovian.
What remains to be verified is the third property of Lemma B.3 . @t1, t2 P r0, 1s and
t1 ă t2, @µt1 P tµipt1qu,








































“pt2 ´ t1qpHpµ0q ´ ErHpµ1qsq
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
Lemma B.3. @µ P ∆pXq, pi P ∆2pXq and ş pipνqdν “ µ. Then there exists probability space
pΩ,F ,Pq and stochastic process xµty s.t.:
1. xµty is a martingale.
2. µ0 “ µ, µ1 „ pi.
3. @t1, t2 P r0, 1s and t1 ă t2, ErHpµt1q ´ Hpµt2q|Ft1s “ pt2 ´ t1qErHpµ0q ´ Hpµ1qs.
Proof. If |Suppppiq| is finite, the Lemma B.3. is identical to Lemma B.2. and the proof
is done. Now I discuss the general case where Suppppiq is an infinite set. Let M “ş
pipνqpHpµq ´ Hpνqqdν.
Step 1. Discretizing ∆pXq. Since Hpµq is a continuous function on ∆pXq, by Heine-
Cantor theorem Hpµq is uniformly continuous. Pick εk “ M2k and let δk be corresponding
continuity parameter for εk. Discretize ∆pXq into a set of nested grids with grid size
dk ď δk. Let Dkν be each dk-cube containing µ. Then @µ P ∆pXq, @pi1 P ∆pDkµq:
ż
pi1pνqpHpµq ´ Hpνqq ď εk
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is an orthogonal normal base of ∆pI1q. Let xµ “ pq11, . . . , q1I1q. Then it is
easy to see than xµ P ∆pNq. @λ P r0, 1s, define xi1,λ “ λxµ ` p1´ λqxi1 .
Define linear map f : ∆pI1q Ñ ∆pXq as f pxq “ řI1i“1 xi1µ1i1 (xi1 is i1th coordinate of




xji1,λpHp f pxi1,λqq ´ Hpµ1j q `M1j q
Now consider properties of Qi1 . First of all, since H is continuous and f is linear, Qi1pλq
is continuous in λ. Second, Qi1p0q “ M1i1 and Qi1p1q “ M. Since M ą ε1 ě M1i1 , by
intermediate value theorem there exists λi1 s.t. Qi1pλi1q “ ε1. Now define:
$’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’%
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It is easy to verify that:
$’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’%
ÿrq1i1rµ1i1 “ µż rpi1i1νdν “ rµ1i1ÿrq1i1 rpi1i1pνq “ pipνqĂM1i1 ” M2 , ĂM0 “ M2
Step 3. Recursively apply step 2. Suppose I have defined a discrete time stochastic



































Noticing that I have verified that
´
µ, prqii1 , rµ1i1q, rpi1i1¯ we find in step one satisfies this con-
dition for k “ 1. Now we prove that we can construct a discrete time stochastic process
with k` 1. Define a new process xµiy exactly as in the assumption for i ă k. Now for any
sample path in Fk´1, applying the procedure in step 2 to prior µk´1 and distribution of
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pµkq. Then I get prqkik , rµkik , rpikik q satisfying:
$’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’%




In the new process, let µk|Fk´1 „ prqkik , rµkikq and µk`1|Fk´1, rµkik „ rpikik . Now let us verify
Equation (B.6). The first condition is trivially satisfied for i ă k. If i “ k, by construc-
tion the support size of rµkii is finite. The second condition is true for i “ k, k ` 1 given
Equation (B.7) .’s first two properties. The third and forth condition are implied the last
condition of Equation (B.7). µ0 is still µ and µk`1 „ pi by third property of Equation (B.7).
Hence, for any positive K, a xµiyiďK is well defined. And by construction, for any
K1 ă K2, the two processes have exactly same path distribution for i ă K1. So except if I
need to explicitly use the distribution of µK, otherwise I refer to xµiy as an infinite process.
Step 4. Extension to continuous time. Let Tk “ 1 ´ 12k . The main idea is to define
finite dimensional joint distribution at Tk’s according to xµky. Then within each interval
rTk, Tk`1s, the process is defined using Lemma B.2. For any sequence of µ0, . . . , µTk , define:
PpµTk “ µk
ˇˇ
µ0, . . . µTk´1q “ Ppµk
ˇˇˇ
µlil “ µTl , @l ă kq
Now for any t1, . . . , tk and µt1 , . . . , µtk , I define the joint distribution of the sample path.
First assume tk ă 1. Then there exists a unique sequence of:
0 ¨ ¨ ¨ Tl1 , t1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tm1 , Tl1`1loooooooooomoooooooooon
Interval 1
¨ ¨ ¨ Tl2 , tm1`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tm2 , Tl2`1looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
Interval 2
¨ ¨ ¨ Tln , tmn´1`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tklooooooooomooooooooon
Interval n
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Noticing that tms`1 can be same as Tls`1 and tms can be same as Tls`1. Now for any se-
quence of pµTls q, apply Lemma B.2 . to prior µTls and distribution PpµTls`1
ˇˇ
µ0, . . . , µTls q.
Lemma B.2 . implies that there exists a space pΩ,F ,Pq and xrµty s.t. rµ0 “ µTls and rµ1 „




µtms´1`1 , . . . , µtms , µTls`1
ˇˇˇ
µ0, . . . , µTls
¯
“P
´rµ2ls ¨ptms´1`1´Tls q “ µtms´1`1 , . . . , rµ2ls ¨ptms´Tls q “ µtms , rµ1 “ µTls`1 ˇˇˇµ0, . . . , µTls¯
Now we can define the finite joint distribution of µtk :
P
`







PpµTj |µ0, . . . , µTj´1q‚˛¨ P´µtms , . . . , µtms`1 , µTls`1`1 ˇˇˇµ0, . . . µTls`1¯
fifldµT1 , . . . µTln`1
Noticing that by definition of xµky, each PpµTj |µ0, . . . , µTj´1q is a probability measure. By
definition of xrµty, each P´µtms , . . . , µtms`1 , µTls`1`1 ˇˇˇµ0, . . . µTls`1¯ is a joint probability mea-
sure. Therefore, Ppµ0, . . . , µtkq is a joint probability measure.
Now consider the case tk “ 1. Since tk´1 ă 1, there must be some finite Tl ą tk´1.
There exists a unique sequence of:
0 ¨ ¨ ¨ Tl1 , t1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tm1 , Tl1`1loooooooooomoooooooooon
Interval 1
¨ ¨ ¨ Tl2 , tm1`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tm2 , Tl2`1looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
Interval 2
¨ ¨ ¨ , tk´1, Tln`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tk











µlil “ µTl , @l ă K
¯
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Now we can define the finite joint distribution of µtk :
P
`













µ0, . . . , µTln`1
¯
dµT1 , . . . µTln`1
Same as the previous case, each PpµTj |µ0, . . . , µTj´1q and P
´
µtms , . . . , µtms`1 , µTls`1`1
ˇˇˇ
µ0, . . . µTls`1
¯
are joint probability measures. Moreover, PpS|µ0, . . . , µTK´1q is a probability measure. Im-
portantly, by definition of xµky, for K1 ă K, P is defined consistently:
PpS|µ0, . . . , µK1´1q “
ż
PpS|µ0, . . . , µK´1qdµK1 , . . . , µK´1
Therefore, Ppµ0, . . . , µtkq is a joint probability measure. To sum up, we defined a finite
dimensional joint probability measure satisfying the conditions in Daniell-Kolmogorov
theorem. Hence, there exists probability space pΩ,F ,Pq and xµtytPr0,1s satisfying all finite
distributions.
Step 5. Verify that xµty satisfies Lemma B.3. µ0 “ µ is true by construction. @S Ă ∆pXq:
PpSq “ Ppµ1 P Sq “ pipSq
So µ1 „ pi. Now I verify property 1 and property 3. @t1, t2 P r0, 1s and t2 ą t1,
• Case 1. If Dk s.t. Tk ď t1 ă t2 ď Tk`1, then by construction of xµty in rTj, Tj`1s, µt is
Markovian and Erµt2 |Ft1s “ Erµt2 |µt1s “ µt1 .
ErHpµt1q ´ Hpµt2q|µt1s “2kpt2 ´ t1qErHpµtkq ´ Hpµtk`1q|Ftks
“pt2 ´ t1q2k ¨ M2k
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“pt2 ´ t1qM
• Case 2. There exists a unique sequence of:
0 ¨ ¨ ¨ Tj, t1, Tj`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ Tk, t2, Tk`1





































ˇˇFTj`1ı` E”HpµTj`2q ´ Hpµt2qˇˇFTj`1ıˇˇˇFt1ı































































B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2 .
Proof. I break the proof of Lemma 1.2 . into three lemmas. Lemma B.4 . shows that solving
Equation (1.5’). is equivalent to solving Equation (B.8)., which reduces the signal struc-
ture to be nested, and containing only action as direct signals and continuation signals.
Then Lemma B.5 . shows that solving Equation (B.8) . is equivalent to solving Equation (B.9) .,
which transforms signal process formulation to conditional distribution formulation. Then
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Lemma B.6. shows that solving functional equation Equation (B.10). is equivalent to solv-
ing sequential problem Equation (B.9) . using the standard methodology. Finally, we apply
Theorem B.1. to Equation (B.10). to further reduce the dimensionality of strategy space to
Equation (1.6). 
Lemma B.4 (Reduction of redundency).
`S t, T ,AT ˘ solves Equation (1.5’). if and only if there
exists







PrT “ ts`E“upAt,X q|T “ t‰˘´ PrT ą tsE”Cdt´I´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ˇˇT ą tı¯
s.t. rS t “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1
S t when T ą t` 1
(B.8)
What’s more, the optimal utility level is same in Equation (1.5’). and Equation (B.8).
Proof. Suppose
`S t, T ,At˘ is a feasible strategy to Equation (1.5’). I first show that it is
WLOO that the DM discards all information after taking an action: take given T and At,
let s0 be a degenerate signal, define signal process pS t as:
pS t “
$’’&’’%
S t when T ě t` 1
s0 when T ď t
By definition, pS t “ S t conditional on T ě t` 1. Therefore:
I
´ pS t;X | pS t´1, 1T ďt¯ “
$’’&’’%
I
`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘ when T ě t` 1
0 when T ď t
X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on T “ t
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1. By definition, when T ě t` 1, pS t “ S t. So conditional on T “ t` 1, X Ñ S t Ñ
At`1 implies X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1.
2. When pS t´1 “ s0, 1T ďt “ 1. When pS t´1 ‰ s0:
Prob
´
















T ą t| pS t´1,X¯ “ Prob´T ą t| pS t´1¯
which is independent to realization of X . So X Ñ pS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt. The first equality
is by the law of total probability (conditional on T ě t), X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ďt and
when pS t´1 ‰ s0, ProbpT “ tq “ 0. The second equality is by when pS t´1 ‰ s0,
ProbpT ě tq “ 1.































`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘˘
ff
The first equality is by pS t being degenerate when t ě T . The second equality is frompS t “ S t when T ą t. Therefore, ´ pS t,At, T ¯ is a feasible strategy dominating `S t,At, T ˘.
Now we define rS t:
rS t “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1
pS t when T ą t` 1
203
Appendix B. Supplemental materials for Chapter 1.
Initial information rS´1 is defined as a degenerate(uninformative) signal and induced be-
lief is the prior. rS t replaces the signal defined in pS t by a direct signal that suggests the
corresponding action profile in next period when T “ t ` 1. Verify that the rS t satisfies
the information processing constraints in Equation (1.5’). and improves utility:
1. When rS t´1 P ts0uŤ A, it’s for sure that T ď t. Otherwise, T ą t. Therefore 1T ďt is a
direct garbling of rS t´1. So X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt.
2. When T “ t, At “ rS t´1. Therefore S Ñ pS t´1 Ñ At implies X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ At
conditional on T “ t.
3. Information measure associated with
´ rS t,At, T ¯when T ą t:
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T “ t` 1¯` 1T ąt`1 I´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯` 1T ąt`1 I´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
ď1T “t`1 I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯` 1T ąt`1 I´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą 1¯
First equality is simply rewriting two possible cases of T . Second equality is from def-
inition of rS t when T ą t ` 1. The inequality is from X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on
T “ t ` 1. Therefore,
´ rS t, T ,At¯ dominates the original solution in Equation (1.5’) . by
achieving same action profile at lower costs.
´ rS t, T ,At¯ is a feasible solution to Equa-
tion (B.8) . Therefore solving Equation (B.8) . yields a weakly higher utility than Equa-
tion (1.5’) . What remains to be proved is that any
´ rS t, T ,At¯ feasible in Equation (B.8) .
can be dominated by some strategy feasible in Equation (1.5’) . It’s not hard to see that
the strategy is feasible in Equation (1.5’). Finally we show that the two formulation gives
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PrT “ ts`E“upAt,X q|T “ t‰˘´ PrT ą tsE”Cdt´I´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ˇˇˇT ą tı¯
First equality is from rewriting the utility part conditional on decision time T “ t. Second
equality is from rewriting the information cost part conditional on decision time T ď t
and T ą t. Therefore, Equation (1.5’). is equivalent to Equation (B.8). 
Lemma B.5 (Tranformation of space). With Assumption A . satisfied,
`S t, T ,AT ˘ solves Equa-
tion (1.5’). if and only if there exists pt
`

































What’s more, the optimal utility level is same in Equation (1.5’). and Equation (B.9).
Proof. Let ptp¨|µtq be the distribution of posteriors generated by rS t ˇˇT ąt, rS t´1“rSt´1 , where µt
is posterior belief associated with signal rSt´1. Let qtspµtq “ P”T “ tˇˇ rS t´1 “ rSt´1, T ě tı.
Now we can explicitly represent the distribution of rS , T ,Awith the conditional distribu-
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tions. First, PrT “ ts and PrT ą ts can be calculated by integrating qtspµtq:
PrT “ ts “E
”





T “ tˇˇ rS´1, T ą 0ıP”T ą 0ˇˇ rS´1ıı
“p1´ q0s pµ0qqP






















T “ tˇˇT ą 1, rS1ıˇˇµ1ıp1´ q1s pµ1qqp0pµ1|µ0qdµ1




pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqqtspµtqdµ1 . . . µt
Similarly, we can get:
PrT ą ts “
ż t´1ź
τ“0
pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqp1´ qtspµtqqdµ1 . . . µt
Then we can calculate the joint distribution of T and µt:
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
P
“T “ t, µt “ ν‰ “ ż t´1ź
τ“0
pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqqtspµtqdµ1 . . . µt´1
P
“T ą t, µt “ ν‰ “ ż t´1ź
τ“0
pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqp1´ qtspµtqqdµ1 . . . µt´1
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Therefore: $’’’’&’’’’%
At ˇˇT “t „
şśt´1
τ“0 pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqdµ1 . . . µt´1qtspµtqşśt´1
τ“0 pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqqtspµtqdµ1 . . . µtrS t ˇˇT ąt „
şśt´1
τ“0 pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqdµ1 . . . µt´1p1´ qtspµtqqşśt´1





































pτpµτ`1|µτqp1´ qτs pµτqqp1´ qtspµtqqdµ1 . . . µt´1dµt
To sum up, we showed that starting from rS , T ,A solving Equation (B.8)., we can construct





solving Equation (B.9). We can easily define T : T ˇˇT ět,µt „ Bpqtspµtqq condi-
tionally independent across all t, µt. rS t ˇˇT ąt,µt „ ptp¨|µtq, At ˇˇT “t,µt “ argmaxř upa, xjqµtj.
Therefore, the previous calculation shows that the value of Equation (B.9) . is also achieved
in Equation (B.8) . Combining with the previous result, we conclude that Equation (B.8) .
and Equation (B.9) . are equivalent in the sense that
´ rS , T ,A¯ solves Equation (B.8) . if and
only if the corresponding ppt, qtsq solves Equation (B.9). 
LemmaB.6 (Recursive representation). Vdtpµq is the optimal utility level solving Equation (B.9).
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Since RHS is linear in qspµq, it will be WLOG that we only consider boundary solution
qspµq P t0, 1u. Therefore, it is be exactly the same as Equation (B.10).
Now consider the equivalence between the sequential problem and the recursive prob-
lem. By assumption Erupa, xq|µs is bounded above bymaxa,x upa, xq. Therefore, e´ρdt¨tErupa, xq|µs
is uniformly (for all choice of µ, a) converging to zero when t Ñ 8. Then Vdtpµq is the so-
lution of Equation (B.9). by the standard theory of dynamic programming. 
B.1.3 Convergence
I first prove two useful lemmas. Lemma B.7. shows that optimal strategy has informa-
tiveness of signal in each period of same order of dt. Lemma B.8 . shows that there exists a
unique limit of Vdt in L8 norm.
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B.1.3.1 Bounded flow cost
Lemma B.7 (Bounded flow cost). With Assumption 1.2 . satisfied, there D∆ P R` s.t. Id˚tpµq ď
∆dt. @µ, dt. Where Id˚tpµq “
ř
pipHpµq ´ Hpνiqq for optimal ppi, νiq in Equation (1.6).
Proof. @ ppi, νiq which solves Equation (1.6)., assume the value is Vdtpµq and Id˚tpµq “ř
pipHpµq ´ Hpνiqq. Now for I ă Id˚t, consider a different information acquisition strategy:
• At prior µ, use the following information structure:
$’’&’’%
µ1i “ νi with probability II˚dt pi
µ10 “ µ with probability 1´ II˚dt
This information structure mixes uninformative signal into ppi, νiq with probability
1´ II˚dt ą 0. It is Bayes plausible by definition.
• At any posterior other than µ, follow the original strategy.
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The first inequality is from bounding V with max v. The second inequality is from 1´
e´ρdt ă 2ρdt, e´ρdt ă 1 and 1´ II˚dt ą 0. On the other hand, the discounted total cost of this
strategy is:



















The inequality is from e´ρdt ă 1 and 1´ II˚dt ą 0. Therefore, by optimality of ppi, νiq at µ,





´V1pµq ´ `CdtpId˚tq ´ Cost1pµq˘ ě 0
ùñ
ÿ
piVpνiq ´ eρdtV1pµq ´ pCdtpId˚tq ´ Cost1pµqq ě 0









































2ρmax v. Let I “ αId˚t, then I ă Id˚t and Equation (B.11) . is violated. By contradiction,
Id˚t ď ∆dt. 
B.1.3.2 Convergence of Vdt
Lemma B.8. With Assumption A . and Assumption 1.2 . satisfied. Let Vpµq “ lim supdtÑ0Vdtpµq.
Then lim
dtÑ0
∥∥Vdtpµq ´Vpµq∥∥8 “ 0.
Proof. We break down the proof of Lemma Lemma B.8. into three steps:
210
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sequence, because every experimentation strategy associated with dt2n can be replicated in
a problem with dt2n`1 : the DM can always split the experiment into two stages with equal
cost in two periods and get an identical distribution of posterior beliefs at the end of
second period (Lemma B.3 .). Moreover, Vdt
2n
is always bounded above by fully informed
utility. Then existence of Vdt “ limVdt
2n
is guaranteed by monotonic convergence theorem.
Now let’s prove the convergence is uniform in sup norm, i.e. Vdt
2n
is a Cauchy sequence
under sup norm. @m ą n, @µ0, consider the problem with dt2m , consider the optimal ex-































The second equality is get by rewriting T “ 2m´nT1 ` τ. Then take summation first over
τ then over T1 (and relabel T1 to be T).
Now we construct an experimentation strategy for problem with dt2n . We combine all ex-
periments between 2m´nT and 2m´npT ` 1q, and get the joint distribution of posteriors.
We use this as the signal structure in each period T. Given this construction, at the end
of each 2m´nT, the posterior distribution will be exactly same as that using original ex-
periment. Then we assign same action as before to each posterior. By construction this
action profile satisfies Markov property of information (i.e. signal realization is a suffi-
cient statistics for action). Therefore if we let Upµ0q be the discounted expected utility
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2n ´ e´ρ dt2n
¯
max v (B.14)
Where max v is an upper bounded of total utility from action. The second and third
inequalities are from concavity of f . Equation (B.13) . is obtained by definition of Cdtp¨q “
dt ¨C` ¨dt˘. Noticing that Equation (B.13) . is different from Equation (B.12) . by only one term:
the discounting term in inner summation (e´ρ
dt
2m instead of e´ρ
dt
2n ). This characterizes the
experiment design in problem dt2n . In each period T, actions are all postponed to the end
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of period. Therefore they are discounted by at most dt2n , which is period length and costs
are shifted to the beginning of each period. The next inequality is from e´ρ
dt
2m ă 1 and






∥∥∥ ď max v´eρ dt2n ´ e´ρ dt2n ¯Ñ 0 when nÑ 0.
• Step 2: Prove that @dt ą 0, Vdt are identical, WLOG we can call it Vpµq. @dt, dt1 ą 0, @n,
consider Vdt
2n
. Pick m large enough that there exists N s.t. dt2n`1 ď N dt
1
2m ď dt2n ď pN ` 1qdt
1
2m .
Consider optimal experimentation and action associated with dt2n , we construct experi-
mentation strategy for problem with dt
1
2m . For each time period T in the original problem,
split the experiment in period T into N ` 1 periods and take any action at the end of
N ` 1th period (apply Lemma B.3. recursively). In the new experiment strategy, the ef-
fective period length will increase from dt2n to pN ` 1qdt
1
2m . First, suppose the information
measure incurred in any period is I in problem with dt2n . Then per-period information
measure from the aforementioned strategy is IN`1 ď 2n´m dt
1













. Therefore, the total cost from experimentation will
increase by no more than N`1N times and that will be bounded by
1
N max v. Second, since


















































´ρN dt12m ´ e´ρpN`1q dt12m
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“´max v e
´ρN dt12m
p1´ e´ρ dt2n q2








p1´ e´ρ dt2n q2
peρ dt12m ´ 1q ` dt
1
dt ¨ 2m´n´1 ‚˛
First inequality is from suboptimality of the constructed experiment and bound of cost
difference. Second inequality is from e´ρT
dt
2n ě e´ρTpN`1q dt12m . Third inequality is from
dt
2n ě N dt
1
2m . Last inequality is from N
dt1
2m ě dt2n`1 . Take m Ñ 8 on both side, we have
Vdt1pµ0q ě Vdt
2n
pµ0q. Then take n Ñ 0 on both side Vdt1pµ0q ě Vdtpµ0q. Since this holds for
arbitrary dt, dt1 and µ0, we conclude that Vdt “ Vdt1 .





∥∥∥ ă ε2 . Then given the proof in last part, for any dt1 ă dt2n , suppose there







p1´ e´ρ dt2n q









exists for any dt1 ď dt2n . Thus there exists δ s.t. @dt1 ă δ,∥∥∥Vdt1 ´Vdt
2n
∥∥∥ ă ε2 , then ∥∥Vdt1 ´V∥∥ ă ε.

B.1.3.3 Lemmas for Lemma 1.3.
Lemma B.9. With Assumption A . and Assumption 1.2. satisfied. Let Vpµq “ limdtÑ0Vdtpµq.
Then V P L (pointwise Lipschitz function).
Proof. We prove by induction on dimensionality of µ. When µ “ δx, supppµq is single-
ton. So Lemma B.9 . is trivially satisifed. Now it is sufficient to prove that V is pointwise
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Lipschitz at any interior µ.
First, since V is the uniform limit of continuous Vdt, V is continuous. @µ P ∆Xo,
suppose by contradiction V is not pointwise Lipschitz. Then D µn Ñ µ, |Vpµnq´Vpµq|‖µn´µ‖ ě n.
There are two possibilities:
• Vpµnq´Vpµq‖µn´µ‖ ě n. Now let νn be a point in B∆X s.t. µn, µ, νn are three ordered points on
a straight line. Let pn, qn be such that pn ` qn “ 1, pnµn ` qnνn “ µ. Pick any I s.t.
CpIq ă 8We have:
I
Vpνnq ´Vpµq ` Vpµnq´Vpµq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µ‖
Hpµq ´ Hpνnq ´ Hpµnq´Hpµq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µ‖
ě I Vpνnq ´Vpµq ` n‖νn ´ µ‖
Hpµq ´ Hpνnq ´ Hpµnq´Hpµq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µ‖
Noticing that the only difference between LHS and RHS is that Vpµnq´Vpµq‖µn´µ‖ is replaced
with n on RHS. Since the nominator is bounded, µ being interior suggesting ‖νn ´ µ‖ is
strictly positive in the limit. Take nÑ 8 on RHS, we observe that RHS goes to infinity.
Therefore, there exists N s.t. @n ě N, RHS is larger than 3ρ sup F` 2CpIq.
I
Vpνnq ´Vpµq ` Vpµnq´Vpµq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µ‖
Hpµq ´ Hpνnq ´ Hpµnq´Hpµq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µ‖
ě 3ρ sup F` 2CpIq
















ùñ pnVpµnq ` qnVpνnq ´Vpµq ě 3ρI sup FIpµn, νn|µq ` 2CpIq
Ipµn, νn|µq
I









ùñ pnVpµnq ` qnVpνnq ´ 2CpIq Ipµn, νn|µqI ě Vpµqe
ρ
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˘´ 2e´ρ Ipµn ,νn|µqI CpIq Ipµn, νn|µq
I
ěVpµq ` e´ρ Ipµn ,νn|µqI sup Fρ
I
Ipµn, νn|µq
Since µn are converging to µ, limnÑ8 Ipµn, νn|µq “ 0. Then we can pick N sufficiently








CpIq ě Vpµq ` ρIpµn, νn|µq
2I
sup F




















We consider an experimentation strategy that divides information measure Ipµn, νn|µq





























First line is expected utility from taking the aforementioned experiment at µ. Second
line is replacing all discounting in cost with a term larger than 1. Taking m sufficiently
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large, last line will be strictly larger than Vdtmpµq. Thus this experiment dominates
optimal value of dtm problem at µ. Contradiction.
• Vpµnq´Vpµq‖µn´µ‖ ď ´n. Then pick νn P B∆X s.t. µ, µn, νn are three ordered points on a straight
line. Let pn, qn be such that pn ` qn “ 1, pnµ` qnνn “ µn. Pick any I s.t. CpIq ă 8. We
have:
I
Vpνnq ´Vpµnq ` Vpµq´Vpµnq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µn‖
Hpµnq ´ Hpνnq ´ Hpµq´Hpµnq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µn‖
ě I Vpνnq ´Vpµnq ` n‖νn ´ µn‖
Hpµnq ´ Hpνnq ´ Hpµq´Hpµnq‖µn´µ‖ ‖νn ´ µn‖
Take nÑ 8 on RHS, we observe that RHS goes to infinity. Therefore, there exists N s.t.
@n ě N, RHS is larger than 3ρ sup F` 2CpIq.




ěeρ Ipµ,νn|µnqI Vpµnq ` ρIpµ, νn|µnqI sup F








CpIq ě Vpµnq ` ρIpµ, νn|µnqI sup F




˘´ dtCpIq ě Vdtmpµnq ` ρdt2 sup F


















RHS is strictly larger than Vdtmpµnq. This experiment dominates optimal experiment of
dtm problem at µn. Contradiction.










D2 f pz, yq|y´ x|2
Proof.
• First inequality: let D “ infzPpx,yq D2 f pz, yq. Suppose by contradiction the statement
is not true, then there exists ε s.t. D´ε2 |y´ x|2 ą f pyq ´ f pxq ´ f 1pxqpy ´ xq. Let
hpwq “ f pwq ´ f pxq ´ f 1pxqpw ´ xq ´ D´ε2 pw ´ xq2. Then hpxq “ 0, h1pxq “ 0 and
hpyq ă 0. Now consider maxz hpzq ´ hpyqy´x pz ´ xq. By continuity of h, maximizer z˚
exists in rx, ys. FOC implies h1pz˚q “ hpyqy´x so z˚ ‰ x. The objective function is 0 at
both x, y so z˚ ‰ y. Then optimality of z˚ implies @dz sufficiently small:
hpz˚ ` dzq ´ hpyq
y´ x pz
˚ ` dz´ xq ď hpz˚q ´ hpyq
y´ x pz
˚ ´ xq
ùñ f pz˚ ` dzq ´ f pz˚q ´ f 1pxqdz´ D´ ε
2
p2z˚ ´ 2x` dzqdz
ď dzp f 1pz˚q ´ f 1pxq ´ pD´ εqpz˚ ´ xqq
ùñ f pz




ùñ D2 f pz˚, yq ă D
Contradiction.
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• Second inequality: let D “ supzPpx,yq D2pz, yq. Suppose by contradiction the state-
ment is not true, then there exists ε s.t. D`ε2 |y´ x|2 ă f pyq ´ f pxq ´ f 1pxqpy´ zq. Let
hpwq “ f pwq ´ f pxq ´ f 1pxqpw ´ xq ´ D`ε2 pw ´ xq2. Then hpxq “ 0, h1pxq “ 0 and
hpyq ą 0. Now consider minz hpzq ´ hpyqy´x pz ´ xq. By continuity of h, minimizer z˚
exists in rx, ys. FOC implies h1pz˚q “ hpyqy´z so z˚ ‰ x. Then optimality of z˚ implies
@dz sufficiently small:
hpz˚ ` dzq ´ hpyq
y´ x pz
˚ ` dz´ xq ě hpz˚q ´ hpyq
y´ x pz
˚ ´ xq
ùñ f pz˚ ` dzq ´ f pz˚q ´ f 1pxqdz´ D` ε
2
p2z˚ ´ 2x` dzqdz
ě dzp f 1pz˚q ´ f 1pxq ´ pD` εqpz˚ ´ xqq
ùñ f pz




ùñ D2 f pz˚, yq ą D
Contradiction.

B.2 Proofs in Section 1.6.
B.2.1 Proof and lemmas of Theorem 1.2 .
Proof of smoothness in Theorem 1.2.
I first show that there exists a set of µ0 such that on each interval when Vpµq ą Fpµq,
Vpµq is defined a Vµ0 . Then I utilize this result to show that V is Cp1q smooth on r0, 1s.
Proof. This is true when µ ď µ˚˚ by definition of Vµ˚ . So I prove this for µ ą µ˚˚. First
prove some useful lemmas:
Lemma B.11. @k, there exists µ0 P Ω s.t. Vµ0pµkq ą Fpµkq.
219
Appendix B. Supplemental materials for Chapter 1.





Fpνq ´ Fpµq ´ F1´pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
Uk is continuous bymaximum theorem on rµ˚˚, µkq. SinceUkpµ˚˚q “ Fpµ˚˚q, limµÑµk Ukpµq “
`8, there exists µ0 s.t. Ukpµ0q “ Fpµ0q and Ukpµq ą Fpµq @µ P pµ0, µkq. Now consider
Vµ0pµq. I claim that Vµ0pµq ą Fpµq @µ P pµ0, µkq. Suppose not, then by intermediate value




Fpνq ´Vµ0pµ1q ´V1µ0pν´ µ1q
Jpµ1, νq ě Ukpµ
1q ą Fpµ1q
Contradiction. Now assume Vµ0 hits F at µ
1
0. Then Uk`1pµ10q ď 0 and limµÑµk`1pµq “ `8,
so we can find Vµ1pµk`1q ą Fpµk`1q. By induction on k, Lemma B.11. is true. 




. Then either I0
Ş
I1 “ H, or I1 Ă I0
and Vµ0 ě Vµ1 .
Proof. The only possible contradiction of Lemma B.12 . is that Dµ1 P I0Ş I1 s.t. Vµ1pµ1q ą
Vµ0pµ1q. Since at µ1, Vµ0pµ1q ą Vµ1pµ1q “ Fpµ1q, by intermediate value theorem, there
exists ξ P pµ1, µ1q s.t. Vµ1pξq ą Vµ0pξq and V1pµ1qpξq ą V1pµ0qpξq. Since ξ P I1, there exists








Fmpνq ´Vµ1pξq ´V1µ1pξqpν´ ξq
Jpξ, νq “ Vµ1pξq ą Vµ0pξq
Contradiction. So Lemma B.12. is true. 
Lemma B.13. V “ ␣maxni“1␣Vνi((νiPΩ,nPN is totally bounded and equi-continuous on rµ˚˚, 1s.
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Proof. Vµ˛ is bounded above by sup Fpµq and below by inf Fpµq. Consider V1µ˛ . When
Vµ˛pµq “ Fpµq, obviously direvative is bounded by max|F1|. When Vµ˛pµq ą Fpµq. Sup-
pose V1µ˛pµq ą max|F1|, then Fpνq ´Vµ˛pµq ´V1µ˛pµqpν´ µq ă Fpνq ´ Fpµq ´ F1pνqpν´ µq ď
0, contradiction. By Lemma A.3 ., V1µ˛ ě 0. So V1µ˛ are uniformly bounded in r0,max|F1|s.
Now consider @n, @νi P Ω, Vνi P rinf F, sup Fs ùñ maxi
␣
Vνi





is piecewisely defined as Vνi on finite disjoint intervals. So its
derivative is piecewisely defined as V1νi , therefore bounded in r0,max|F1|s. ThereforeV is
totally bounded and equi-continuous on rµ˚˚, 1s. 




, V1pµq has Lipschitz parameter
∆.

















Vνipµq is bounded by sup F. It is easy to see that supΩ ă µn (where n is the largest




( ă νpµ0q ă 1. Therefore, µ is bounded away from 1. Then by
Assumption 1.3., ´H2pµq is bounded above. Therefore, ∆ exists for all such µ.
Then consider µ “ pµk, since V2νi is bounded on both side by ∆, V2νipµq ď ∆. Therefore
at µ V1νi has Lipschitz parameter ∆ by Kirszbraun theorem. 
• Step 1: prove V P Crµ˚˚, 1s.
Sort all rational numbers in rµ˚˚, 1s as trnu. @N, there exists µn,M P Ω s.t. Vprnq ´
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, then tVNu Ă V and VN converges to V point-
wisely on trnu. Let pV “ limVn, by Lemma B.13 ., pV P Crµ˚˚, 1s. By definition pV ď V.
Suppose pVpµq ă Vpµq, then there exists Vµ0pµq ą pVpµq. Since both Vµ0 and pV are
continuous, Vµ0 ą pV on an open interval, containing some rn. Contradiction. SopV “ V P Crµ˚˚, 1s. Let tµ ě µ˚˚|Vpµq ą Fpµqu “ Ť Im where Im are disjoint open
intervals.
• Step 2: prove @Im, exists µn P Ω s.t. Vpµq “ limVµnpµq and V1pµq “ limV1µnpµq on Im.
Pick any µ P Im. Let Θpµq “
␣
µ˛ P Ω|Vµ˛pµq ą Fpµq
(
. Then by definition of Vpµq,
Θpµq is non-empty. Let rV “ supµ˛PΘpµqVµ˛ . @N, there exists µn,M P Θpµq s.t. rVprnq ´





Therefore, limVµN “ rV on trnu. By Lemma B.13 . rV “ limVµN P Crµ˚˚, 1s. Now suppose
Vpµq ą rVpµq, then there existsVµ˛pµq ą Vµnpµq ą Fpµq. Then µ˛ P Θpµq by Lemma B.12 .,
contradiction. Therefore, limVµn “ V on Im.
Let Im “ pam, bmq. Now consider tV1µnu. V1µnpamq “ F1pamq. Lemma B.14. implies that V1µn
are totally bounded and equi-continuous on Im. Therefore, there exists subsequence
V1µn being Cauchy w.r.t. sup norm on ram, bms. So V as limit of Vµn is differentiable on
ram, bms and V1 “ limV1µn .1 .
• Step 3: prove @Im, exists µm P Ω s.t. Vpµq “ Vµm on Im.
Let µm “ inf Im. By step 2, it is easy to verify that µn Ñ µm. Then since Equation (A.19) .
is continuous in µ, it is satisfied at µm and µm P Ω. Since both Vµn and V1µn converges
on Im, Equation (A.18) . is satisfied for V on Im. Let Fpµmq “ Fkpµmq.
As an intermediate step, I first prove that Equation (A.18) . is solved for k1 ą k in a non-
degenerate neighbour of µm. Take any µ1 ą µm s.t. Vpµ1q ą Fpµ1q, sinceVpµmq “ Fkpµmq,
there exists µ‹ P pµm, µ1q and ε ą 0 s.t @µ P pµm, µ‹q Vpµq ´ Fkpµq ă Vpµ1q ´ Fkpµ1q ´ ε.
1This result is ex. 14.2.7 from Tao (2016.).
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I claim that Equation (A.18) . is solved at all µ P pµm, µ‹q with k1 ą k. Suppose not, then













Therefore F1k ě V1µnpµq. By construction of Vµn at any µ2 ě µ Equation (A.18) . is solved
with k, therefore F1k ě Vµnpµ2q holds for all µ2 ě µ. This implies @µ2 ě µ, Vµnpµ2q ´
Fkpµ2q ď Vµnpµq ´ Fkpµq ă Vpµ1q ´ Fkpµ1q ´ ε. Take n Ñ 8 and µ2 “ µ1, contradiction.
Therefore, Equation (A.18). is solved at all µ P pµm, µ‹q for Vpµqwith k1 ą k.
Now consider Vµmpµq. By my construction, suppose Vµm is updated up to action k` 1.
I claim that Vµm “ V when µ P rµm, µ‹q. Suppose not true, then there exists µ at which
Vµmpµq ă Vpµq, V1µmpµq ă V1pµq. It is easy to verify that Equation (A.18). is violated at
Vµmpµq. Therefore, ifVµm ­“ V, it must happen in pµ‹, bmq. Againwe can find µ P pµ‹, bmq
s.t. Vµmpµq ă Vpµq, V1µmpµq ă V1pµq, which is not possible. So Vpµq “ Vµmpµq on Im.
To sum up, V can be represented as:
Vpµq “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
Vµ˚pµq if µ P rµ˚, µ˚˚s
Vµmpµq if µ P Im
Fpµq otherwise
Now I prove smoothness of Vpµq on rµ˚, 1s. By Lemma B.14 ., @µ P Im:
F1pamq ´ ∆|µ´ am| ď V1pµq ď F1pamq ` ∆|µ´ am|
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F1pbmq ` ∆|µ´ bm| ě V1pµq ě F1pbmq ´ ∆|µ´ bm|
Therefore |V1pµq ´ F1pµq| is bounded by ∆|In|. Define:
Vnpµq “
$’&’%
Vµmpµq when µ P Im, m ď n
Fpµq otherwise
Then Vnpµq Ñ Vpµq. By Lemma B.11., we can without loss assume first n Vµm have Im
covering µ
m
. Fix n, @µ, @m ě n, if µ P Im and m ď n or µ R Ť Im, then V1npµq “ V1mpµq,
else if µ P Im, m ą n, then |V1npµq ´ F1pµq| and |V1mpµq ´ F1pµq| are all bounded by ∆|Im|.
Therefore, V1npµq is a Cauchy sequence. Then V1npµq Ñ V1pµq pointwise. Since each V1n is
continuous, V is a smooth function on r0, 1s and V1 “ F1 when V “ F. 
Other lemmas for Theorem 1.2.
Lemma B.15. @δ, η ą 0, @µ, ν s.t. µ, ν P pδ, 1´ δq, |Fmpµq| ą η,




1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
pν´ µqFmpµqH2pνq
Lpµ, νq is uniformly Lipschtiz continuous in ν and continuous in µ.
Proof. There exists σ,∆ ą 0 s.t. @µ P pδ, 1´ δq
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
∆ ě |Fmpµq| ě η
∆ ě ˇˇH2pµqˇˇ ě ε
∆ ě ˇˇH1pµqˇˇ, |Hpµq|, ˇˇF1m ˇˇ
Since rδ, 1´ δs is compact, H2 is Lipschitz continuous on rδ, 1´ δs with Lipschitz param-
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eter ∆. Then:
ˇˇ










1` ρc Jpµ, νq




1` ρc Jpµ, ν1q













1` ρc Jpµ, ν1q







F1mp1` ρc Jpµ,νqq` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq´H1pµqq



























1` ρc Jpµ, ν1q







F1mp1` ρc Jpµ,νqq` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq´H1pµqq












































































Therefore, Lpµ, νq is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ν. It is easy to see that Lpµ, νq is
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Therefore, Lpν, µq is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ν and continuous in µ.










νpµq is defined by: ρc Jpνpµq, µq “ 1.
νm˚pµq is defined by: F1m
`
1` ρc Jpµ, νm˚pµqq
˘` ρc Fmpνm˚pµqqpH1pν˚pµqq ´ H1pµqq “ 0.
The red line and blue lines are solution path of ODE 9µ “ Lpµ, νq with initial value satis-
fying Lemma B.16 .
Figure B.1: Phase diagram of p 9µ, 9νq.
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Then there is a continuous function ν on rµ0, 1s satisfying initial condition νpµ0q “ ν0. On
tµ|νpµq ą µu, ν is differentiable, strictly decreasing and satisfis ODE:




1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
pν´ µqFmpµqH2pνq
Proof. Before we proceed to solving the ODE, we characterize the dynamics of pµ, νq on
r0, 1s2. Figure B.1. shows the phase diagram of 9µ, 9ν on r0, 1s2 and some important functions
that determines the dynamics of pµ, νq. The horizongtal axis is µ and vertical axis is ν. The
black line is ν “ µ. The two thin black lines characterizes νpµq as the solutions to:
1´ ρ
c
Jpνpµq, µq “ 0









Fmpν˚pµqqpH1pν˚pµqq ´ H1pµqq “ 0
Since we are discussing the case ν ě µ, we only focus on the upper left half of the graph:









Fmpν0qpH1pν0q ´ H1pµ0qq ď 0
ùñ ν0 ě ν˚pµ0q
Therefore our initial condition means pµ0, ν0q lies in the red region. 9ν “ 0 when νpµq “
ν˚. otherwise 9ν ă 0. When Fpµq is close to 0, 9ν goes to negative infinity if ν ą ν˚pµq. So
the dynamics of ν in this region must have ν strictly decreasing and reaches ν˚ when
Fpµq “ 0. Intuitively, ν will never reach the region ν ą ν0. Then uniform Lipschtiz
continuity of Lpµ, νq on ν P rµ, ν0s, for µ P rµ0, F´1p´ηqs will be enough to guarantee
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existence of solution.









Fmpν0qpH1pν0q ´ H1pµ0qq ě 0
ùñ ν0 ď ν˚pµ0q
Our intial condition will lie below the dashed line in blue region. Lpµ, νq ă 0 in this
region and Lpµ, ν˚q “ 0. So the dynamics of ν in this regionmust have ν strictly decreas-
ing until it reaches ν “ µ. Then uniform Lipschtiz continuity of Lpµ, νq on ν P rµ, ν0s for
µ P rµ0, 1swill be sufficient ot guanrantee existence of solution.
Then we characterize formally the solution of ODEs:
• Fmpµ0q ą 0. Our conjecture is that solution νwill be no larger than ν0 within the region:
µ P rµ0, ν0s, ν P rµ0, ν0s. Therefore, we modify Lpµ, νq to define L˜pµ, νq on the whole
space:
L˜pµ, νq “ Lpmaxtmintµ, ν0u, µ0u,maxtmintν, ν0u, µ0uq
It’s not hard to see that L˜ is uniformly Lipschtiz continuous w.r.t ν P R for µ P r0, 1s and
continuous in µ P r0, 1s. We can apply Picard-Lindelof to solve for ODE 9˜ν “ L˜pµ, ν˜q on
the space with initial condition ν˜pµ0q “ ν0.
– Consider ν˜ on rµ0, 1s, it starts at ν0 ą µ0. It first reaches ν “ µ at µ P pµ0, 1s (we
define it to be 1 when it doesn’t exist). Then for µ P pµ0, µq, we must have Lpµ, ν˜q ă
0. Suppose not, then there exists ν˜pµq ě νm˚pµq ą ν0. We pick a smallest µ such that
this is true. Then this µ must be strictly larger than µ0 because Lpµ,0 , ν0q “ 0 ă
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9νm˚pµ0q. Then at µ, 9˜vpµq “ 0 but 9νm˚pµq ą 0. It’s impossible that v˜ crosses νm˚ from
below. Contradiction. Then 9˜ν ă 0 until it hits ν “ µ.
– µ ă ν0. Suppose µ ě µ0, since ν˜ ă 0 on pµ0, µq, ν˜pµq ă ν0. Contradiction. There-
fore, ν˜ on rµ0, µswill be with region rµ0, ν0s.
In the region rµ0, µs ˆ rµ0, ν0s, L˜ coincides L. Therefore, v˜ is a solution to original ODE
Equation (A.30). We define ν:
νpµq “
$’’&’’%
ν˜pµq if µ P rµ0, µs
µ if µ P rµ, 1s
It’s easy to verify that ν satisfies Lemma B.16 . The blue line on Figure B.1 . illustrates a
solution in this case.
• Fmpµ0q ă 0. Define µ0 “ F´1p0q, our conjecture is that solution ν will be decreasing on
rµ0, µ0q. @η ą 0, define µη “ F´ 1p´ηq, we modify Lpµ, νq to define L˜pµ, νq on the whole
space:
L˜pµ, νq “ Lpmaxpminpµ, µηq, µ0q,maxtmintν, ν0u, νm˚pµquq
It’s not hard to see that L˜ is uniformly Lipschtiz continuous w.r.t. ν P R for µ P r0, 1s
and continuous in µ P r0, 1s. We can apply Picard-Lindelof to solve for ODE 9˜ν “ L˜pµ, ν˜q
on the space with initial condition ν˜pµ0q “ ν0. ν˜ will be strictly decreasing on pµ0, µηs.
Because when ν˜ first touches νm˚ is must crosses from below and this is not possible.
Then, when µ P rµ0, µηs, we have Lpµ, ν˜q “ L˜pµ, ν˜q. Therefore ν˜ is a solution to original
ODE Equation (A.30) .
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Then we extend ν˜ to rµ0, µ0q by taking η Ñ 0 and define:
νpµq “
$’&’%
ν˜pµq if µ P rµ0, µ0q
limµÑF´1p0qν˜pµq if µ “ F´1p0q
First since ν˜ is decreasing, the sup limit will actually be the limit and ν P Crµ0, µ0s. Then
we show that this extension is left differentiable at µ0. Consider:
Vpµq “ Fmpµq
1´ ρc Jpνpµq, µq
By Equation (A.31) ., we know that on rµ0, µ0q sign of V1 is determined by sign of 1´
ρ
c Jpνpµq, µq. At initial value, V0 ě 0 ùñ 1´ ρc Jpν0, µ0q ą 0. On the other hand, Vpµq
will be bounded above by V. So 1´ ρc Jpνpµq, µq as a continuous function of µ has to
stay above 0. Therefore V1pµq ą 0 on rµ0, µ0q. By monotonic convergence, there exists











Now we show that 9νpµ0q “ limµÑµ0 νpµq´νpµ
0q






ą ε. Suppose νpµnq ą νpµ0q `
`
9νpµ0q ´ ε˘pµn ´ µ0q:
Vpµnq ă Fmpµq










c p´H1pνpµ0qq ` H1pµ0q ` H2pνpµ0qqpνpµ0q ´ µ0q 9νpµ0qq
“Vpµ0q
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First strict inequality is from 1 ´ ρc Jpν, µq strictly increasing in ν. When Fmpµq ă 0,
Fmpµq
1´ ρc Jpν,µq
will be decreasing in ν. Second inequality is by taking limit of lower bounded
of Vpµnq with L’Hospital rule. Third strict inequality is from ε ą 0, H2 ă 0. Last
equality is from definition of 9νpµ0q. We get contradiction. Similarly, we cna rule out
νpµnq ă νpµ0q ` p 9νpµ0q ` εqpµn ´ µ0q. Therefore, we extended ν to rµ0, µ0s such that it’s
differentiable on rµ0, µ0s and smooth on pµ0, µ0q.
Let µ0 “ µ0, ν0 “ νpµ0q, ν10 “ 9νpµ0q, then ν0 ą µ0 and$’’&’’%
1´ ρc Jpν0, µ0q “ 0
0 ă F1mρ
c pH1pµ0q´H1pν0q`H2pν0qpν0´µ0qν10q
“ Vpµ0q ď Vpµ0q
Then by Lemma B.17 ., we can solve for νpµq on rµ0, 1s satisfying the conditions in
Lemma B.17 . Moreover, 9νpµ0q “ ν0, then ν is differentiable at µ0. For any other points in
tµ|νpµq ą µu, ν is Cp1q smooth. Since ν10 ă 0, then the solved νwill be strictly decreasing.

Lemma B.17. Assume Fmpµ0q “ 0, F1m ą 0, ν0 P rµ0, 1q, ν10 satisfies$’’&’’%
1´ ρc Jpν0, µ0q “ 0
0 ă F1mρ
c pH1pµ0q´H1pν0q`H2pν0qpν0´µ0qν10q ď Vpµ0q
Then there is a continuous function ν on rµ0, 1s satifying initial condition νpµ0q “ ν0, 9νpµ0q “ ν10.
On tµ|νpµq ą µu, ν is differentiable, strictly decreasing and satisfies ODE:




1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
pν´ µqFmpµqH2pνq
Proof. @ µ1 P pµ0, 1q, @ν1 P rµ1, νm˚pµ1qq, we consider the solution of ODE with initial
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condition pµ0, ν0q. @η ą 0, define µη “ F´1pηq. Then like the proof of Lemma B.16 ., we
can solve for a smooth ν on rµη, µs. ν will be strictly decreasing below νm˚ and strictly
increasing over νm˚. Consider the slope of ν:
9ν “ H
1pνq ´ H1pµq
H2pνqpν´ µq “ Lpµ, νq
ν itself satisfies ODE Equation (A.30) ., then uniqness of solution to ODE implies ν ă ν
@µ P rµη, µs. So solution must lies in the blue region in Figure B.1. Let
Vpµq “ Fmpµq
1´ ρc Jpνpµq, µq
When ν1 Ñ νpµ1q, 1 ´ ρc Jpνpµq, µq Ñ 0. Thus Vpµq Ñ 8. On the other hand, when







H1pµ0q ´ H1pν0q ` H2pν0qpν0 ´ µ0qν10
˘
I want to show that there exists there exists µ1, ν1 s.t. Vpµq Ñ V0 when µÑ µ0.
Index Vpµ0q by initial value pµ1, ν1q: V0pµ1, ν1q. I claim that V0pµ1, ν1q is continuous
in pµ1, ν1q. Suppose not, then there exists limµn1 ,νn1Ñµ1,ν1 V0pµn1 , νn1 q ‰ V0pµ1, ν1q. On the
other hand, index Vpµηq by initial value pµ1, ν1q: Vηpµ1, ν1q, then continuous dependence
of ODE guanrantees that limµn1 ,νn1Ñµ1,ν1 Vηpµn1 , νn1 q “ Vηpµ1, ν1q. Therefore, @N, there exists
η s.t.
ˇˇˇ
limµn1 ,νn1Ñµ1,ν1 V0pµn1 , νn1 q ´V0pµ1, ν1q
ˇˇˇ
|µ0 ´ µη| ą 3N
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Then by continuity, we can have η sufficiently small that:
ˇˇˇ
limµn1 ,νn1Ñµ1,ν1 V0pµn1 , νn1 q ´Vηpµ1, ν1q
ˇˇˇ
|µ0 ´ µη| ą 2N
Then we can have n sufficiently large that:
ˇˇ




Then there must exists µ˜N s.t. |V1pµ˜Nq| ą N. On the other hand, |V1| must be bounded
because:
Vpµq “ Fmpνq ´V
1pµqpν´ µq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq
When V1 going to positive infinity, Vpµq will go to Fmpµq. When V1 going to negative
infinity, Vpµq will go to positive infinity. Both cases are impossible. Therefore, V0pµ1, ν1q
will be a continuous function on initial value. There exists µ1, ν1 such that limηÑ0Vpµηq “











Smoothly extend νpµq to µ0. Therefore, νpµq associated with initial value pµ1, ν1q satisfies





“ Vpµ0q, the assumption in Lemma B.17.
implies ν10 ď 0. 
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Lemma A.31. Assume µ0 ď µ˚, F1m ď 0, V0,V10 satisfies:$’’&’’%





Fmpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq





Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq (A.25’)
and initial condition Vpµ0q “ V0,V1pµ0q “ V10.














Then Dν P Cr0, µ0s satisfying initial condition νpµ0q “ ν0. On tµ|νpµq ą νu, ν is differentiable,
strictly decreasing and satifies ODE:




1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
pν´ µqFmpµqH2pνq
Lemma B.171. Assume Fmpµ0q “ 0, F1m ă 0, ν0 P p0, µ0s, ν10 satisfies$’’&’’%
1´ ρc Jpν0, µ0q “ 0
0 ą ρc pH1pµ0q ´ H1pν0q ` J2pν0qpν0 ´ µ0qν0q ě Vpµ0qF1m
Then D ν P Cr0, µ0s satifying initial condition νpµ0q “ ν0, 9νpµ0q “ ν10. On tµ|νpµq ą µu, ν is
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differentiable, strictly decreasing and satisfies ODE:




1` ρc Jpµ, νq
˘` ρc FmpνqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
pν´ µqFmpµqH2pνq





Fm´kpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq ě maxνěµ0
c
ρ
Fmpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq
Vpµ0q ě V0 ě Fm´kpµ0q





Fm1pνq ´Vm´kpµq ´V1m´kpµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq









Suppose not, then there exists µ1 s.t.
V0 ă c
ρ
Vm´kpµ1q ´V0 ´V10pµ1 ´ µ0q
Jpµ0, µ1q (B.15)
By definition of V0, we must have Vm´kpµ1q ą Fm´kpµ1q. The inequality is trivial because
if Fm´kpµ1q “ Vm´kpµ1q, then choosing µ1 will be suboptimal. Therefore νpµ1q ą µ1. Opti-
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We define LpV,λ, µqpµ1q as a linear function of µ1:
LpV,λ, µqpµ1q “ pVpµq ` λHpµqq ` pV1pµq ` λH1pµqqpµ1 ´ µq (B.16)
Define GpV,λqpµq as a function of µ:
GpV,λqpµq “ Vpµq ` λHpµq (B.17)
















This is a convex function and have unique minimum. Therefore, the minimumwill be de-
termined by FOC. Simple calculation shows that it is minimized at νpµ0q and the minimal
value is 0.
FOC : V1m´kpµ0q `
ρ
c













































The last inequality is from rewriting Equation (B.15) . Therefrore, LpVm´k, ρcVm´kpµ0q, µ0qpµ1q´
GpVm´k, ρcVm´kpµ0qqpµ1q will have minimum strictly negative. Suppose it’s minimized at
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`Vm´kpµ1q ´Vm´kpµ0q ` ρcVm´kpµ0qpHpµ




ěVm´kpµ1q ´Vm´kpµ0q ` ρcVm´kpµ0qpHpµ























































Hpµ1q ´ Hpνpµ1qq ` H1pµ1qpνpµ1q ´ µ1q˘
ąρ
c
pVm´kpµ1q ´Vm´kpµqqJpµ1, νpµ1qq ą 0
Contradiction.
Nowwe showLemma B.18 . Suppose that it is not true, then there exists µ1 P pµ0, νpµ0qq
and µ2 ě µ
m1 s.t.:
Vm´kpµ1q ă cρ
Fm1pµ2q ´Vm´kpµ1q ´V1m´kpµ1qpµ2 ´ µ1q
Jpµ1, µ2q
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The two equalities are directly from definition of L and G. First inequality is from subopti-











˘p¨q is lower at νpµ0q. Since both of them are lin-






















Contradicting that µ2 is superior than νpµ1q. 





Fm´kpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq ď maxνěµ0
c
ρ
Fmpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
Jpµ0, νq
Vpµ0q ě V0 ě Fm`kpµ0q





Fm1pνq ´Vm´kpµq ´V1m´kpµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.3.
Proof. In this part, we introduce the algorithm to construct Vpµq and νpµq. We only dis-
cuss the case µ ě µ˚ and the case µ ď µ˚ will follow by a symmetric method.
Algorithm:
• Step 1: Define:
V`pµq “max
νěµ
Fmpνq ´ CpIqI Jpµ, νq
1` ρI Jpµ, νq
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V´pµq “max
νďµ
Fmpνq ´ CpIqI Jpµ, νq
1` ρI Jpµ, νq
V` is increasing and V´ is decreasing. There exists µ˚ P r0, 1s s.t. V`pµq ě V´pµq




• Step 2: I construct the first piece of Vpµq to the right of µ˚. By Lemma B.20 ., there are
three possible cases of µ˚ to discuss (µ˚ “ 1 is omitted by symmetry).
Case 1: Suppose µ˚ P p0, 1q and Vpµ˚q ą Fpµ˚q. Then there exists pm, νpµ˚q ą µ˚, Iq s.t.
Vpµ˚q “ Fmpνpµ
˚qq ´ CpIqI Jpµ˚, νpµ˚qq
1` ρI Jpµ˚, νpµ˚qq
With initial condition pµ0 “ µ˚,V0 “ Vpµ˚q,V10 “ 0q, we solve for Vmpµq on rµ˚, 1s as
defined by Lemma B.22 . Define
Vµ˚pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ď µ˚
Vmpµq if µ ě µ˚
Be Lemma B.22 ., when Vµ˚pµq ą Fpµq, Vµ˚ is smoothly increasing and optimal νpµq is
smoothly decreasing.









IfVmppµmq ą Fm´1ppµmqwe solve forVm´1with initial condition µ0 “ µˆm,V0 “ Vmpµˆmq,V10 “
V1mpµˆmq. Then redefine Vµ˚pµq|µěpµm “ Vm´1pµq. Otherwise skip to looking for pµm´1. If
m´ 1 ą m, we continue this procedure by looking for µˆm´1 until m “ m. Now suppose
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Vm first hits Fpµq at µ˚˚ ą µ˚. Vµ˚ is a smooth function on rµ˚, µ˚˚s such that:
Vµ˚pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ď µ˚ or µ ě µ˚˚
Vkpµq if µ P rpµk, pµk´1s2 .
By construction, optimal posterior νµ˚pµq is smoothly decreasing on each ppµk`1, pµkq and










Case 2: Suppose µ˚ P p0, 1q but Vpµ˚q “ Fpµ˚q, let µ˚˚ “ inf␣µ|Vpµq ą Fpµq(.









Define µ˚˚ “ inf
!
µ
ˇˇ rVpµq ą F1pµq) ą 0.










Let m be the index of optimal action. Solve for Vm with initial condition µ0 “ µ˛,V0 “
Fpµ˛q,V10 “ F1´pµ˛q. Then take same steps in Step 3 and solve for pµk and Vk´1 sequen-
tially until Vm0 first hits F. This step refers to Figure A.6 .-4,5. Now suppose Vm0 first hits
1Define pµm`1 “ µ˚ and pµm “ µ˚˚ for consistency.
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Fpµq at some point µ˛˛ (can potentially be µ), define:
Vµ˛pµq “
$’’&’’%
Fpµq if µ ă µ˛ or µ ą µ˛˛
Vkpµq if µ P rpµk`1, pµks3 .
By Lemma B.21 ., Vµ is piecewise smooth are pasted smoothly. So Vµ is a smooth func-
tion on rµ, µ2s. Optimal posterior νµ˛pµq is smoothly decreasing on each ppµk`1, pµkq and










Let Ω be the set of all such µ˛’s.
• Step 4: Define:
Vpµq “
$’’&’’%






if µ ě µ˚˚
Smoothness:
I want to show that Vpµq is piecewisely defined as Vµ0’s. This is true when µ ď µ˚˚ by
definition of Vµ˚ . So I prove this for µ ą µ˚˚. First it is easy to verify that Lemmas B.11 .,
B.12. and B.13. still hold. The original proof directly applies by replacing Equation (A.18) .
with Equation (B.18). and Lemma A.3 . with Lemma B.21.




, V1pµq has Lipschitz parameter
∆.
3Define pµm`1 “ µ˛ and pµm0 “ µ˛˛ for consistency.
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ùñ V2µipµq ` C1pIqH2pµq ă 0
C1pIq is bounded since CpIq is bounded by sup F. It is easy to see that supΩ ă µ
n
(where n
is the largest index). By Lemma B.11 ., there is µ0 P Ω s.t. Vµ0pµnq ą Fpµnq. By Lemma B.12 .,
supΩ “ sup␣µ|Vµ0pµq ą Fpµq( ă νpµ0q ă 1. Therefore, µ is bounded away from 1. Then
by Assumption 1.3 ., ´H2pµq is bounded above. Therefore, ∆ exists for all such µ.
Then consider µ “ pµk, since V2µi is bounded on both side by ∆, V2µipµq ď ∆. Therefore
at µ V1µi has Lipschitz parameter ∆ by Kirszbraun theorem. 
• Step 1: V P Crµ˚˚, 1s. Sort all rational numbers in rµ˚˚, 1s as trnu. @N, there exists µn,M P




, then tVNu Ă V and VN converges
to V pointwisely on trnu. Let pV “ limVn, by Lemma B.13 ., pV P Crµ˚˚, 1s. By definitionpV ď V. Suppose pVpµq ă Vpµq, then there exists Vµ0pµq ą pVpµq. Since both Vµ0 andpV are continuous, Vµ0 ą pV on an open interval, containing some rn. Contradiction.
So pV “ V P Crµ˚˚, 1s. Let tµ ě µ˚˚|Vpµq ą Fpµqu “ Ť Im where Im are disjoint open
intervals.
• Step 2: @Im, exists µn P Ω s.t. Vpµq “ limVµnpµq and V1pµq “ limV1µnpµq on Im. Pick any
µ P Im. Let Θpµq “
␣
µ˛ P Ω|Vµ˛pµq ą Fpµq
(
. Then by definition of Vpµq, Θpµq is non-
empty. Let rV “ supµ˛PΘpµqVµ˛ . @N, there exists µn,M P Θpµq s.t. rVprnq ´Vµn,Nprnq ď 1N .





limVµN “ rV on trnu. By Lemma B.13 . rV “ limVµN P Crµ˚˚, 1s. Now suppose Vpµq ąrVpµq, then there exists Vµ˛pµq ą Vµnpµq ą Fpµq. Then µ˛ P Θpµq by Lemma B.12.,
contradiction. Therefore, limVµn “ V on Im.
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Let Im “ pam, bmq. Now consider tV1µnu. V1µnpamq “ F1pamq. Lemma B.19. implies that V1µn
are totally bounded and equi-continuous on Im. Therefore, there exists subsequence
V1µn being Cauchy w.r.t. sup norm on ram, bms. So V as limit of Vµn is differentiable on
ram, bms and V1 “ limV1µn .
• Step 3 @Im, exists µm P Ω s.t. Vpµq “ Vµm on Im. Let µm “ inf Im. By step 2, it is easy to
verify that µn Ñ µm. Then since Equation (B.19) . is continuous in µ, it is satisfied at µm
and µm P Ω. Since both Vµn and V1µn converges on Im, Equation (B.18). is satisfied for V
on Im. Let Fpµmq “ Fkpµmq.
As an intermediate step, I first prove that Equation (B.18) . is solved for k1 ą k in a non-
degenerate neighbour of µm. Take any µ1 ą µm s.t. Vpµ1q ą Fpµ1q, sinceVpµmq “ Fkpµmq,
there exists µ‹ P pµm, µ1q and ε ą 0 s.t @µ P pµm, µ‹q Vpµq ´ Fkpµq ă Vpµ1q ´ Fkpµ1q ´ ε. I
claim that Equation (B.18) . is solved at all µ P pµm, µ‹q with k1 ą k and I. Suppose not,

















Therefore F1k ě V1µnpµq. By construction of Vµn at any µ2 ě µ Equation (B.18) . is solved
with k, therefore F1k ě Vµnpµ2q holds for all µ2 ě µ. This implies @µ2 ě µ, Vµnpµ2q ´
Fkpµ2q ď Vµnpµq ´ Fkpµq ă Vpµ1q ´ Fkpµ1q ´ ε. Take n Ñ 8 and µ2 “ µ1, contradiction.
Therefore, Equation (B.18). is solved at all µ P pµm, µ‹q for Vpµqwith k1 ą k.
Now consider Vµmpµq. By my construction, suppose Vµm is updated up to action k` 1.
I claim that Vµm “ V when µ P rµm, µ‹q. Suppose not true, then there exists µ at which
Vµmpµq ă Vpµq, V1µmpµq ă V1pµq. It is easy to verify that Equation (B.18) . is violated at
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Vµmpµq. Therefore, ifVµm ­“ V, it must happen in pµ‹, bmq. Againwe can find µ P pµ‹, bmq
s.t. Vµmpµq ă Vpµq, V1µmpµq ă V1pµq, which is not possible. So Vpµq “ Vµmpµq on Im.
To sum up, V can be represented as:
Vpµq “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
Vµ˚pµq if µ P rµ˚, µ˚˚s
Vµmpµq if µ P Im
Fpµq otherwise




Vµmpµq when µ P Im, m ď n
Fpµq otherwise
Then Vnpµq Ñ Vpµq. By Lemma B.11., we can without loss assume first n Vµm have Im
covering µ
m
. Fix n, @µ, @m ě n, if µ P Im and m ď n or µ R Ť Im, then V1npµq “ V1mpµq,
else if µ P Im, m ą n, then |V1npµq ´ F1pµq| and |V1mpµq ´ F1pµq| are all bounded by ∆|Im|.
Therefore, V1npµq is a Cauchy sequence. Then V1npµq Ñ V1pµq pointwise. Since each V1n is
continuous, V is a smooth function on r0, 1s and V1 “ F1 when V “ F.
Unimprovability
Finally, I prove unimprovability of Vpµq.













ν ě µ when µ ě µ˚
ν ď µ when µ ď µ˚
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We still focus on the case µ ě µ˚. For the case µ ď µ˚, a totally symmetric argument
applies by referring to Lemma B.231 . Equation (P-C1). is implied by Equation (B.18) . for
µ P E. So it is sufficient to prove Equation (P-C1) . for µ P EC. Suppose there exists











By Lemma B.11 ., there exists Ik s.t. µk P Ik. At bk “ sup Ik, Upbkq ď Fkpbkq. Therefore,
since Upµq is continuous there exists largest µ1 ă µ s.t .Upµ1q “ Fkpµ1q. Then Equa-
tion (B.19) . is satisfied at µ1 so consider Vµ1 . Sicne Vµ1pµq ď Vpµq “ Fkpµq, there exists
µ2 P pµ1, µq s.t. Vµ1pµ2q ď Fkpµq and V1µ1pµ2q ď Fkpµq. Therefore Upµ2q ą Fkpµ2q im-
plies Vµ1pµ2q ą Fkpµ2q, contradiction. Apply a symmetric argument to µ ď µ˚, I proved
Equation (P-C).













ν ě µ when µ ě µ˚
ν ď µ when µ ď µ˚









ď Vpµq ă I
2
ρ
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Suppose the optimizer is ν,m, I. Optimality implies Equation (B.22) .:
Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq “ C
1pI1q
Together with Equation (B.20) ., we have I1C1pI1q “ ρ rV ` CpI1q. Then combine with
Equation (B.21)., we get:
$’’&’’%
F1m ` C1pIqH1pνq “ V1pµq ` C1pI1qH1pµq
pFmpνq ` C1pI1qHpνqq ´ pVpµq ` C1pI1qHpµqq “ pV1pµq ` C1pI1qH1pµqqpν´ µq
We define L and G as in Theorem 1.2 . Then L will be linear and GpFm,C1pI1qqpνqwill be
a concave function of ν. Consider:
LpV,C1pI1q, µqpνq ´ GpFm,C1pI1qq
FOC implies that it will be convex and attains minimum 0 at ν. For any m1 other than
m,
LpV,C1pI1qqpνq ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI1qqpνq
will be convex and weakly larger than zero. However:
LpV,C1pI1q, µqpµ2q ´ GpV,C1pI1qqpµ2q
“´ pVpµ2q ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpµ2 ´ µq ´ C1pI1qJpµ, µ2qq
ă0
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The inequality is from definition of I1:
I1C1pI1q ´ CpI1q ă I2C1pI2q ´ CpI2q
ùñ C1pI1q ă C1pI2q
ùñ C1pI1q ă Vpµ
2q ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpµ2 ´ µq
Jpµ, µ2q
Therefore, LpV,C1pI1q, µqp¨q´GpV,C1pI1qqp¨qwill have a strictly negativeminimum. Sup-
pose it’s minimized at rµ, Then FOC implies:




V,C1pI1q, rµ˘pνprµqq ´ G`Fm,C1pI1q˘prνq
“L`V,C1pI1q, µ˘pνprµqq ´ G`Fm,C1pI1q˘pνprµqq
`Vprµq ´Vpµq ` C1pI1qpHprµq ´ Hpµqq ´ `V1pµq ` C1pI1qHpµq˘prµ´ µq
ěVprµq ´Vpµq ` C1pI1qpHprµq ´ Hpµqq ´ `V1pµq ` C1pI1qH1pµq˘prµ´ µq
“G`V,C1pI1q˘prµq ´ L`V,C1pI1q, µ˘prµq
ą0
Let m1, νprµq, rI be maximizer at rµ, rIC1prIq “ ρVprµq ` CprIq:
0 “LpV,C1prIq, rµqpνprµqq ´ GpFm1 ,C1prIqqpνprµqq
“LpV,C1pI1q, rµqpνprµqq ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI1qqpνprµqq
` pC1prIq ´ C1pI1qqJprµ, νprµqq
ąpC1prIq ´ C1pI1qqJprµ, νprµqq
248
B.2. Proofs in Section 1.6.
Since rµ ą µ, we have C1prIq ´ C1pI1q ą 0. Contradiction. Therefore we proved Equa-
tion (P-D1).
• Step 3: We show that V satisfies Equation (1.4) . First, since V is smooth, envelope
theorem implies:






ùñ V2pµq ` C1pIqH2pµq ă 0















V´pµ˚q “ Vpµ˚q and whenever Vpµq “ V´pµq, we will have V´1pµq ă 0. Therefore,





ppVpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µqq `V2pµqσ2 ´ CpIq
*
s.t. pJpµ, νq ` H2pµqσ2 “ I

Lemma B.20. Define V` and V´ :
V`pµq “ max
νěµ,m,I
IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
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V´pµq “ max
νďµ,m,I
IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
There exists µ˚ P r0, 1s s.t. V`pµq ě V´pµq @µ ě µ˚; V`pµq ď V´pµq @µ ď µ˚. Moreover
Vpµ˚q ą 0.
Proof. We define function Um` and Um´ as following:
Um`pµq “ max
νěµ,I
IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
Um´pµq “ max
νďµ,I
IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
SinceCpIq, Fmpµq and Jpµ, νq are all smooth functions, the objective functionwill be smooth.















pH1pµq ´ H1pνqq “ 0
FOC-I :ρFmpνq ` CpIq ´ C1pIqpI ` ρJpµ, νqq “ 0
SOC : H “
»—–IpρFmpνq ` CpIqqpI ` ρJpµ, νqqH2pνq 0
0 ´Jpµ, νqpI ` ρJpµ, νqq2C2pIq
fiffifl
Noticing that SOC is evaluated at the pairs pν, Iq at which FOC holds.




IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2ρ2pIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq2
´ 2ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq`IF1m ´ CpIqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq˘
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` ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqH2pνq
`pI ` ρJpµ, νqq2CpIqH2pνq

FOC-ν ùñ F1m “ pCpIq ` ρFmpνqqpH
1pµq ´ H1pνqq




IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2ρ2pIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq2
` 2ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqCpIqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq2
´ 2ρpCpIq ` ρFmpνqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq2
` ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqH2pνq
`pI ` ρJpµ, νqq2CpIqH2pνq

“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqH2pνq
`pI ` ρJpµ, νqq2CpIqH2pνq

“pI ` ρJpµ, νqqH2pνqpρIFmpνq ´ ρCpIqJpµ, νq ` ICpIq ` ρCpIqJpµ, νqq
“ IpρFmpνq ` CpIqqpI ` ρJpµ, νqqH
2pνq




IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2pIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqq
´ 2pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpFmpνq ´ C1pIqJpµ, νqq
´ Jpµ, νqpI ` ρJpµ, νqq2C2pIq

FOC-I ùñ IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq “ pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpFmpνq ´ C1pIqJpµ, νqq
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IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpFmpνq ´ C1pIqJpµ, νqq
´ 2pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpFmpνq ´ C1pIqJpµ, νqq
´ Jpµ, νqpI ` ρJpµ, νqq2C2pIq

“´Jpµ, νqpI ` ρJpµ, νqq
2C2pIq




IFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νq
I ` ρJpµ, νq
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2ρpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq
´ ρpI ` ρJpµ, νqqpFmpνq ´ C1pIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq
´ pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpIF1m ´ CpIqpH1pµ´ H1pνqqqq
` pI ` ρJpµ, νqq2`F1m ´ C1pIqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq˘
“ 1pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3
„
2ρpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq
´ ρpIFmpνq ´ CpIqJpµ, νqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq
´ pI ` ρJpµ, νqqpI pCpIq ` ρFmpνqqpH
1pµq ´ H1pνqq
I ` ρJpµ, νq CpIqpH
1pµ´ H1pνqqqq
` pI ` ρJpµ, νqq2
ˆpCpIq ` ρFmpνqqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq





pI ` ρJpµ, νqq3 pρIFmpνq ´ ρCpIqJpµ, νq ´ IpCpIq ` ρFmpνqq
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The only term we don’t know its sign is
ρFmpνq ` CpIq “ I ` ρJpµ, νqH1pµq ´ H1pνqF
1
m
Therefore, H will be ND if ν ą µ and F1m ą 0, or ν ă µ and F1m ă 0. In these cases, FOC
uniquely characterizes the maximum. Suppose ν ą µ and F1m ă 0 or ν ă µ and F1m ą 0, the
H will never be ND, and choice of νwill be on boundary. What’s more, simple calculation
shows that choosing ν “ µ will dominate choosing ν “ 0, 1. Therefore:
Um`pµq “ Fmpµqwhen F1m ă 0
Um´pµq “ Fmpµqwhen F1m ą 0




´H2pµqpν´ µq`CpIq ` ρI Fmpνq˘`
1` ρI Jpµ, νq
˘2 ą 0




´H2pµqpν´ µq`CpIq ` ρI Fmpνq˘`
1` ρI Jpµ, νq
˘2 ă 0
Therefore, Um` and Um´ have exactly the same properties as in Lemma A.2., the rest of
proofs simply follow Lemma A.2 . What’s more, we define νm˚ and Im˚ as the maximizer in
this problem.
Now I prove that Vpµ˚q ą 0. We know that Vpµ˚q solves:
Vpµ˚q “ max
νěµ˚,I
Fpνq ´ CpIqI Jpµ˚, νq
1` ρI Jpµ˚, νq
“ max
νďµ˚,I
Fpνq ´ CpIqI Jpµ˚, νq
1` ρI Jpµ˚, νq
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Consider the following term:
V “ max
µi,pi,I
p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´ CpIqI Ipµi|µ˚q
1` ρI Ipµi|µ˚q





“ p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´V´p1Hpµ1q ´ p2Hpµ2q ` Hpµ˚q
I want to claim that V ď Vpµ˚q. Suppose not, then:
p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´Vpµ˚q
´p1Hpµ1q ´ p2Hpµ2q ` Hpµ˚q ą
p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´V





Then at least one of the following:
Fpµ1q ´Vpµ˚q
´Hpµ1q ` Hpµ˚q ` H1pµ˚qpµ1 ´ µ˚q ;
Fpµ2q ´Vpµ˚q
´Hpµ2q ` Hpµ˚q ` H1pµ˚qpµ2 ´ µ˚q
is larger than ρIVpµ˚q ` CpIqI . Suppose the fisrt term does, then:
ρVpµ˚q ă I Fpµ1q ´Vpµ
˚q
Jpµ˚, µ1q ´ CpIq
Contradicting optimality ofVpµ˚q. Same argument applies to the second term. SoVpµ˚q ě
V. However:
lim
cÑ0 p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´
CpIq
I
Ipµi|µ˚q “ p1Fpµ1q ` p2Fpµ2q ´ C1p0qIpµi|µq ą 0
Therefore, Vpµ˚q ě V ą 0. 
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Lemma B.21. Assume µ0 ě µ˚, F1m ě 0, V0,V10 satisfies:$’’&’’%



















and initial condition Vpµ0q “ V0, V1pµ0q “ V10.
















Fmpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq











Noticing that HI,I ă 0, therefore I satisfying FOC will be unique given µ, ν. On the other
hand, FOC-ν is independent of I. Hν,ν ă 0 when FOC-ν ě 0. Therefore, solution of F)C-
ν will be unique. When FOCs are satisfied, H is strictly ND, then the solution of FOCs
are going to be maximizer. Therefore, FOC-ν and FOC-I uniquely characterize optimal
choice of ν, I. Now we impose feasibility:
Vpµq “ I
ρ
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FOCs reduces to:
FOC-ν:pF1m ´V1pµqq ` ρVpµq ` CpIqI pH
1pνq ´ H1pµqq “ 0 (B.21)
FOC-I: IC1pIq “ ρVpµq ` CpIq (B.22)















F1m ` C1pIqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqq
˘
Jpν, µq “ 1
ρ
ˆ
I ´ CpIq ` ρFmpµq
C1pIq
˙ (B.24)
We obtained an equation system with one ODE of pc, 9Iq and one regular equation for ν.
Since Jpν, µq is strictly monotonic for ν ě µ, we can also define an implicit inverse function
M to eliminate ν in the equation.
JpMpy, µq, µq “ y





















We define Impµ0qC1pImpµ0qq ´ CpImpµ0qq “ ρFmpµq when this equation has solution and
Impµq “ 0 when ρFmpµq is so small that this equation has no solution. Since Fmpµq is
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increasing in µ, Impµq is increasing and strictly increasing when Impµq ą 0. We consider
the initial conditions:




ùñ Impµ0q ă I0 ď Im˚pµ0q
Then Lemma B.22. guaranteed the existence of an increasing function Ipµq on rµ0, 1s. 
Lemma B.22. Define M as JpMpy, µq, µq “ y. Assume µ0 P rµ˚, 1q, I0 satisfies:
Impµ0q ă I0 ď Im˚pµ0q
Then there exists a Cp1q and strictly increasing I on rµ0, 1s satisfying initial condition Ipµ0q “ I0.





















Proof. We first characterize some useful properties of the ODE. We denote the ODE by
9I “ Rpµ, Iq.
• Domain: By definition of Impµq, @µ P p0, 1q
Impµq ´ CpImpµqq ` ρFmpµqC1pImpµqq “ 0




I ´ CpIq ` ρFmpµq
C1pIq
˙
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Therefore, @I ě Impµq, I´ CpIq`ρFmpµqC1pIq ě 0. Strictly inequality holds when I ą Impµq. On
the other hand, when I ă Impµq, if Fmpµq ě 0, then I´ CpIq`ρFmpµqC1pIq ă 0. Else if Fmpµq ď 0,
then Impµq “ 0. Since M only applies to non-negative reals, we know that the ODE is
only well defined in the region: tI|I ě Impµqu.
• Continuity: It is not hard to verify that the ODE is well behaved (satisfying Picard-
Lindelof) when µ is strictly bounded away from t0, 1u, I is uniformly bounded away
from Impµq. One just need to calculate Mypy, µq by implied function theorem:
B
ByMypy, µq “ ´
1
H2pMpy, µqqpMpy, µq ´ µq




“ 0. Since I is uniformly
bounded away from Impµq, then Mpy, µq ´ µ is uniformly bounded away from 0.
• Monotonicity: When I “ Im˚pµq, 9I “ 0. This can be shown by considering FOC on Im˚:$’&’%
F1m ´ C1pIqpH1pµq ´ H1pνqq “ 0
pI ` ρJpµ, νqqC1pIq “ CpIq ` ρFmpνq
ùñ pI ´ ρJpν, µqqC1pIq “ CpIq ` ρFmpµq ` ρF1mpν´ µq ` C1pIqpH1pνq ´ H1pµqqpν´ µq
ùñ pI ´ ρJpν, µqqC1pIq “ CpIq ` ρFmpµq

















ùñ 9I “ Rpµ, Iq “ 0
Then we consider the monotonicity of Rpµ, Iq:
B
BI Rpµ, Iq “ C
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Therefore, Rpµ, Iq will be positive in tImpµq ă I ď Im˚pµqu. This refers to the blue region
in Figure B.2 .
@δ ą 0, we consider solving the ODE 9I “ Rpµ, Iq in region: µ P rδ, 1´ δs, I P rImpµq `
δ, Im˚pµqs. The initial condition pµ0, I0q is in the blue region of Figure B.2 . (When H1 is
finite, we can take µ P r0, 1s.) Picard-Lindelof guarantees a unique solution satisfying
the ODE in the region. What’s more, it’s straight forward that the solution Ipµq will be
increasing. A solution is a blue line with arrows in Figure B.2 . A solution Ipµq will lie
between Impµq and Im˚pµq until it hits the boundary of region.
Now we can take δ Ñ 0 and extend Ipµq towards the boundary. Since the end point
of Ipµq has both µ, I monotonically increasing, there is a limit I, µ with Impµq “ I. Then
since Rpµ, Iq has a limit ρF1m
Ih2pIq , we actually have limµÑµ V
1pµq “ F1m by Equation (B.23). So




will be smooth on rµ0, 1s. 
Lemma B.211. Assume µ0 ď µ˚, F1m ě 0, V0,V10 satisfies:$’’&’’%



















and initial condition Vpµ0q “ V0, V1pµ0q “ V10.
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Lemma B.221. Define M as JpMpy, µq, µq “ y. Assume µ0 P p0, µ˚s, I0 satisfies:
Impµ0q ă I0 ď Im˚pµ0q
Then there exists a Cp1q and strictly decreasing I on r0, µ0s satisfying initial condition cpµ0q “ I0.






































Vpµ0q ě V0 ě Fm´kpµ0q




























Vm´kpνq ´V0 ´V10pν´ µ0q
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Let I0C1pI0q “ ρV0 `CpI0q, then optimality implies Equation (B.20) . and Equation (B.21) . at
µ “ µ0:
$’&’%
F1m´k ` C1pI0qH1pνpµqq “ V10 ` C1pI0qH1pµq`
Fm´kpνpµqq ` C1pI0qHpνpµqq
˘´ `V0 ` C1pI0qHpµq˘ “ `V10 ` C1pI0qH1pµq˘pνpµq ´ µq





L is a linear function and G is a concave function. Therefore this is a convex function and
have uniqueminimumdetermined by FOC. Simple calculation shows that it is minimized





“´ pVm´kpνq ´Vm´kpµ0q ´V1m´kpµ0qpν´ µ0q ´ C1pI0qJpµ0, νqq
ă0
The inequality is from Equation (B.26). and definition of I0:
I0C1pI0q ´ CpI0q ă I1C1pI1q ´ CpI1q
ùñ C1pI0q ă C1pI1q




Therefore LpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ0qpνq ´GpVm´k,C1pI0qqpνqwill be strictly negative at ν and will
have minimum strictly negative. Suppose it’s minimized at µ2 (µ2 ą µ0), then FOC im-
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plies:
V1m´kpµ0q ` C1pI0qH1pµ0q “ V1m´kpµ2q ` C1pI0qHpµ2q
Let I2C1pI2q “ ρVm´kpµ2q ` CpI2q, then we have I2 ą I0 and C1pI2q ą C1pI0q. Consider:
LpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ2qpνpµ2qq ´ GpFm´k,C1pI0qqpνpµ2qq
“LpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ0qpνpµ2qq ´ GpFm´k,C1pI0qqpνpµ2qq
`Vm´kpµ2q ´Vm´kpµ0q ` C1pI0qpHpµ2q ´ Hpµ0qq ´ pV1pµ0q ` C1pI0qqpµ2 ´ µ0q
ěVm´kpµ2q ´Vm´kpµ0q ` C1pI0qpHpµ2q ´ Hpµ0qq ´ pV1pµ0q ` C1pI0qqpµ2 ´ µ0q
“GpVm´k,C1pI0qqpµ2q ´ LpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ0qpµ2q ą 0
However:
0 “LpVm´k,C1pI2q, µ2qpνpµ2qq ´ GpFm´k,C1pI2qqpνpµ2qq
“LpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ2qpνpµ2qq ´ GpFm´k,C1pI0qqpνpµ2qq
` pC1pµ2q ´ C1pI0qqpHpµ2q ´ Hpνpµ2qq ` H1pµ2qpνpµ2q ´ µ2qq
ąpC1pI2q ´ C1pI0qqJpµ2, νpµ2qq ą 0
Contradiction.
Now we show Lemma B.23. Suppose it’s not true, then there exists ν P pµ0, νpµ0qq,
µ2 ě µ
m









Fm1pµ2q ´V1m´kpνq ´V1m´kpνqpµ2 ´ νq
Jpν, µ2q “ C
1pI2q
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If we let I1C1pI1q “ ρVpνq ` CpI1q, then I1 ą I0 and C1pI1q ą C1pI0q. By definition:
0 ďLpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ0qpµ2q ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpµ2q
“LpFm´k,C1pI0q, νpµ0qqpµ2q ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpµ2q
0 ďLpVm´k,C1pI0q, µ0qpνq ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpνq
“LpFm´k,C1pI0q, νpµ0qqpνq ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpνq
ùñ LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpµ2q ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI1qqpµ2q
“LpFm´k,C1pI0q, νpµ0qqpµ2q ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpµ2q
` pC1pI1q ´ C1pI0qqJpµ0, µ2q
ą0
LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpµ2q ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI1qqpµ2q
“LpFm´k,C1pI0q, νpµ0qqpνq ´ GpFm1 ,C1pI0qqpνq
` pC1pI1q ´ C1pI0qqJpµ0, νq ą 0
No we consider LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqp¨q and LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqp¨q:$’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’%
LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqpνq “ GpVm´k,C1pI1qqpνq
Lpvm´k,C1pI1q, νqpνpµ0qq ě GpVm´k,C1pI1qqpνpµ0qq
LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpνq ą GpVm´k,C1pI1qqpνq
LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpνpµ0qq “ GpVm´k,C1pI1qqpνpµ0qq
ùñ
$’’&’’%
LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqpνpµ0qq ě LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpνpµ0qq
LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqpνq ă LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqpνq
Since both functions are linear: ddµLpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqpµq ą ddµLpFm´k,C1pI1qνpµ0qqpµq, then
264
B.3. Proofs in Section 1.7 .
LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqp¨q must be larger than LpFm´k,C1pI1q, νpµ0qqp¨q at any µ2 ě νpµ0q. This
implies:
LpVm´k,C1pI1q, νqpµ2q ą GpFm1 ,C1pI1qqpµ2q
Contradicting the assumption. 

















Vpµ0q ě V0 ě Fm`kpµ0q










B.3 Proofs in Section 1.7.
B.3.1 Linear delay cost
B.3.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.4.

































´ şτ0 dHpµtqdt dtı
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First inequality is by Jensen’s inequality. First equality is by definition of It. Second
inequality is by iterated law of expectation. Last equality is straight forward. Since xµty P








ď EPrFpνqs ´ EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs
λ
pm` Cpλqq
ùñ Vpµq ď sup
PP∆2pXq,λą0
EPrFpνqs ´ m` Cpλq
λ
EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs
On the other hand, @P P ∆2pXq,λ ą 0, let xµty be a compound Poisson process which
realizes according to P with Poisson rate λEprHpµq´Hpνqs , τ is jump time of xµty. Then it is












B.3.2 General information measure
B.3.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.5.
Proof. Consider Equation (1.13) ., it’s sasy to see that both the inner maximization prob-
lem and the constraint are linear in pi and σ2. Therefore, Equation (1.13) . can be written










Now suppose µ P D and ρVpµq “ c V2pµqJ2ννpµ,µq . This is saying, the maximization problem:
sup
ν
cpVpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µqq
Jpµ, νq
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Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq˘
It must be ď 0 when ν Ñ µ` and ě 0 when ν Ñ µ´. Otherwise, the diffusion experiment
will be locally dominated by some Poisson experiment. When νÑ µ, Jpµ, νq Ñ 0,V1pνq Ñ





V2pνq ´ J2ννpµ, νqVpνq´Vpµq´V
1pµqpν´µq

























Now consider Vpµq ´ cρ V
2pµq
J2ννpµ,µq . By assumption, it’s non-negative and achieves 0 at µ.
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By smoothness of V and J, for FOC to be non-positive when ν Ñ µ` and non-negative
when νÑ µ´. So Equations (B.27) . and (B.28). implies:
V1pµqJ2ννpµ, µq `VpµqJp3qννµpµ, µq “ 0
Now suppose there exists µn Ñ µ s.t. ρVpµnq “ c V
2pµnq
J2ννpµn,µnq , we have:
V1pµnqJ2ννpµn, µnq `VpµnqJp3qννµpµn, µnq “ 0




V1pµqJ2ννpµ, µq `VpµqJp3qννµpµ, µq
¯
“ 0
ùñ V2pµqJ2ννpµ, µq `V1pµq
´









VpµqJ2ννpµ, µq2 ´ VpµqJ2ννpµ, µq
´










2Jp3qννµpµ, µq2 ` Jp3qνννpµ, µqJp3qννµpµ, µq
J2ννpµ, µq ` J
p4q
νννµpµ, µq ` Jp4qννµµpµ, µq “ 0
By assumption, µ P D, therefore the differential equation must not be satisfied. This








is a closed set (closed w.r.t. D) containing no limiting point. That is to say, within any
compact subset of D, this set is finite. This set is a Borel set, thus Lebesgue measurable.
By definition of Lebesgue measure, the measure of a set can be approximated by compact
subsets from below. Therefore, this set has zero-measure. 
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B.3.2.2 Construction of a special cost function
Take any general cost structure Jpµ, νq and κpµ, σq that satisfies Assumption 1.4. In
the section, I introduce the method to construct a cost structure such that (i) the cost of
Gaussian learning is κpµ, σq and (ii) the DM is exactly indifferent between using Guassian
learning and Poisson learning.
Step 1. Let gpµq “ J2ννpµ, µq (then κpµ, σq “ 12gpµqσ2). Restrict the DM to using only














Change parameter and let vpµq “ ddµ logpVpµqq, then vpµq satisfies the following ODE:
v1pµq ` vpµq2 “ ρ
c
gpµq (B.31)
By Assumption 1.4 ., gpµq is a smooth function on p0, 1q. Therefore it is easy to verify that
on any closed sub-interval of p0, 1q, Picard-Lindelöf is satisfied that there exist unique
solution to Equation (B.31) . given initial condition. Let vpµ,C1q be the solution indexed
by free parameter C1, then Vpµq “ C2e
şµ
0 vpC1,νqdν. The two free parameters pC1,C2q can be
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0 vpC1,νqdν “ Fpµ1q
C2e
şµ1
0 vpC1,νqdνvpC1, µ1q “ F1pµ1q
C2e
şµ2
0 vpC1,νqdν “ Fpµ2q
C2e
şµ1
0 vpC1,νqdνvpC1, µ2q “ F1pµ2q
Notice that smooth pasting need to be checked for at most C2|A| pairs of actions, index all
solutions byVi. ThenVpµq “ maxtVipµqu solves Equation (B.29) . Let E “ tµ|Vpµq ą Fpµqu.
Step 2. @µ P E, define J0pµ, νq as:
J0pµ, νq “ c
ρ
Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Vpµq











s.t. pJ0pµ, νq ` 12 J0ννpµ, µqσ
2 ď c
First of all, by definition, Vpµq, p ” 0 and σ2 “ cJ0ννpµ,µq is feasible and satisfies the equality
condition. Now @ν P r0, 1s:
c
Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
J0pµ, νq “ ρVpµq
Therefore, any Poisson learning strategy is as good as the Gaussian learning strategy. By
definition of J0, 12 J0ννpµ, µqσ2 “ 12gpµqσ2 “ κpµ, σq.
Step 3. Smooth extension of J0. So far, J0 is only defined on E. J0 can be extended
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smoothly onto r0, 1s satisfying @µ P EC:
$’’&’’%
J0ννpµ, µq “ gpµq
J0pµ, νq ě c
ρ
Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Vpµq , @ν
The extension is intuitively simple but quite technical, which is ommited here.
Such a J0pµ, νq is uniquely defined for µ P E. For µ P EC, there can be many de-
grees of freedom because Gaussian learning is anyway strictly dominated by stopping.
So it is sufficienly to make Poisson learning also dominated. Now, suppose Jpµ, νq and
κpµ, σq are such that Gaussian learning is weakly optimal. Then Jpµ, νqmust be pointwise
weakly higher than J0pµ, νq, @µ P E. On the other hand, since Jννpµ, µq “ J0ννpµ, µq, this
implies Jν3pµ, µq “ J0ν3pµ, µq. That is to say, assuming Gaussian learning being weakly
optimal is imposing an additional third derivative constraint on Jpµ, νq on the constriants
in Assumption 1.4., making the set of cost functions non-generic.
B.3.3 Linear cost function
B.3.3.1 Proof of Theorem 1.6.








`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘
ff
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It’s easy to see that this is determined only by action time T and action process AT . LetrS t´1 “ `1T “t,At ˇˇT “t˘. Then by information processing constraint in Equation (1.5’) ., we
have:
Prob
´ rS t ˇˇS t,X¯ “Prob`1T “t`1,At`1 ˇˇS t,X ˘ “ Prob`1T ďt`1,At`1 ˇˇS t,X ˘
“Prob`1T ďt`1,At`1 ˇˇS t˘ “ Prob´ rS t ˇˇS t¯






































































´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, 1T ďt¯ı
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Therefore, by replacing signal process S t with rS t, the DM can achieve the same utility












































¯ˇˇT “ 1ı´ λI´ rS0;X ˇˇµ, T ą 0¯






















´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, 1T ďt¯ı (B.32)
is negative, then discard all actions and information after first period will give the DM
higher expected utility. This information and action process satisfies this theorem. There-




























¯ˇˇT “ 1ı´ λI´ rS0;X ˇˇµ, T ą 0¯¯
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¯ˇˇT “ 1ı´ λI´ rS0;X ˇˇµ, T ą 0¯¯
























¯ˇˇT “ 1ı´ λI´ rS0;X ˇˇµ, T ą 0¯¯







¯ˇˇT “ 2ı´ λI´ rS1;X ˇˇ rS0, T ą 1¯¯
























¯ˇˇT “ 1ı´ λI´ rS0;X ˇˇµ, T ą 0¯¯







¯ˇˇT “ 2ı´ λI´ rS1;X ˇˇ rS0, T ą 1¯¯













































¯ˇˇT ě 1ı´ λ lim
tÑ8 I














¯ˇˇT ě 1ı´ λI´AT ;X ˇˇT ě 1¯¯
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´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, 1T ďt¯ı





















Therefore, we showed that any dynamic information acquisition strategy solving Equa-
tion (1.5’). will have weakly lower expected utility level than a static information acquisi-
tion strategy solving Equation (1.14).
Now let us consider the continuous time problem. It is clear by Lemma B.5. that any
discretization of Equation (1.1) . can be implemented by Equation (1.5’). Hence,












ErupA,X qs ´ λIpA;X q
“ sup
PP∆2pXq
EPrFpνq ´ λpHpµq ´ Hpνqqs






















ùñ Vpµq ě sup
PP∆2pXq
EPrFpνq ´ λpHpµq ´ Hpνqqs
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Combining the two inequalities, Equation (1.14). is proved. 
B.4 Proofs in Section 1.8.
B.4.1 Choice accuracy and response time: proof of Proposition 1.1 .
Proof. Since both H0pµq and Fpµq are symmetric functions around µ0 “ 0.5, by symmetry
and quasi-concavity of value function (Theorem 1.2 .), @ck, µ˚ “ µ0. Let the expected utility
of the action favoring beliefs ą 0.5 be Frpµq, and the utility of the other action Flpµq. @ck,
by the proof of Lemma A.2., there exists unique νlk and ν
r




1` ρck J0pµ0, νq
νlk P argmaxνďµ
Flpνq
1` ρck J0pµ0, νq
















FrpνqpH10pµq ´ H10pνqqpFrpµqpH10pµq ´ H10pνqq ` F1r J0pν, µqq
F1r
`




The equality is by plug the FOC determining ν˚ into the cross derivative. The inequality
follows by H0pµq being strictly concave, F1r ą 0 and Frpµ0q “ Fpµ0q ą 0. Since the cross
derivative w.r.t. ν and c is strictly positive at νr˚, the standard comparative statics analysis
suggests that the optimal belief νr˚ is strictly increasing in parameter c. A completely
symmetric argument applies to νl˚ and νl˚ is strictly decreasing in parameter c. Therefore,
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are ordered on r0, 1s:
0, νlk, ¨ ¨ ¨ , νl1, µ0, νr1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , νrk, 1
Moreover, @c P pci, ci`1q, νr˚pcq P pνri , νri`1q and νl˚pcq P pνli`1, νli q. Now assume that the
goal is to make the sign of µ˚ ´ µ0 strictly positive (negative) when c P pc2i, c2i`1q (c P
pc2i´1, c2iq). To achieve this goal, define Hpµq based on H0pµq. Let Ma,bpµq be a function
on Rwith the following properties:
• Parameter a, b P R and a ă b.
• @a, b, µ, Ma,bpµq ă 0 if µ P pa, bq and Ma,b “ 0 otherwise.
• @a, b, Ma,bpµq is Cp2q smooth on R and |M2a,bpµq| is bounded by 1.
The choice of function M can be quite arbitrary. For example, it is not hard to verify that:















2 . Since H0pµq satisfies As-






, H2pµq ď ´2ε. Now define Hpµq:





I verify that Hpµq satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1.1 . It is easy to verify that
Jpµ0, νq “ Jpµ0, νq when ν R Ťpνr2i, νr2i`1q or Ťpνl2iq, νl2i´1. Jpµ0, νq ą J0pµ0, νq otherwise.




















1` ρc Jpµ0, νq
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1` ρc J0pµ0, νq
Therefore, µ˚ “ µ0 and the optimal strategy at µ0 is the same as that with H0pµq.
Now I prove that the sign of µ˚ ´ µ0 strictly positive (negative) when c P pc2i, c2i`1q
(c P pc2i´1, c2iq). For the first case c P pc2i, c2i`1q, since Jpµ0, νr˚pcqq ą J0pµ, νr˚pcqq and
















1` ρc J0pµ0, νq
The first strict inequality is from uniqueness of optimal νr˚pcq, Jpµ0, νr˚pcqq ą J0pµ, νr˚pcqq
and continuity of the objective function in ν. Therefore, V`pµ0q ă V´pµ0q. Since V`pµq is
increasing in µ and V´pµq is decreasing in µ, their crossing point µ˚ ą µ0. For the other
















1` ρc J0pµ0, νq
Therefore, V`pµ0q ą V´pµ0q. Since V`pµq is increasing in µ and V´pµq is decreasing in µ,
their crossing point µ˚ ă µ0. 
B.4.2 Radical innovation: proof of Propositions 1.2. and 1.3.
Proof. Consider the solution to the problem of firm L, where the payoff to riskless arm
is uLpPsq. By Theorem 1.2 ., the policy function νLpνq is a strictly decreasing function on
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experimentation region EL. νLpµq is piecewise smooth. Each discrete point of νLpµq cor-
responds to a critical point where the DM is indifferent between confirming two beliefs





where µJ is the smallest and µ1 is the largest. I first prove the following useful lemma.
Lemma B.24. At each µj, let ν
j
L ă νjL be the smallest and largest optimal posterior beliefs for firm
L. Then either νSpµjq ă νjL or νSpµjq ą νjL.

















Optimality condition Equations (A.26). and (A.27). implies that it attains minimum 0 at
both νjL and ν
j
















Since in L’s experimentation region VL ą VS, the term is strictly positive for ν ą µj. Now















































``VSpµjq ´VLpµjq ` pV1Spµjq ´V1Lpµjqqpν´ µjq˘
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Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq˘
Notice that the second term is linear in ν and the third term is concave in µ. Since Equa-
tion (B.33) . is minimized at νjL and ν
j
L, the two points share the same supporting hyper-
plane. Now Equation (B.34) . equals Equation (B.33) . plus a strictly concave term. As a
result, Equation (B.34) . has positive first derivative at νjL and negative first derivative at
V jL. Therefore, the posterior belief that minimizes Equation (B.34) . is either strictly less
than νjL or strictly larger than ν
j
L. 
Step 1. I prove that in the region µ ě µ1, there exists critical belief µc that the satisfies
the property of Proposition 1.3 . By Lemma B.24 ., there are two possible cases.
The first case is that νSpµ1q ă ν1L. Now if at belief µ1, firm S’s optimal posterior is already
associated with a less risky action, then since by definition of µ1 firm L doesn’t use any
action less risky than that associated with µ1
L
at all. So µc “ µ1. If otherwise firm S’s and
firm L’s optimal beliefs are associated with the same action, then by the previous analysis,
νSpµjq ă νjL. Now I prove that νSpµq ă νLpµq for all µ ě µj. This can be easily seen from
the phase diagram Figure B.1 . Since the two firms are using the same action, their optimal
belief is characterized by the same set of ODEs (except for different in initial value). Since
we know that VL ą VS, then the policy function νL must touch the diagonal line later
than νS. By Picard-Lindelof solution to ODE doesn’t cross, νLpµq ą νSpµq for µ ě µ0 and
νLpµq ă νSpµq for µ ď µ0 (µ0 is the critical belief the action giving zero expected payoff).
Giving this single crossing property, since νLpµ`1 q ą νSpµ`1 q, νLpµq ą νSpµq for all µ ě µ1.
The second case is that νSpµ1q ą ν1L. Now for some µ ą µ1, νSpµq stays above νLpµq
whenever it corresponds to a more risky action. However, the analysis in the first case
shows that when firm S switches action, it either jumps to a strictly less risky action, or
stays at the same action as firm L for some beliefs (but νLpµq and νSpµq crosses once). In
280
B.4. Proofs in Section 1.8 .
either cases, the single crossing property holds. So there exists such critical belief µc.
Notice that the analysis in this region is already sufficient to prove Proposition 1.2.
Step 2. I prove Proposition 1.3 . by induction. I prove the following statement that if for
µj, there are two possibles cases: νSpµjq ă νjL and νSpµq ă νLpµq @µ ě µj; or νSpµjq ą νjL
and there exists µc ą µj, then the same statement is true for µj`1.
If νSpµj`1q ă νj`1L , then the argument is simple. Case 1 is that firm S has already switched
to a less risky action, then before the firm H switches, νLpµq ą νSpµq for sure, up to µj.
Then νLpµq ą νSpµq for µ ě µj as well by assumption in induction. Case 2 is that firm S is
using the same action as firm L. The by the argument in step 1, before either firm switches
to a less risky action, νLpµq ą νSpµq. Suppose by contradiction that firm L first switches to
a less risky action at µj, then by Lemma B.24., νSpµ´j q ą νLpµ´j q, contradiction. Therefore,
to sum up νSpµq ă µLpµq @µ ą νj`1L .
If νSpµj`1q ą νj`1L , the we only need to discuss that firm S ever uses the same action as
firm (because otherwise either single crossing happens and we are in the case νSpµjq ă νjL,
then the induction assumptions shows νSpµq ă νLpµq for all µ ě µj; or crossing doesn’t
happen, then the induction assumptions shows that single crossing happens for µc ą µj).
In this case, the analysis in step 1 shows that νLpµq and νSpµq crosses at most once, and
afterwards, the induction assumptions shows νSpµq ă νLpµq for all µ ě µj. To sum up,
I prove that νL and νS crosses at most once in firm L’s experimentation region. Notice
that VL ą VS, therefore, there exists µ in L’s experimentation region where VSpµq “ Fpµq
already. Obviously for such belief νLpµq ą νSpµq. On the other hand, on the left end of L’s
experimentation region:
Fpνq ´VLpµq
Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq ă
Fpνq ´VSpµq
Hpµq ´ Hpνq ` H1pµqpν´ µq ď VSpµq
So since VLpµq ą VSpµq it must be that V1Spµq ą 0. Therefore, there exist µ in S’s experi-
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mentation regionwhereVLpµq “ Fpµq. This proves that E0Şp0, µcq ‰ H and E0Şpµc, 1q ‰
H. 
B.5 Proofs in Appendix A.1.
B.5.1 Convergence of policy
B.5.1.1 Proof of Theorem A.1.
Proof. The original statement in Theorem A.1 . is equivalent to: @ε ą 0, there exists δ
s.t. @dt ď δ, @µ P r0, 1s, there exists |µ1 ´ µ| ď ε and any optimal posterior induced
in discrete time problem with period length dt will be within either rµ1 ´ ε, µ1 ` εs or
rνpµ1q ´ ε, νpµ1q ` εs.Now pick any ε ą 0, let’s discuss two cases separately:
Case 1: µ P r0, 1szE. I first prove the case with Assumption A . and Assumptions 1.2-a .
and 1.3. I will show that for any dt, any informative experiment is suboptimal. Suppose







Hpµq ´ř piHpνiq ď cdt
Now consider a problem with dt2 . Consider the following strategy: mix experiment pi, νi
and prior with probability 12 . Then obviously Bayes plausibility and capacity constraint




























First inequality is from optimality of Vdt
2
. Second inequality is from 12´x ą x2 for x P p0, 1q.
Third inequality is from Vdt
2
ě Vdt. Last inequality is from assumption. Therefore Fpµq “
Vpµq ě Vdt
2
ą Fpµq. Contradiction. So for µ P r0, 1s, Ndtpµq “ tµu for any dt ą 0. Noticing
that this satisfies Theorem A.1. independent of choice of dt and ε.
Then consider the case with Assumption A . and Assumptions 1.2-b . and 1.3. Suppose
not true, and there exists νi ‰ µ s.t.:
e´ρdt
ÿ









Hpµq ´ř piHpνiq “ I
Now consider a problem with dt2 . Consider the following strategy: mix experiment pi, νi
and prior with probability 12 . Then obviously Bayes plausibility and capacity constraint











pνiq ¨ 12t ´
ÿ
t“0











































First inequality is from optimality of Vdt
2
. Second inequality is from 12´x ą x2 for x P p0, 1q.
Third inequality is from Vdt
2
ě Vdt. Last inequality is from assumption. Therefore Fpµq “
Vpµq ě Vdt
2
ą Fpµq. Contradiction. So for µ P r0, 1s, Ndtpµq “ tµu for any dt ą 0. Noticing
that this satisfies Theorem A.1. independent of choice of dt and ε.
Case 2: µ P E. Suppose Theorem A.1 . is not true. Then there exists ε s.t. @dt, there exists
µdt P E s.t. Dνdt P Ndtpµdtq and @µ P Bεpµdtq, dHpνdt,Npµqq ą ε. Now pick dtn “ 2´n Ñ 0.
Since pµdtn , νdtnq is an infinite sequence in compact space r0, 1s2, we can WLOG assume`
µdtn , νdtn
˘Ñ pµ, νq. @µ1 P B ε
2




˘ ą ε. N can be picked sufficiently large that ˇˇνdtn ´ νˇˇ ă ε2 . Therefore




to pµ, νq, which
is bounded away by ε2 from the graph of Np¨q.






Vpµq with Assumption 1.2-a.
C1pIpµqq with Assumption 1.2-b.
Consider:
Gp¨q “ Vp¨q ` λHp¨q
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Then optimality condition implies that:
$’&’%
Gpνq “ Gpµq ` G1pµqpν´ µq @ν P rν
Gpνq ă Gpµq ` G1pµqpν´ µq otherwise
(B.35)
By Theorem B.1., @dt, there exists λdtn s.t. Equation (1.6) . is solved by concavifying Gn “
Vdtn ` λdtnH at µdtn .
Obviously λdtn is non-negative. Suppose it diverges to `8. Then consider function









































So for n sufficiently large, µ1dtn will be higher than the connected straight line of µdtn and
νdtn on Gdtn . Contradicting optimality of νdtn . So λdtn is a bounded sequence.
Suppose there exists convergent subsequence limλdtn ă λ. If µ ‰ µ˚ then pick µ1 such
that µ1 is in the same interval as µ in E and limλdtn ă λpµ1q ă λ, let λ1 “ λpµ1q. If µ “ µ˚
then let λpµ˚q ą λ1 ą limλdtn . Now consider concavifying V ` λ1H. By monotonicity
in Theorem 1.2 . and definition of µ˚, we know that optimal posteriors are bounded away
from µ. Moreover, Vpµq ` λ1Hpµq ă covpV ` λ1Hqpµq. Pick ε ą 0 sufficiently small such
that optimal posteriors ofV`λ1H are bounded away from µ by ε andVpµq`λ1Hpµq` ε ă
covpV ` λ1Hqpµq. Let ν1 ă µ ă ν2 be two optimal posterios for V ` λ1H closest to µ. By
continuity, there exists δ s.t @|µ2 ´ µ| ă δ, Vpµ2q ` λ1Hpµ2q ` ε2 ă covpV ` λ1Hqpµ2q. Pick
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dtn s.t. ‖Vdtn ´V‖ ă ε8 , then
Vdtnpµ2q ` λ1Hpµ2q
ăVpµ2q ` λ1Hpµ2q ` ε
8
ăcovpV ` λ1Hqpµ2q ´ 3ε
8
ďcovpVdtn ` λ1Hqpµ2q ´
ε
4
The last inequality comes from the fact that any convex combination of points on V`λ1H




˘` ε8 . Therefore, we showed that any point µ2 within δ ball of µ
can’t be on supporting hyperplane of Vdtn ` λ1H. So any optimal posterior of Vdtn ` λ1H
is bounded away from µ by δ. Pick N sufficently large than @n ě N, ˇˇµdtn ´ µˇˇ ă δ2 .
Then, optimal posterior of Vdtn ` λ1H is bounded away from µdtn by δ2 . By definition of
λ1, N can be picked sufficently large that @n ě N λdtn ď λ1. Therefore, by Lemma B.25 .,
optimal posteriors are even further from µdtn . To sum up, we found N s.t. @n ě N, the
optimal posteriors from concavifying Vdtn ` λdtnH are bounded away from µdtn by δ2 . The























Therefore, for sufficently large n, experimentation cost will eventually exceed cdtn. Con-
tradiction.
Suppose there exists subsequence limλdtn “ λ1 ě λ. By definition, there exists linear
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Since λdtn Ñ λ1, Gn is bounded at µdtn and νdtn . Therefore, Ln has bounded slope and
constant term. It’s easy to see that Ln will converge uniformly to linear function L8 on
belief space ∆X. Moreover, @ν P ∆X:
Gnpνq “ Vdtnpνq ` λdtnHpνq Ñ Vpνq ` λ1Hpνq “ rGpνq ď L8pνq
Gnpµdtnq “ Vdtnpµdtnq ` λdtnHpµdtnq Ñ rGpµq “ L8pµq (B.36)
Gnpνdtnq “ Vdtnpνdtnq ` λdtnHpνdtnq Ñ rGpνq “ L8pνq
Second and third convergence comes from Vdtn uniformly convergent and V continuous.rGpµq “ Gpµq ` pλ1 ´ λqHpµq. Equation (B.36). implies that L8 is a supporting hyperplane
of graph of rG, tangents rG at µ and ν. Since rG is a smooth function, we know that rG1pµq “rGpνq´ rGpµq
ν´µ . On the other hand, Equation (B.35) . implies that:
Gpνq ă Gpµq ` G1pµqpν´ µq
ùñ
´ rGpνq ´ rGpµq¯´ `λ1 ´ λ˘pHpνq ´ Hpµqq ă ´ rG1pµq ´ `λ1 ´ λ˘H1pµq¯pν´ µq
ùñ rGpνq ´ rGpµq ă rG1pµqpν´ µq
Contradiction. Last inequality is from concavity of H : Hpνq ´ Hpµq ă H1pµqpν ´ µq.
Therefore Theorem A.1. is true.

287
Appendix B. Supplemental materials for Chapter 1.
Lemma B.25. Let X be closed interval inR. Let V be a continuous function on X, H be a concave
function on X. Let Eλ “
␣
x P XˇˇcovpV ` λHqpxq ą Vpxq ` λHpxq(. Then tEλu are ordered
monotonically as λ by set inclusion: if λ ě λ1, then @ interval I in Eλ, there exists interval I1 in
Eλ1 s.t. I Ă I1.
Proof. @λ, take any I P Eλ. Let I “ rx, ys. Define:
Lpzq “ Vpxq ` λHpxq ` Vpyq ´Vpxq ` λHpyq ´ λHpxq
y´ x pz´ xq
Then @z P X:
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
Lpxq “ Vpxq ` λHpxq
Lpyq “ Vpyq ` λHpyq
Lpzq ą Vpzq ` λHpzq if z P px, yq
Lpzq ě Vpzq ` λHpzq if z ă x or z ą y
Now take any λ1 ă λ and consider V ` λ1H. Let:
rLpzq “ Vpxq ` λ1Hpxq ` Vpyq ´Vpxq ` λ1Hpyq ´ λ1Hpxq
y´ x pz´ xq
“ Lpzq ` pλ1 ´ λq
ˆ
Hpxq ` Hpyq ´ Hpxq
y´ x pz´ xq
˙
$’&’%
ě Lpzq ` pλ1 ´ λqHpzq if z P rx, ys
ď Lpzq ` pλ1 ´ λqHpzq if z R rx, ys
ùñ
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
rLpxq “ Vpxq ` λ1Hpxq
rLpyq “ Vpyq ` λ1Hpyq
rLpzq ą Vpzq ` λ1Hpzq if z P px, yq
Therefore, @z P px, yq, covpV ` λ1Hqpzq ą Vpzq ` λ1Hpzq. So there exists interval I1 P Eλ1
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s.t. I Ă I1. 
B.5.2 Continuum of actions
B.5.2.1 Proof of Lemma A.1.
Proof. We prove with two steps:
Step 1: We first show that if we let VdtpFq be the solution to Equation (1.6)., then Vdt is
Lipschitz continuous in F under L8 norm. @F1, F2 convex and with bounded subdifferen-
tials, consider F “ maxtF1, F2u, F “ mintF1, F2u. Then by properties of convex functions,
F, F are convex. BFpµq, BFpµq Ă BF1pµqŤ BF2pµq. Therefore F and F are both within the
domain of convex and bounded subdifferential functions with the following quantitative
property:
$’&’%
F ě F1, F2 ě Fˇˇ
F´ Fˇˇ “ |F1 ´ F2|
It’s not hard to see that V is monotonicaly increasing in F. Therefore, we have:
VdtpFq ď VdtpF1q,VdtpF2q ď VdtpFq
Now let ppi, µiq be the policy solving VdtpFq. Let Vdt “ VdtpFq,Vdt “ VdtpFq. Let C be total
expected cost associate with this strategy. Then consider:
Vdtpµq ě1VdtpµqďFpµqFpµq ` 1VdtpµqąFpµqe´ρdt
ÿ
p1i pµqVdtpµ1i q ´ C
ě1VdtpµqďFpµqFpµq ` 1VdtpµqąFpµqe´ρdt
ÿ
p1i pµq1Vdtpµ1i qďFpµ1i qFpµ
1
i q ´ C
` 1VdtpµqąFpµqe´2ρdt
ÿ
p1i pµq1Vdtpµ1i qąFpµ1i q
ÿ
p2i pµ1i qVdtpµ2i q ´ C
ě ¨ ¨ ¨
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ˇˇ ď ˇˇF´ Fˇˇ ùñ |VdtpF1q ´ VdtpF2q| ď |F1 ´ F2|. VdtpFq has Lipschitz
parameter 1.
Step 2: @F1, F2, @ε ą 0, by Lemma 1.3 ., there exists dt s.t. |VpFiq ´ VdtpFiq| ď ε|F1 ´ F2|.
Therefore:
|VpF1q ´ VpF2q| ď|VpF1q ´ VdtpF1q| ` |VpF2q ´ VdtpF2q| ` |VdtpF1q ´ VdtpF2q|
ďp1` 2εq|F1 ´ F2|
Take εÑ 0, since LHS is not a function of ε, we conclude that VpFq is Lipschitz continuous
in F with Lipschitz parameter 1. 
B.5.2.2 Proof of Theorem A.2.
Proof. We prove the three main results in following steps:
• Lipschitz continuity. By Lemma A.1., we directly get Lipschitz continuity of operator V
on tFn, Fu and the Lipschitz parameter being 1.
• Convergence of derivatives. Let Vn “ VpFnq, V “ VpFq, we show that @µ s.t. Vpµq ą Fpµq,
V1pµq “ limV1npµq. Since Vpµq ą Fpµq, by continuity strict inequality holds in an closed
interval rµ1, µ2s around µ. Then by Lemma B.27 ., limnÑ8V1npµ1q exists @µ1 P rµ1, µ2s.
Now consider function V1npµq. Since V2n pµq is uniformly bounded for all n, V1npµq are
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uniformly Lipschitz continuous, thus equicontinuous and totally bounded. Therefore
by lemma Arzela-Ascolli, V1n converges uniformly to limV1n. By convergence theorem
of derivatives, V1 “ limV1n on rµ1, µ2s. Therefore, V1pµq “ limnÑ8V1npµq.
• Feasibility. For µ s.t. Vpµq “ Fpµq, feasibility is trivial. Now we discuss the case Vpµq ą
Fpµq. We only prove for µ ą µ˚ and µ “ µ˚, the case µ ă µ˚ follows by symmetry. If
µ ą µ˚, there exists N s.t. @n ě N, µ ą µn˚. N can be picked large enough that in a
closed interval around µ, Vnpµq ą Fnpµq. Therefore, there exists νn being maximizer for
Vnpµq bounded away from µ and satisfying:
Vnpµq “ c
ρ
Fnpνnq ´Vnpµq ´V1npµqpνn ´ µq
Jpµ, νnq
Pick a converging subsequence νn Ñ ν:
c
ρ











Therefore Vpµq is feasible in Equation (A.4).
Suppose µ “ µ˚. Then there exists a subsequence of µn˚ converging from one side of
µ˚. Suppose they are converging from left. Then µ ě µn˚. Previous proof still works.
Essentially, what we showed is that the limit of strategy in discrete action problem
achieves Vpµq in the continuous action limit.
• Unimprovability. First, when µ P t0, 1u, information provides no value but discounting
is costly, therefore Vpµq is unimprovable. We now show unimprovability on p0, 1q by
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adding more feasible information acquisition strategies in several steps.




Fpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
Suppose not true, then there exists ν s.t.:
lim
nÑ8 ρVnpµq “ρVpµq









Second line is by the contradictory assumption. Third line is by convergence of Fn by
assumption, convergence ofVn by LemmaA.1 . and convergence ofV1n by Lemma B.27 .
Last inequality is by suboptimality of ν.
Similarly, for the case µ ď µ˚, we can apply a symmetric argument to prove.
– Step 2. Poisson experiments at Vpµq “ Fpµq. In this step, we show that @µ ě µ˚ and
Vpµq “ Fpµq (The symmetric case µ ď µ˚ is ommited).
First of all, we show that V is differentiable at µ and V1pµq “ F1pµq. Suppose not,
then since Vpµq “ Fpµq and V ě F, we know that V ´ F is locally minimized at µ.
Therefore DV`pµq ą DV´pµq. By Definition A.2., there exists ε ą 0, µn1 Õ µ and





µ´µn1 . Let δ
n






pVpµn1q ´Vpµqq ě ε
pµn2 ´ µqpµ´ µn1q
µn2 ´ µn1
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Vpµn1q ě Vpµq ` ε ¨mintδn1 , δn2 u
On the other hand:
µ´ µn1
µn2 ´ µn1


























pµn2 ´ µqpµ´ µn1q
µn2 ´ µn1
`




2 are determined by applying intermediate value theorem on H
1. Now we
can choose N s.t. @n ě N, maxµ1Prµn1 ,µn2 stH2pµ1qu ď 2H2pµq. Therefore:
µ´ µn1
µn2 ´ µn1




ďH2pµqpµn2 ´ µqpµ´ µn1q
“H2pµqδn1 δn2
Nowwe consider a stationary experiment at µ that takes any experiment with poste-
riors pµn1 , µn2q with flow probability cH2pµqδn1 δn2 . Then by definition the flow cost of this

















˘` µn2´µµn2´µn1 `Hpµq ´ Hpµn1q˘
ěVpµq ´
rVpµq ` εmin␣δn1 , δn2(
H2pµqδn1 δn2
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“Vpµq `mintδn1 , δn2 u
ε´ H2pµqmax␣δn1 , δn2(
1` ρcH2pµqδn1 δn2
n can be pick large enough that ε´ H2pµqmax␣δn1 , δn2( is positive. Therefore rVpµq ą
















˘` µn2´µµn2´µn1 `Hpµq ´ Hpµn1q˘
ùñ lim
mÑ8
rVmpµq “ rVpµq ą limmÑ8Vmpµq
There exists m large enough that rVmpµq ą Vmpµq, violating optimality of Vm. Contra-
diction. Therefore, we showed that V1pµq “ F1pµq.
Next we show unimperovability. Suppose not, then Dν s.t.:
Fpµq ă c
ρ
Fpνq ´ Fpµq ´ F1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
By continuity of V, Dε and a neighbourhood µ P O, @µ1 P O:
Vpµ1q ` ε ď c
ρ
Fpνq ´Vpµ1q ´ F1pµqpν´ µ1q
Jpµ1, νq
By uniform convergence of Fn and Vn, there exists ε ą 0 and N s.t. @n ě N:
Vnpµ1q ` ε2 ď
c
ρ










Fnpνq ´Vnpµ1q ´ F1pµqpν´ µ1q
Jpµ1, νq
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ùñ V1npµ1q ě F1pµq ` ρε2c
Jpµ1, νq
ν´ µ1
In an interval around µ, V1npµ1q ´ F1pµq ě ρε2c Jpµ
1,νq
ν´µ1 , which is a positive number inde-
pendent of n and uniformly bounded away from 0 for all µ1. Then it’s impossible
that V1pµq “ F1pµq. Contradiction.
What’s more, since V1 is Lipschitz continuous at any Vpµq ą Fpµq, it can be extended
smoothly to the boundary. Since V1 “ F1 at Vpµq “ Fpµq, then the limit of this smooth
extension has limV1pµq “ F1pµq. Therefore V is Cp1q smooth on r0, 1s.
– Step 3. Repeated experiments and contradictory experiments. With the convergence
result we have on hand, we can apply similar proof by contradiction method in step







Vpνq ´Vpµq ´V1pµqpν´ µq
Jpµ, νq
*
– Step 4. Diffusion experiments. Suppose at µ, diffusion experiment is strictly optimal:




Then by Definition A.2 ., there exists ε, δ1 s.t.:
Vpµq ` ε ď c
ρ
Vpµ` δ1q ´Vpµq ´V1pµqδ1
Hpµq ´ Hpµ` δ1q ` H1pµqδ1






δ1`δ2 pVpµ` δ1q ´Vpµqq `
δ2
δ1`δ2 pVpµ´ δ2q ´Vpµqq
δ2
δ1`δ2 pHpµq ´ Hpµ` δ1qq `
δ2
δ1`δ2 pHpµq ´ Hpµ´ δ2qq
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By convergence of Vn, there exists n s.t.:




δ1`δ2 pVnpµ` δ1q ´Vnpµqq `
δ2
δ1`δ2 pVnpµ´ δ2q ´Vnpµqq
δ2
δ1`δ2 pHpµq ´ Hpµ` δ1qq `
δ2
δ1`δ2 pHpµq ´ Hpµ´ δ2qq
ùñ δ2
δ1 ` δ2Vnpµ` δ1q `
δ1







δ1 ` δ2Hpµ` δ1q ´
δ1






δ1 ` δ2Hpµ` δ1q ´
δ1




If we consider the experiment with posterior beliefs µ` δ1, µ´ δ2 at µ. Taking this
experiment at µ with flow probability:
c
Hpµq ´ δ2δ1`δ2Hpµ` δ1q ´
δ1
δ1`δ2Hpµ´ δ2q
Then the flow cost constraint will be satisfied and the utility gain is:
rVnpµq “ δ2δ1`δ2Vnpµ` δ1q ` δ1δ1`δ2Vnpµ´ δ2q
1` ρc
´





















To sum up, we proved that Vpµq solves Equation (A.4) .

Lemma B.26 (Convergence of µ˚). Suppose Assumption A . and Assumptions 1.3 ., 1.2-a. and A.1.
are satisfied. Let Fn be piecewise linear function on [0,1] satisfying:
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1. |Fn ´ F| Ñ 0;
2. @µ P r0, 1s, lim F1npµq “ F1pµq.
Let µn˚ be as defined in Lemma A.2. associated with Fn. Suppose µ˚ “ lim µn˚. Then,
1. @µ ą µ˚, DN s.t. @n ě N, νnpµq ě µ.
2. @µ ă µ˚, DN s.t. @n ě N, νnpµq ď µ.
Proof. @µ ą µ˚, by definition lim µn˚ “ µ˚, there exists N s.t. @n ě N: |µn˚ ´ µ˚| ă |µ´ µ˚|.
Therefore µ ą µn˚ and thus νnpµq ě µ. Same argument applies to µ ă µ˚. 
Lemma B.27. Suppose Assumption A . and Assumptions 1.3 ., 1.2-a. and A.1. are satisfied. Let Fn
be piecewise linear function on [0,1] satisfying:
1. |Fn ´ F| Ñ 0;
2. @µ P r0, 1s, lim F1npµq “ F1pµq.
Define Vn “ VpFnq and V “ VpFq. Then: @µ P r0, 1s s.t. Vpµq ą Fpµq, D limV1npµq.
Proof. With Lemma B.26 ., we can define µ˚ P r0, 1s (we pick an arbitrary limiting point
when there are multiple ones). First by assumption lim F1npµq “ F1pµq, and V1n “ F1m
on the boundary by construction in Theorem 1.2 ., the statement is automatically true for
µ P t0, 1u. We discuss three possible cases for different µ P p0, 1q separately.
• Case 1: µ ą µ˚. If Vpµq ą Fpµq, then by convergence in L8 norm, there exists N
and neighbourhood µ P O s.t. @n ě N, µ1 P O, Vnpµ1q ą Fnpµ1q. We know that by
no-repeated-experimentation property of solution νnpµq to problem with Fn, νnpµq ą
supO. Now consider V1npµq. Suppose V1npµq have unlimited limiting point. Then exists
subsequence limV1npµq “ 8 or ´8. If limV1npµq “ 8, consider ν “ 0, else if limV1npµq “




















npµq ν´ µJpµ, νq
“`8
Contradiction. Therefore we know that V1npµq must have finite limiting points. Now
suppose V1npµq doesn’t converge, then there exists two subsequences limV1npµq “ V11
and limV1mpµq “ V12, V11 ‰ V12 P R. Suppose V11 ą V12. Now take a converging subse-
quence of optimal policy at µ νnk Ñ ν1. By previous result ν1 ě supO. Therefore ν1




















1 ´V12qpν1 ´ µq
Jpµ, ν1q
ąVpµq
Contradiction. Therefore, limit point of V1npµq must be unique. Such limit point exists
since V1n are uniformly bounded. To sum up, there exists limV1npµq.
• Case 2: µ “ µ˚. Since Vpµ˚q ą Fpµ˚q. This implies that DN s.t. @n ě N, Vnpµ˚q ą Fnpµ˚q.
In this case, by Lemma A.2 ., µn˚ are unique. Since µn˚ is the unique intersection of Un`
andUn´ (Definition ofUn`,Un´1 are as in LemmaA.2 ., n is index), we can first establish
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1` ρc Jpµ, µ1q
Therefore, suppose the maximizer for index n is νn, mn, then for index n1:
Un
1`pµq ě Fn1pνnq
1` ρc Jpµ, νnq
ěUn`pµq ` Fnpνnq ´ Fn1pνnq
1` ρc Jpµ, νnq
ěUn`pµq ´ |Fn ´ Fn1 |
Since n and n1 are totally symmetric, we actually showed that the functional map from
Fn to Un` is Lipschitz continuous in Fn with Lipschitz parameter 1. Symmetric argu-
ment shows that same property for Un´. Since by assumption Fn is uniformly con-
verging, we can conclude that Un` and Un´ are Cauchy sequence with L8 norm.
Therefore converging. Then Un` ´Un´ uniformly converges and their roots will be
UHC when n Ñ 8. To show convergence of µn˚, it’s sufficient to show that such
limit is unique. This is not hard to see by applying envelope theory to Un` and Un´:
d
dµU
n`pµq “ ´ρc FpνnqH
2pµqpνn´µq
Jpµ,νnq2 . Therefore U
n` ´Un´1 will have slope bounded below
from zero, therefore the limit will also be strictly increasing. So µ˚ is unique.
Since µn˚ Ñ µ, and V2n pµq are all bounded from above:
V1npµ˚q “V1npµn˚q `V2n pξnqpµ˚ ´ µn˚q
“V2n pξnqpµ˚ ´ µn˚q Ñ 0
• Case 3: µ ă µ˚. We can apply exactly the symmetric proof of case 1.
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
B.5.3 General state space
B.5.3.1 Proof of Theorem A.3.
Proof. @µ P E, consider X “ supppµq (This is without loss since we can always focus on
only the support of µ). Let pp, ν,Σq be optimal policy at µ.
Step 1. Derive optimality condition. Suppose p ‰ 0:
ρVpµq “ ´c Vpνq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpν´ µq
Hpνq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpν´ µq (B.37)
Now let p “ ´ cHpνq´Hpµq´∇Hpµqpν´µq . As an analog to Equation (1.8) ., first order condition
implies:
FOC´ ν :∇Vpνq ´∇Vpµq ` λp∇Hpνq ´∇Hpµqq “ 0




Gpνq ´ Gpµq ´∇Gpµqpν´ µq “ 0
(B.38)
Feasibility condition Equation (B.37) . implies λ “ ρcVpµq.Moreover, optimality implies
@ν1 P ∆pXq:
ρVpµq ě ´c Vpν
1q ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpν1 ´ µq
Hpν1q ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpν1 ´ µq
ùñ Gpν1q ´ Gpµq ´∇Gpµqpν1 ´ µq ď 0 (B.39)
Suppose p “ 0, then Σ ‰ 0. Pick any non-zero row σ, then feasibility condition of
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Equation (A.1). implies:
ρVpµq “ ´c σ
THVpµqσ
σTHHpµqσ
Optimality condition also implies Equation (B.39).
Step 2. Prove Vpνq ą Vpµq. Suppose by contradiction that Vpνq ď Vpµq. Consider
Vpµαq where µα “ αν ` p1´ αqµ, α P p0, 1q. Since ∆pXq is convex, µα P ∆pXq. Now by
Equation (B.39)., Gpµαq ď Gpµq `∇Gpµqpµα ´ µq. For α sufficiently small, µα P E. @λ1 ă λ,
let G1 “ V ` λ1H. Then since H is strictly concave, G1 is more convex that G, therefore
$’&’%
G1pµαq ´ G1pµq ´∇G1pµqpµα ´ µq ă 0
G1pµαq ´ G1pνq ´∇G1pνqpµα ´ νq ă 0
ùñ G1pµαq `∇G1pµαqpµ´ µαq ă G1pµq
or G1pµαq `∇G1pµαqpν´ µαq ă G1pνq
So optimality condition is not satisfied at µα. Suppose Vpµαq is achieved with non-zero pi,
Then λ characterizing FOC at µα must be strictly larger than λ. Therefore Vpµαq ą Vpµq.
SupposeVpµαq is achievedwith zero pi. ThenVpµαq ď Vpµq again implies Equation (B.39) .




ðñ ∇Vpµqpν´ µq ě 0
ùñ Vpνq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpν´ µq ď 0
Contradicting Equation (B.37) .
Step 3. Prove Vpνq “ Fpνq. Suppose by contradiction that Vpνq ą Fpνq. By the analysis
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in step 2, let λ “ ρVpµqc and G “ V ` λH. Let λ1 “ ρVpνqc and G1 “ V ` λ1H. Then
@ν1 P ∆pXq, ν1 ‰ ν:
Gpν1q ďGpνq `∇Gpνqpν1 ´ νq
ùñ G1pν1q “Gpν1q ` pλ1 ´ λqHpν1q
ďGpνq `∇Gpνqpν1 ´ νq ` pλ1 ´ λqHpν1q
ăGpνq `∇Gpνqpν1 ´ νq ` pλ1 ´ λqHpνq `∇Hpνqpν1 ´ νq
“G1pνq `∇G1pνqpν1 ´ νq
On the other hand, @ν1, Gpν1q ď Gpνq`∇Gpνqpν1´ νq implies HGpνq being negative semi-
definite. Then @σ, σTHGpνqσ ď 0. Therefore, @σ, σTHGpνqσ` pλ1´ λqσTHHpνqσ ă 0 ùñ
ρ
cVpνq ă ´ σ
THVpνqσ
σTHHpνqσ . Contradicting Vpνq being sovled in Equation (A.1) .
Step 4. Prove that the set of µ at which ρcVpµq “ ´ σ
THVpµqσ
σTHHpµqσ is no where dense.
Suppose by contradiction that there exists an open ball O Ă E on which @µ, ρcVpµq “
maxσ´ σ
THVpµqσ
σTHHpµqσ . LetO be a non-degenerate closed ball contained inO. Since V is contin-
uous on V, there exists µ˚ P argminµPO Vpµq. @µ P O, by definition HVpµq ` ρVpµqc HHpµq
is negative semi-definite. Therefore, HVpµq ` ρVpµ˚qc HHpµq is negative semi-definite.
Now consider Gpµq “ Vpµq ` ρcVpµ˚qHpµq on O. Gpµq has pointwise negative semi-
definite Hessian. So Gpµq is a convex function. On the other hand, optimality of Gaus-
sian signal at µ˚ implies Gpµq to be concave. Therefore Gpµq is linear on O. So Vpµq “
Lpµq ´ ρcVpµ˚qHpµq on O, where Lpµq is a linear function.
Now I show that Vpµq is a constant on O. Suppose not, Vpµq ą Vpµ˚q. Then Vp¨q `
ρVpµq
c Hp¨q “ Lp¨q ` ρc pVpµq ´ Vpµ˚qqHp¨q has negative-definit Hessian at µ. So there ex-
ists no σ s.t. σTHVpµqσ ` ρVpµqc σTHHpµqσ “ 0. Contradiction. However, Vpµq being a
constant on O implies HVpµq ” 0 on O, contradiction.
Step 5. Prove that @µ P E, exists ν P EC satisfying Equation (B.37) . Suppose p ą 0,
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then as discussed in step 1, proof is done. Now suppose p “ 0. Then by step 4, there is
a converging sequence of µn Ñ µ and νn satisfying Equation (B.37) . for each µn. By step
3, νn P EC so νn are bounded away from µn by positive distance. Since νn P EC and EC is
closed subset of ∆pXq, there exists converging subsequence νn Ñ ν P EC. Therefore, by
smoothness of V and H,
Vpµq “ lim
nÑ8Vpµnq “ limnÑ8´c
Vpνnq ´Vpµnq ´∇Vpµnqpνn ´ µnq
Hpνnq ´ Hpµnq ´∇Hpµnqpνn ´ µnq
“´ c Vpνq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpν´ µq
Hpνq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpν´ µq









step 4, K is a nowhere dense set and the inequality in property 4 is satisfied by construc-
tion. Now I prove property 1 on EzK:




Fpνpµqq ´Vpµq ´∇Vpµqpνpµq ´ µq






´HVpµqpνpµq ´ µq ` ρcVpµqp´HHpµqpνpµq ´ µqq
Hpνpµqq ´ Hpµq ´∇Hpµqpνpµq ´ µq
¸
ą 0
Now I prove property 3 on EzK: Define Jpµ, νq “ Hpµq ´ Hpνq `∇Hpµqpν ´ µq. Then
Equations (B.37). and (B.38). implies
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
Vpµq “ Fpνq ´ pν´ µq
T ¨∇Vpµq
1` ρc Jpµ, νq
∇Vpµq “
´

















1´ ρc Jpν, µq
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Then ν “ νpµq satisfies the following PDE @α:
αT ¨ BBµ
Fpµq
1´ ρc Jpν, µq
`Dαν BBν
Fpµq






1´ ρc Jpν, µq
¸












ùñ Dαν ¨HHpνqpν´ µq “ Jpν, µqFpµq`1´ ρc Jpν, µq˘DαVpµq
ùñ Dµ´νν ¨HHpνqpν´ µq “ Jpν, µqFpµq`1´ ρc Jpν, µq˘
`´Dν´µVpµq˘ ă 0
The inequality comes from Vpµq ą 0 and Dν´µVpµq ą 0. 
B.5.4 Axiom for posterior separability
B.5.4.1 Proof of Theorem A.4.
Proof. Let S0 be a fully revealing information structure i.e. with any prior belief µ, each
signal induces posterior belief δxi with probability µpxiq. @µ P ∆X, define:
Hpµq “ IpS0;X |µq
@S which induces ν with probability hpνqwith prior µ:
IpS0;X |µq “IpS ;X |µq ` ErIpS0;X |S , µqs
“IpS ;X |µq `
ż
IpS0;X |νqhpνqdν
“HpS ;X |µq ` EhrIpS0;X |νqs
ùñ IpS ;X |µq “Hpµq ´ EhrHpνqs
Moreover, HpEhrνsq ´ EhrHpνqs ě 0 for all distribution h implies that H is a concave func-
tion on ∆X. 
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C.1 Omitted proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1.
Proof.









IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq
ˇˇT ě t‰ ď c
X Ñ St Ñ A conditional on T “ t
X Ñ St Ñ 1T ět
Equation (C.1) . is more relaxed than Equation (2.1) . in the first constraint. In Equation (2.1) .,
the flow cost constraint is imposed on each prior induced by previous information and
decision choice. Equation (C.1) . only requires the average cost conditional on not having
stopped yet being bounded by c:
IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq ď c
ùñ E“IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětqˇˇT ě t‰ ď Erc|T ě ts “ c
Therefore, any feasible strategy for Equation (2.1) . is feasible for Equation (C.1) . So
Equation (C.1). is a more relaxed problem than Equation (2.1) .
Step 2. Value from solving Equation (C.1) . is no larger than value from solving Equa-.
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tion (2.2). @ pSt, T q satisfying constraints in Equation (C.1)., define:
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
It “ IpSt´1;X |T ě tq
pt “ PpT “ t|T ě tq
Pt “ PpT ď tq
Want to show that pIt, ptq is feasible and implements same utility in Equation (2.2). as














Second, consider feasibility constraint:
c ěE“IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětqˇˇT ě t‰
“PpT “ t|T ě tqErIpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq|T “ ts
`PpT ą t|T ě tqErIpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq|T ą tqs
“ptpIpSt, 1T ět;X |T “ tq ´ IpSt´1, 1T ět;X |T “ tqq
`p1´ ptqpIpSt, 1T ět;X |T ą tq ´ IpSt´1, 1T ět;X |T ą tqq
“pt IpSt;X |T “ tq ` p1´ ptqIpSt;X |T ą tq
´ppt IpSt´1, 1T ět;X |T “ tq ` p1´ ptqIpSt´1, 1T ět;X |T ą tqq
ěpt IpA;X q ` p1´ ptqIt`1 ´ IpSt´1, 1T ět;X |T ě tq
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“pt I¯ ` p1´ ptqIt`1 ´ It
First inequality is feasibility constraint. Fist equality is law of iterated expectation. Second
equality is chain rule from posterior separability. Third equality is rewriting terms. Notic-
ing that condition on T “ t` 1, 1T ďt is degenerate. Second inequality is from information
processing inequality and applying chain rule again. Last equality is by definition. It is
easy to verify by law of total probability that:
Pt “PpT ď tq “ PpT “ tq ` PpT ď t´ 1q
“PpT ě tqPpT “ t|T ě tq ` PpT ď t´ 1q
“p1´ Pt´1qpt ` Pt´1
Then we verify initial conditions:
$’’&’’%
I1 “ IpS0;X |T ě 1q “ 0
P0 “ PpT ď 0q “ 0

C.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1.




. We show that the statement in Theorem 2.1 . is
correct with the assumed ρt. Since ρt “ 0 when t ě T, Equation (2.2) . is finite horizon. So












p I¯ ´ Iτqpτ ` pIτ`1 ´ Iτqp1´ pτq ď c
Pτ “ Pτ´1 ` p1´ Pτ´1qpτ
Pt´1 “ 0, It “ I





pV˚ ` p1´ pqVt`1pI1q (C.2)
s.t. p I¯ ´ Iqp` pI1 ´ Iqp1´ pq ď c

































solves Equation (C.2) . This is clearly true for t “ T ´ 1. Since when t “ T ´ 1, Vt`1 ” 0
so there is no utility gain from accumulating I. Now we prove the conjecture by back-
ward induction on t. Suppose the conjecture is true for t. Consider solving Vt´1 from
Equation (C.2).
• Case 1: I¯ ď c` I. Then choosing p “ 1 gives utility T´τT V˚ immediately, thus optimal
and VtpIq “ T´tT V˚ “ rVtpIq.





c` I ´ I1
I¯ ´ I1 V
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When I1 ď I¯ ´ c, the objective function is:
T ´ t
T
c` I ´ I1
I¯ ´ I1 V
˚ ` I¯ ´ I ´ c
I¯ ´ I1
T ´ t´ 1
T
V˚
ùñ FOC : ´ 1
T
I¯ ´ I ´ c
p I¯ ´ I1q2 V
˚ ď 0
When I1 ą I¯ ´ c, the objective function is:
T´ t
T
c` I ´ I1
I¯ ´ I1 V



























¯T´t´1 I¯ ´ I ´ c
Tp I¯ ´ I1q2V
˚ ă 0
To sum up, decreasing I1 is always utility improving. So optimal I1 “ 0 and optimal
















































Therefore, rVtpIq solves Equation (C.2). So with ρt defined by max␣0, T´tT (, Equation (2.2).
is solved by strategy It ” 0 (i.e. pt “ cI¯ ) and optimal utility is rV1p0q.
Now, consider a general convex ρt. We want to show that pt “ cI¯ is still optimal
strategy for Equation (2.2) . By definition limtÑ8
ř
τět ρτ “ 0, so @ε there exists T s.tř
těT ρt ă ε. Pick T to be an even number. Now define ρtτ recursively:
• ρTτ “ maxtρT ` pτ ´ TqpρT ´ ρT´1q, 0u. Define pρTτ “ ρτ ´ ρTτ when τ ď T and pρTτ “ 0
otherwise. It is not hard to verify that pρTτ is convex in τ and pρTτ “ 0 @τ ě T ´ 1.
• ρT´2τ “ max
␣pρTT´2 ` pτ ´ T ` 2qppρTT´2 ´ pρTT´3q, 0(. Define pρT´2τ “ pρTτ ´ ρT´2τ . It is not
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hard to verify that pρT´2τ is convex in τ and pρT´2τ “ 0 @τ ě T ´ 3.
• ¨ ¨ ¨
• ρT´2kτ “ max
!pρT´2k`2T´2k ` pτ ´ T ` 2kq´pρT´2k`2T´2k ´ pρT´2k`2T´2k´1¯, 0). Define pρT´2kτ “ pρT´2k`2τ ´
ρT´2kτ .































ρtp1´ Pt´1qptV˚ ` εV˚
First inequality is from
ř
těT ρt ă ε. Second inequality is from optimality of pt in last part.
Last inequality is from
ř
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C.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof. First of all, redefine rSt s.t.
rSt “
$’’&’’%
St conditional on T ě t
s0 conditional on T ă t
where equality is defined as signal distribution conditional on X and T being identical.
It is not hard to verify that rSt, T still satisfies constraints in Equation (2.1).:
• If T ă t, Ip rSt;X | rSt´1, 1T ětq “ 0 since rSt is degenerate. If T ě t, then T ě t´ 1 so
Ip rSt;X | rSt´1, 1T ětq “ IpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětq ď c.
• Conditional on T “ t, rSt “ St so X Ñ rSt Ñ A.
• If rSt “ s0, then T ă t for sure, so 1T ět is independent to X . If rSt ‰ s0, then T ě t
for sure, so 1T ět is independent to X .
So replacing S with rS we still get a feasible strategy and induced decision time distribu-
tion T is unchanged. From now on, we assume WLOG that St ” s0 when T ă t. I only







































ErIpSt;X |St´1, 1T ětqs “ 1c
8ÿ
t“1







tÑ8 IpSt;X q ` limτÑ8
8ÿ
t“τ















PpT “ tqIpA;X q
“ IpA;X q
c
Third line is from flow informativeness constraint. Forth line is from St
ˇˇ
T ăt ” s0. Fifth
and sixth line is from chain rule of posterior separable information measure. Seventh line
is from information process inequality and law of interated expectation. Second last line
is from information processing constraint. 
C.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2.3.
Proof. Take any strategy pµt, T q feasible in Equation (2.6). Define
$’&’%




ˇˇT ą t‰ (C.4)
Now we prove that Equation (C.4) . is a feasible strategy in Equation (2.7) . and implements
same value. First, since H is concave, then It ě 0. Since µ0 “ µ, I0 “ 0. Since µt|T “t “ pi
and µ0 “ µ, then P0 “ 0. Now we verify 9It ď c´ ptp I¯ ´ Itq
ErHpµt`dtq|T ą ts “´ Hpµq ´ ErHpµt`dtq|T ą t` dtsPpT ą t` dt|T ą tq
´ErHpµt`dtq|T P pt, t` dtssPpT P pt` dts|T ą tq
ùñ It`dt “Hpµq ´ 1´ Pt1´ Pt`dt
ˆ
ErHpµt`dtq|T ą ts ´ Pt`dt ´ Pt1´ Pt ErHpµt`dtq|T P pt, t` dtss
˙
ùñ It`dt ´ It “ErHpµtq|T ą ts
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ErHpµt`dtq|T ą ts ´ Pt`dt ´ Pt1´ Pt ErHpµt`dtq|T P pt, t` dtss
˙
“1´ Pt`dt











ùñ dIt “Er´dHpµtq|T ą ts ´ dPt1´ Pt pEpirHpµq ´ Hpνqs ´ Itq
ùñ 9It ďc´
9Pt
1´ Pt p I¯ ´ Itq
First equality is law of iterated expectation. Second, third and forth equalities are rear-
ranging terms. Fifth equality is from taking dt Ñ 0. Inequality is from ErdHpµtq|µts ď
ddt.








To sum up, for any feasible strategy in Equation (2.6)., there exists an feasible strategy in
Equation (2.7). attaining same value. So the statement in Lemma 2.3 . is true. 
C.1.5 proof of Theorem 2.3.




´ cI¯ t c
I¯dt. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that V ď
ş8
0 ρte
´ cI¯ t c
I¯dt. Pick any
pt satisfying constraints in Equation (2.7) . Now since pt and ρt are integrable, @ε ą 0,






























































Now consider the following sequence:
$’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’%
pρk “ ρk¨dt




p I¯ ´ pIkqpk ` ppIk`1 ´ pIkqp1´ pkq ď pcpPk “ pPk´1 ` p1´ pPk´1qpk
• Solve ODE defining Pt, we get Pt “ 1´ e´
şt
0 pτdτ. Apply this to calculate pPk ´ pPk´1 “
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τ psdspc´ I¯ pτqdτ







































τ psdspc´ I¯ pτqdτ















































Bt1 “0&Hpt, tq “ 0
ùñ Hpt, t1q ”0
Therefore, to sum up:
∆pIkp1´ pkq ` pkp I¯ ´ pIkq ď pc
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C.1. Omitted proofs
We have checked that pk, pPk, pIk is feasible in problem Equation (2.2) . with parameter pρk andpc. Then by Theorem 2.1 .:
rT{dtsÿ
k“1
pρk´1´ pPk´1¯pk ď 8ÿ
k“1
























Since logp1´ xq ď ´x,
´
1´ cdtI¯







´ cI¯ kdt c
I¯
dt` 2ε
On the other hand, since ρte´
c
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C.1.6 Proof of Lemma 2.4.
Proof. Similar to discussion in proof of Lemma 2.2., I only prove for ErT s ă 8. Let:
$’&’%
Pt “ PpT ď tq
It “ ErHpµq ´ Hpµtq|T ą ts
Then be proof of Lemma 2.3 .:






































Inequality is flow informativeness constraint. Second equality is by Equation (C.5). Forth
equality is by intergral by part. 
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D.1 Proof in Section 1.3.
D.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. (Necessity) First suppose I˚pS ;X |µq satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then choose I˚ it-






















S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ěI˚pS ;X |µq
First inequality is from sub-additivity. Second inequality is from monotonicity. On the







S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
“ I˚pS ;X |µq






S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
ď I˚pS ;X |µq







S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff
“ I˚pS ;X |µq
(Sufficiency) On the other hand, suppose given IpS ;X |µq,














D.1. Proof in Section 1.3 .
Then
0. Uninformative signal: First it’s not hard to observe that acquiring no informaiton
is sufficient for an uninformative signal S . Therefore if choose N “ 0 we have,
0 ě I˚pS ;X |µq. Then:
I˚pS ;X |µq “ 0
1. Monotonicity: @`S i˘ s.t. X Ñ `S1, . . . ,SN˘ Ñ S . Since X Ñ S Ñ T , we have




















S i;X |S1, . . . ,S i´1
¯ff










T 1, . . . , T N
¯
Ñ T










S1, . . . ,SN
¯
Ñ S
ùñ I˚pT ;X |µq ď I˚pS ;X |µq
First inequality comes from that factor that
`S i˘ serves as one feasible group of`T i˘ in the minimization. Second inequality comes from taking inf on RHS. Final
inequality comes from definition of I˚.
2. Sub-additivity: Suppose S “ pS1,S2q. @
´









S12 , . . . ,SN22
¯
conditinal on S1 s.t. @ realization of S1, X Ñ
´








S11 , . . . ,SN11 ,S12 , . . . ,SN22
¯
Ñ pS1,S2q Ñ S
ùñ I˚pS ;X |µq ď E
«N1ÿ
i“1





IpS i2;X |S1,S12 , . . . ,S i´12 q
ff
ùñ I˚pS ;X |µq ď inf E
«N1ÿ
i“1





IpS i2;X |S1,S12 , . . . ,S i´12 q
ff
ùñ I˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚pS1;X |µq ` ErI˚pS2;X |S1, µqs
3. C-linearity: @S , consider S1 “ pt0, 1u,λ, 1´ λq being an uninformative binary signal.
S2 “ S when S1 “ 0 and constant when S1 “ 1. Therefore `S1,S2˘ “ Sλ. By sub-
additivity:
I˚pSλ;X |µq ď λI˚pS ;X |µq
On the other hand, consider S1 conditional on Sλ. If Sλ induces ν ‰ µ, then S1 is
uninformative. Otherwise S1 “ S . Then `Sλ,S1˘ “ S , by sub-additivity:
I˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚pSλ;X |µq ` p1´ λqI˚pS ;X |µq
ùñ λI˚pS ;X |µq ď I˚pSλ;X |µq
To sum up, λI˚pS ;X |µq “ I˚pSλ;X |µq.

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D.2 Proof in Section 3.3.
D.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Let Vpµq be expected utility in Equation (P). Then by assumption Vpµq ě 0. Sup-
pose Vpµq “ 0, then Theorem 3.1. is straight forward. Vpµq is achieved by choosing doing
nothing and acquiring no information. From now on, we assume Vpµq ą 0. Pick any
ε ă Vpµq, we want to show that there exists A, T s.t.:

























X Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
X Ñ S t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t




s0 when T ď t
At`1 when T “ t` 1
Therefore, At`1,1T ďt and 1T “t`1 are all explicitly signal realizations included in S t. We
discuss two cases separately:
Case 1. ErT s ě 1: Consider ST “ `S0,S1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ST˘ as a combined information structure of
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`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ff
“I
´
S0;X ˇˇµ¯` E« 8ÿ
t“1
I
`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ff
“I
´
S0;X ˇˇµ¯` E”I´S1;X ˇˇS0¯ı` E« 8ÿ
t“2
I
`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ff
ěI`S1;X ˇˇµ˘` E« 8ÿ
t“2
I
`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ff







































ProbpT ą tqE“I`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ˇˇT ą t‰ (D.2)
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Since Vpµq ´ ε ą 0, then:
m ¨ ErT s ď max v
ùñ ProbpT ą Tq ¨ T ¨m ď max v
ùñ ProbpT ą Tq ď max v
mT





¯ˇˇT ď tı ě E”u´AT ,X¯ı´ ProbpT ą Tq ¨max v





¯ˇˇT ď tı ě E”u´AT ,X¯ı´ max v2
mT
Choose T ` 1 ą mεmax v2 . Now combine Equations (D.1) . and (D.2)., and
ř8
t“0 ProbpT ą tq “
ErT s, then we have:
I
´
ST;X ˇˇµ¯ ď 8ÿ
t“0

























`S t;X ˇˇS t´1˘ˇˇT ą t‰˘








ProbpT ą tqE“ f pIpS t;X |S t´1, 1T ątqq‰








f pIpS t;X |S t´1, 1T ďtqq
ff
Consider AT`1 “ `A0,A2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,AT`1˘ as a random variable which summarizes realiza-
tions of all At. Since At`1 are directly included in S t, we have X Ñ ST Ñ AT`1. There-
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f pIpS t;X |S t´1qq
ff
That’s to say, if we can implementAT`1 with expectedwaiting time ErT s and information





, then utility level will be weakly higher than V. We define the
new strategy as follows:
1. In each period, acquire a combined information structure by mixing AT`1 with
probability 1ErT s and uninformative signal structure with probability 1´ 1ErT s .
2. Following arrival of signal AT`1, choosing the corresponding action.
3. If no informative signal arrive, do nothing and go to next period.
It’s not hard to see that in this strategy, action and signal are identical thus the three
information processing constraint are naturally satisfied. In each period, the probabiltiy




















ErT s ¨ t “ ErT s


















D.2. Proof in Section 3.3 .
Therefore, we find a strategy which is no worse than original strategy than ε2 . Then:














ùñ Vpµq ď sup
A,T





Therefore, we proved Theorem 3.1 . when ErT s ě 1.
Case 2. ErT s ă 1: Since T P N, ErT s ă 1 means PpT “ 0q ą 0. When T “ 0, no
informatin is acquired yet and decision making is based on prior. Therefore:
E
«





IpS t;X |S t´1q˘ff
“ProbpT “ 0qE
”
upA0,X q|T “ 0
ı
` ProbpT ě 1qE
«










` ProbpT ě 1qE
«





IpS t;X |S t´1q˘ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
First equality is from law of iterated expectation. Inequality is from when T “ 0, choice
of A0 is not necessarily optimal. Suppose:
max
a
Eµrupa,X qs ě E
«
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Then strategy pS t,At, T q is dominated by acquiring no information and this already
proves Theorem 3.1. Suppose on the other hand:
max
a
Eµrupa,X qs ă E
«
























IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
Then we define strategy S t1,At1, T1 where: pS t1,At1, T1q “ pS t,At, T


















IpS t;X |S t´1q
¯ˇˇˇˇˇT ě 1
ff
We only need to verify the information processing constraints.
• When T1 ď t: S t1 “ s0
• When T1 “ t` 1: S t1 “ S t “ At`1 “ At`11 .
• T1 “ 0 happen with zero probability.














D.2. Proof in Section 3.3 .
On the other hand the inequality of the other hand is straight foward, any strategy achieve






















I first show that the objective function is quasi-convex. mT is already linear, so it’s suf-




. By transforming argument, it’s not hard to see
that it’s equivalent to show quasi-convexity of f pIqI w.r.t. I. Now consider I1 ă I2 and





ă f pλI1p1´ λqI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2
ùñ λ f pI1q ` p1´ λq f pI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2 ă
f pλI1p1´ λqI2q
λI1 ` p1´ λqI2
contradicting convexity of f pIq. Therefore, mT ` T` IT˘ is quasi-convex in T. Since f is
convex, it always has one-side derivatives well defined. So an necessary condition for T

























λ“ ITðùñ m` f pλq ´ λ f 1` pλq ď 0 ď m` f pλq ´ λ f 1´ pλq
ðñ m` f pλq
λ
P B f pλq
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What’s more, since f is convex, the correspondence f pλq ´ λ f 1pλq is increasing (in set
order). Therefore, the set of λ such that m` f pλqλ P B f pλq must be an connected interval.
Therefore, m` f pλqλ P B f pλq is actually also sufficient for minimizing mT ` T f p IT q.
Case 1.: tλ|m` f pλq P λB f pλqu ‰ H: Since f is convex, B f is a continuous correspondence,
therefore the set is closed. Pick the smallest λ:






























ðñ IpA;X |µq ě λ
Theorem 3.1. is proved.
Case 2.: m` f pλq ´ λB f pλq ą 0 @λ. That is to say:





is strictly increasing in T @I. Therefore, independent of choice I, choosing smaller T will
yield higher utility. T will eventually be smaller than 1. So we can rule out this case.
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Case 3.: m` f pλq ´ λB f pλq ă 0 @λ. That is to say:





is strictly decreasing in T @I. However this is not possible since:
lim






To sum up, if tλ|m` f pλq P λB f pλqu “ H, then we define λ “ 8. Then the constraint for
second term in Equation (D.3) . can never be satisfied and Vpµq “ supa Erupa,X qs. 
Lemma D.1 (Reduction of redundency).
`S t, T ,AT ˘ solves Equation (P). if and only if there
exists






PrT “ ts`E“upAt,X q|T “ t‰´m ¨ t˘ (D.4)





´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ˇˇT ą tı˙
s.t. rS t “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1
S t when T ą t` 1
What’s more, the optimal utility level is same in Equation (P). and Equation (D.4).
Proof. Suppose
`S t, T ,At˘ is a feasible strategy to Equation (P). Let first show that it’s
WLOG that the DM can discard all information after taking an action: take given T and
331
Appendix D. Appendix for Chapter 3.
At, take s0 as a given degenerate signal, define pS t as:
pS t “
$’’&’’%
S t when T ě t` 1
s0 when T ď t
By definition, pS t “ S t conditional on T ě t` 1. Therefore:
I
´ pS t;X | pS t´1, 1T ďt¯ “
$’’&’’%
I
`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘ when T ď t
0 when T ě t` 1
X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on T “ t
To show that the first information processing constraint is satisfied, we discuss the casepS “ s0 and pS ‰ s0 separately:
• When pS t´1 “ s0, T ď t´ 1. Therefore:
Prob
´
T ą tˇˇ pS t´1 “ s0,X¯ “ 0
Prob
´
T ď tˇˇ pS t´1 “ s0,X¯ “ 1
which is independent of realization of X .
• When pS t´1 ‰ s0, T ě t. Then by law of total probability:
Prob
´
T ą tˇˇS t´1¯
“Prob
´
T ą tˇˇS t´1,X¯
“Prob
´
T ą tˇˇS t´1,X , T ě t¯ProbpT ě t|S t´1,X q
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` Prob
´
T ą tˇˇS t´1,X , T ă t¯ProbpT ă t|S t´1,X q
“Prob
´
T ą tˇˇS t´1,X , T ě t¯ProbpT ě t|S t´1,X q
ùñ Prob
´




T ą t| pS t´1¯
Prob
´
T ě t| pS t´1,X¯
“Prob
´
T ą t| pS t´1¯
which is independent of realization of X .
Therefore, we proved that:
X Ñ pS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt
Therefore































`S t;X |S t´1, 1T ďt˘˘
ff
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Therefore,
´ pS t,At, T ¯ is a feasible strategy dominating `S t,At, T ˘. Now we define rS t:
rS t “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
s0 when T ă t` 1
At`1 when T “ t` 1
pS t when T ą t` 1
Initial information rS´1 is defined as a degenerate(uninformative) signal and induced be-
lief is the prior. Verify the properties of rS t:
1. When rS t´1 P ts0u Y A, it’s for sure that T ď t. Otherwise, T ą t. Therefore 1T ďt is a
direct garbling of rS t´1. So we must have X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ 1T ďt.
2. When T “ t, At “ rS t´1. Therefore X Ñ rS t´1 Ñ At conditional on T “ t.
3. Information measure associated with
´ rS t,At, T ¯when T ą t:
I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1 I
´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“1T “t`1 I
´
At`1;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1 I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
ď1T “t`1 I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T “ t` 1¯
` 1T ąt`1 I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą t` 1¯
“I
´ pS t;X ˇˇ pS t´1, T ą 1¯
First inequality is simply rewriting two possible cases of T . Second equality is from def-
inition of rS t when T ą t ` 1. First inequality is from X Ñ pS t Ñ At`1 conditional on
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T “ t ` 1. Therefore,
´ rS t, T ,At¯ dominates the original solution in Equation (P). by
achieving same action profile but lower costs.
´ rS t, T ,At¯ is a feasible solution to Equa-
tion (D.4). Therefore solving Equation (D.4). yields a weakly higher utility than Equa-
tion (P). What remains to be proved is that any
´ rS t, T ,At¯ feasible in Equation (D.4) .
can be dominated by some strategy feasible in Equation (P). It’s not hard to see that it’s
feasible in Equation (P). Finally we show that the two formulation gives same utility:
E
«

















PrT “ ts`E“upAt,X q|T “ t‰´m ¨ t˘PrT ą tsE” f´I´ rS t;X ˇˇ rS t´1¯¯ˇˇˇT ą tı¯
Therefore, Equation (P). is equivalent to Equation (D.4) . 
D.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.











Case 1. λ˚ ă 8. By definition of λ˚, we know that
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Then m` f pλ
˚q
λ˚ I ď gpIq ď m` f pIq and gpIq is a convex function on r0,8q.Equation (D.5) .
can be rewritten as:
Vpµq “ sup
A
ErupA,X qs ´ gpIpA;X |µqq (D.6)
Therefore by definition:
V2pµq ď Vpµq ď V1pµq
Now it is sufficient to show that if supAPA IpA;X |µq ě λ˚ then Vpµq ě V1pµq, other-
wise Vpµq ď V2pµq. First of all, suppose supAPA IpA;X |µq ě λ˚, then by definition of
















ě V1pµq ´ 1
i














IpAii;X |µq Ñ λ˚



































ùñ V2pµq “ Vpµq
Now suppose supAPA IpA;X |µq ă λ˚. Assume by contradiction that Vpµq ą V2pµq. Then
I first claim that @Ai solving Equation (D.6) ., lim sup IpAi;X |µq ď λ˚. If this claim is true,
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then there is immediately a contradiction:
$’&’%
lim IpAi;X |µq “ λ˚







ùñ lim ErupAi,X qs ´ gpλ˚q “ Vpµq




“ Vpµq ą V2pµq
Suppose the claim is not true, then Vpµq ă V1pµq and there exists:
$’&’%
lim IpAi1;X |µq “ λ1 ą λ˚







lim IpAi2;X |µq “ λ2 ă λ˚







@α P r0, 1s consider compound experiment: S0 is an unrelated random draw with out-
come 1 with probability 1 ´ α and 2 with α. Conditional on 1, do experiment Ai1 and
follow recommendation. Otherwise do Ai2 and follow recommendation. Call this infor-
mation structure Aiα. Then Assumption 3.1 . implies:
IpAiα;X |µq ď p1´ αqIpAi1;X |µq ` αIpAi2;X |µq
Since l1 ą λ˚ ą λ2, WLOG we can assume IpAij;X |µq is bounded within λ1,λ2 by ε
and 2ε ă λ1 ´ λ˚. Now consider the utlity of strategy Aiα in Equation (D.6) . Suppose





















ěVpµq ` `gpλ1 ´ εq ´ gpλ˚q˘´ 1
i














ě Vpµq ´ 1
i
` δ
Suppose there exists αi s.t. IpAi
αi

























ěVpµq ` αpV1pµq ´Vpµqq ´ 1
i












` m` f pλ
˚q
λ˚









λ1 ´ αpλ1 ´ λ2q ´ ε´ λ˚˘*















Contradicting optimality of Vpµq. To sum up, I show that when supAPA IpA;X |µq ă λ˚,
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IpA;X |µq ě λ˚
V2pµq if sup
APA
IpA;X |µq ă λ˚
Case 2. λ˚ “ `8. By definition of λ˚,
´
m
λ ` f pλqλ
¯
is strictly decreasing in λ. @A,λ being
feasible in Equation (D.5)., it can be improved by replacing λ with IpA;X |µq (feasibility is




ErupA,X qs ´m´ f pIpA;X |µqq
which is exactly Equation (3.3). 
D.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Proof. Existence: Equations (3.2) . and (3.3). can be solved prior by prior. Therefore, I some-
times don’t explicitly include prior any more in this proof. It’s not hard to see that it’s
sufficient to prove existence of solution to:
sup
A
ErupA,X q ´ f pIpA;X |µqqs (D.7)
where A P ∆A ˆ X and f is convex. Equation (D.7) . can be modified to accommodate
Equation (3.2). by setting f to be a linear function. This can be WLOG directly modeled
by changing the information measure I. Equation (D.7) . is different from Equation (3.3) . by
only a constant. Therefore, it is sufficient to show existence of solution to Equation (D.7) .
under Assumption 3.1 .
Next let’s explicitly model the set of all feasible A’s as Markovian transition matrices:
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∆Aˆ X P Rp|A|´1qˆ|X|. Let’s call this set Λ and any conditional distribution ppa|xq P Λ.
We define rI : ΛÑ R`:
rIppp¨|¨qq “ Ipγq




pipµsq “ řy pps|yqµpyq





ppa|xqµpxqupa, xq ´ f
´rIppq¯
To prove Proposition 3.5 ., it is sufficient to show the convexity of rI. If rI is convex, the
objective function is continuous in p on the interior of Λ and any space Λε is compact (a
closed and bounded set in Euclidean space). Now let’s study the convexity of rI. Consider
@ p1, p2 P Λ. Let p “ λp1 ` p1´ λqp2. It’s not hard to verify that p P Λ as well. Want to
show:
rIppq ď λrIpp1q ` p1´ λqrIpp2q
Now define p1 on A ˆ t1, 2u “ ta1, a2, . . .u with twice number of signals than A. Let
λ1 “ λ,λ2 “ 1´ λ, @a, x
p1pai|xq “ λipipa|xq
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Then p1 will be Blackwell more informative than p:
»———————–
1 1 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0 0
0 0 1 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 1 1
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
¨ p1 “ p (D.8)
On the other hand, p1 can be written as combination of p1 and p2. Let S0 be randomly
t1, 2u with probability λ1,λ2. Let pS1|1, µq „ p1 and pS1|2, µq „ p2. Then it’s easy to see
that pS0,S1, µq „ p1. Therefore:
rIppq ďrIpp1q
“IpS0,S1;X |µq
ďIpS0;X |µq ` λ1 IpS1|1;X |µq ` λ2 IpS1|2;X |µq
“λrIpp1q ` p1´ λqrIpp2q
First inequality is from monotonicity, second inequality is from sub-additivity. ThereforerI is a convex (and continuous) function. It’s easy to see that Λ is a compact set. So we can
apply Weierstrass theorem to conclude existence of solution.
Now suppose p1,p2 are two distinct maximizer. Consider p “ αp1 ` p1 ´ αqp2. By
convexity of rI and f :
Eµrupa, xqppa, xqs “αEµrupa, xqp1pa, xqs ` p1´ αqEµrupa, xqp2pa, xqs
f
´rIppq¯ ďα f´rIpp1q¯` p1´ αq f´rIpp2q¯
Therefore p weakly dominates p1 and p2 and p PA. A is convex.
Uniqueness: Now suppose I also satisfies strict-monotonicity. Then consider proof
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in last section. First, let p1 ‰ p2. Suppose equality rIppq “ rIpp1q holds, then strict-
monotonicity implies that p is Blackwell sufficient for p1:
M ¨ p “ p1
WhereM is a stochastic matrix. Consider the following operation: If p11 „ p12, then proof is
done. Otherwise, first remove replication of p1 (when two rows of p1 are mutiplications of
each other, then add them up) and get rp1. Since p11  p12, we can assume rp11 “ p11, rp12 “ p12.
Define p1 “ p11 ` p12 and pi “ rp1i`1. By definition rp1 Blackwell dominates p. On the other
hand, p Blackwell dominates p, so dominates p1, and rp1. By Lemma D.2., rp1 and p are
identical up to permutation. Then p11 must equal to some pi.
• Case 1. If i “ 1, then p11 ` p12 is a multiplication of rp111 , which is a multiplication ofrp11. This means p11 and p12 are replication, contradiction.
• Case 2. If i ą 1, then rp11 is a multiplication of pi, which is a multiplication of rp1i`1.
Contradicting definition of rp1.
Therefore, p11 and p12 are replications. Now permute p1 and apply the same analysis on all
p12i´1, p12i. We can conclude that any row of p1 is a replication of that of p2. To sum up, a
necessary condition for rIppq “ αrIpp1q ` p1´ αqrIpp2q is that each row in p1 and p2 induces
same posterior belief ν.
Now consider A being set of solutions to Equation (3.1) . Suppose by contradiction
there exists A1 and A1 and a such that they induces different posterior with realization
a. Let p1, p2 be corresponding stochastic matrices, consider any A „ αp1 ` p1´ αqp2. By
previous proof, IpA;X |µq ă αrIpp1q` p1´ αqrIpp2q. In first part, we show thatA is convex,
so A is feasible. This contradicts unimprovability.
To sum up, solutions to Equation (D.7) . always have the same support. Of course if A
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is uninformative, then it induces prior µ. In both case, support of posteriors is uniquely
determined.

Lemma D.2 (Blackwell equivalence). Let P and P1 be two stochastic matrices. P has no repli-
cation of rows. Suppose there exists stachatic matrices MPP1 and MP1P s.t.:
P1 “ MP1P ¨ P
P “ MPP1 ¨ P1
Then MPP1 and MP1P are permutation matrices.
Proof. Let Pi “ ppi1, pi2, . . .q be ith row of P. Suppose Pi can not be represented as positive
combination of P´i’s. Then by construction Pi “ MPP1i ¨MP1P ¨ P, we have:
MPP1i ¨MP1P “ p0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0looomooon
i´1
, 1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0q
Then by non-negativity of stochastic matrices, suppose MPP1ij ą 0, then MP1Pj are all 0
except MP1Pji. Then for all such rows j, we have MPP1 j be a vector with only ith column
being non-zero. However this suggests they are replicated rows. So the only possibility
is that j s.t. MPP1ij ą 0 is unique. And
MPP1ij ˆMP1Pji “ 1
Since stochastic matrices have elements no larger than 1, it must be MPP1ij “ MP1Pji “ 1.
This is equivalently saying P1j “ Pi. Since permutation of rows of P1 doesn’t affect our
statement, let’s assume P1i “ Pi afterwards for simplicity.
So far we showed that if Pi is not a positive combinations of P´i’s, then P1i “ Pi. We do
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the folloing transformation: rP, rP1 are P, P1 removing ith row. ĂMPP1 ,ĂMP1P are MPP1 ,MP1P
removing ith row and column. It’s easy to verify that we still have:
rP1 “ ĂMP1P ¨ rPrP “ ĂMPP1 ¨ rP1
and ĂMPP1 ,ĂMP1P still being stochastic matrices since previous argument shows MPP1ii and
MP1Pii being the only non-zero element in their rows. Since they are both 1, they must also
be only non-zero element in their columns. So removing them doesn’t affect the matrices
being stochatic matrices.
Now we can repeat this process iteratively until any row rPi will be a positive combi-
nation of rP´i. If rP has one unique row, then the proof is done. We essentially showed that
P “ P1 (up to permutation of rows). Therefore we only need to exclude the possibility ofrP having more than one rows.








“a21 rP1 ` nÿ
ią2
a2i rPi





Since all rows in rP are non-negative (and strictly positive in some elements). This is
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possible only in two cases:





˘ “ 0. This implies rP1 “ a12 rP2. Contradicting
non-replication.
• Case 2. a21a12 ă 1. Then rP2 is a positive combination of rPią2. Of course rP1 is also a
positive combination of rPią2.
Now by induction suppose rP1, . . . , rPi are positive combinations of rPjąi. Then:
rPi`1 “ iÿ
j“1



























k ` ai`1j ‚˛rPj
Similar to previous analysis, non-replication implies
ři
j“1 ai`1j ă 1 and rPi`1 is a positive
combination of rPjąi`1. Then by replacing rPi`1 in combination of all rPjďi, we can conclude
that rP1, . . . , rPi`1 are all positive combinations of rPjąi`1. Finally, by induction we have allrPiăn being positive combination of rPn. However, this contradicts non-replication. To sum
up, we proved by contradiction that rP has one unique row. Therefore, Pmust be identical
to P1 up to permutations. 
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